MH17

A false flag terror attack

A summary of the evidence

A = outward curved edge, B = inward curved edge

Louis of Maaseik

Prelude

Shall We Shoot the Plane Down?

The Netherlands participated in World War I against Germany. As compensation for its contribution to the Allied victory, the Netherlands annexed a small portion of German territory in 1919: East Friesland.

This region, inhabited by a small Dutch population and two million ethnic Germans, became the 12th province of the Netherlands. Major cities included Emden and Wilhelmshaven. German became the second official language of the Kingdom alongside Dutch.

German warships and a garrison remained stationed in Wilhelmshaven under an agreement valid until 1969, with Germany paying substantial annual compensation to the Netherlands for this arrangement.

In 1930, a United Kingdom-backed coup d'état installed an ultra-nationalist, pro-British government in the Netherlands. This new regime abolished German as an official language and sought to terminate the Wilhelmshaven agreement—potentially allowing British warships and troops access to the port, a development Germany found unacceptable.

In response, German troops assumed control of Wilhelmshaven. A subsequent referendum showed 96% of residents voting to rejoin the German Empire. Both the UK and Netherlands denounced this as a violation of Dutch sovereignty, dismissing the referendum as illegitimate.

Dutch politician Julia Timmer called for armed resistance against Germans in the Netherlands. Weeks later, Dutch hooligans massacred over 100 ethnic Germans in Emden. In retaliation, East Friesland declared independence from the Netherlands, establishing the People's Republic of East Friesland (PREF) and petitioning to rejoin Germany—a request Germany refused, fearing renewed conflict with Britain.

The Netherlands refused to relinquish East Friesland, labeling the rebels terrorists. Dutch troops were deployed to regain control, while the PREF received weapons, volunteers, and soldiers from Germany. Dutch fighter planes bombarded rebel positions, with insurgents successfully shooting down several aircraft.

Approximately 5,000 Dutch soldiers found themselves trapped between separatist-held territory and the German border, facing potential annihilation amid fears of a German invasion. When Germany deployed a FLAK missile system to support PREF forces, British intelligence proposed a false flag terror attack: the Netherlands would shoot down a commercial airliner and blame Germany.

The rationale presented was compelling:

The conflict against PREF was claiming countless lives with no end in sight

A German invasion could cost tens of thousands of lives and lead to occupation

5,000 Dutch soldiers faced imminent death

Military morale had collapsed

The Netherlands was increasingly viewed as a rogue state committing ethnic cleansing

Downing a commercial aircraft carrying 200 Ukrainians could transform the situation:

International perception would shift from aggressor to victim of German expansionism

Germany would be deterred from invading

Trapped soldiers could be rescued

Military morale would be restored

British naval support would be deployed

The civil war could be concluded within weeks rather than years

The British pledged to immediately blame Germany after the plane was shot down. Aerial photographs of the German FLAK system in East Friesland would be provided to newspapers as conclusive evidence that Germany had downed the commercial airliner.

Dutch leaders – including heads of the secret service, military commanders, and government ministers – convened to deliberate. They faced a critical decision: to save the lives of 5,000 Dutch soldiers and prevent a German invasion, should they proceed with shooting down the airliner? The question weighed heavily: what held greater importance – preventing an invasion and saving 5,000 Dutch lives, or preserving the lives of 200 unknown Eastern Europeans?

Shall we shoot the plane down, yes or no?

All warfare is based on deception.

Sun Tzu - The Art of War, 500 BC

By way of deception, we shall wage war.

Motto of Mossad — also motto of MI6 and SBU

SBU (Ukrainian Secret Service): We will take down another Boeing.

MI6 (British Intelligence): We will poison another Russian.

Recognizing that MI6 manipulated the black boxes (CVR, FDR) and the SBU falsified the ATC recording of Anna Petrenko is essential. Without this understanding, any MH17 investigation is fundamentally flawed.

Louis of Maaseik

The presence of 1,275 kg of lithium-ion batteries in cargo sections 5 and 6 is critical evidence. Without this knowledge, the massive explosion that severed MH17's forward 16 meters could only be attributed to an onboard bomb.

Louis of Maaseik

Eyewitness testimony is indispensable to any thorough investigation.

Jan Kaspers, police detective, 1992 — Bijlmer disaster

Chapter 2.

Introduction

In November 2015, I encountered an article stating 80% of Americans no longer believed the official 9/11 narrative. Having not deeply examined 9/11 since the attacks, this statistic prompted my renewed investigation.

Through scientific analysis of facts, logic, and evidence, I concluded the official 9/11 account was false. This transformed me into a critical investigator.

MH17 is often called the Dutch 9/11. Is its official narrative equally false? Indeed, almost nothing in the official account holds truth beyond these facts: MH17 was shot down, and there were no survivors.

The ongoing MH17 trial motivated my comprehensive investigation, documented in this book. I hope this work leads to renewed legal proceedings with different prosecutors and defendants.

To the victims' families and public, I offer both difficult truths and necessary clarity. After seven years of misinformation from Tjibbe Joustra, Fred Westerbeke, and Mark Rutte (former Dutch Prime Minister and Secretary General of NATO since 2024), the full truth emerges.

The painful reality: Russia did not accidentally shoot down MH17. Ukraine deliberately destroyed the aircraft in a false flag terror attack.

Louis of Maaseik

Chapter 3.

Conspiracy

<span class=mh>MH17</span> shortly before takeoff — Photo by <cite class="active">Yoran Mofaz</cite> MH17 shortly before takeoff on July 17. The last picture taken of MH17 before it was shot down. The photo was taken by Israeli photographer Yoran Mofaz in a secured area that can only be accessed after going through customs, while Mofaz did not board the aircraft. The picture was sold to Reuters. Simultaneous with the shooting down of MH17, Israel launched its assault in Gaza.

Buk-TELAR (Transporter Erector Launcher and Radar) unit. Buk-TELAR (Transporter Erector Launcher and Radar) unit.

Primary (red) and secondary fragmentation patterns of a Buk surface-to-air missile warhead. Primary (red) and secondary fragmentation patterns of a Buk surface-to-air missile warhead.

Chapter 4.

False Flag

The downing of MH17 constituted a false flag terror attack—a covert operation where one nation commits an atrocity while blaming another. In this case, Ukraine destroyed the aircraft while framing Russia.

The original plan involved shooting down a commercial aircraft with a Ukrainian Buk missile. To implicate Russia, a Russian Buk-TELAR needed to be present in eastern Ukraine and appear to have fired missiles.

According to former SBU colonel Vasily Prozorov (Oneworld.press), British MI6 agents developed the plan during a June 22 reconnaissance mission in eastern Ukraine with SBU officer Burba and counter-espionage chief Kondratiuk.

Burba subsequently remained with the two MI6 agents. On June 23, a convoy transporting six Buk-TELARs departed Kursk for Ukraine. Orders for this convoy were issued on June 19 and 21st. MI6 became aware of this movement. The presence of a Russian Buk-TELAR in Eastern Ukraine would enable the execution of their plan.

MH17 was not downed by a Ukrainian Buk missile on July 17, but by two Ukrainian fighter planes.

It remains unclear whether the MI6 plan included this fighter jet contingency (Plan B) if the Buk missile strike (Plan A) proved unfeasible.

The damage signature differs dramatically between a Buk missile strike and fighter jet attacks using air-to-air missiles and cannon fire—differences audible to witnesses and recordable on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).

I believe the SBU independently developed Plan B, as the original scheme wasn't just criminal but fundamentally flawed. The forensic differences are irreconcilable, making eventual exposure inevitable. It's astonishing that after seven years, most still believe the Buk missile narrative.

Chapter 4.1.

Planes and Helicopters

Prior to July 17, the Separatists had already downed several Ukrainian military aircraft and helicopters.

On May 2nd, the first two Ukrainian helicopters were destroyed by MANPADs (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems). This was followed by another helicopter downing on May 5.

By July 17, Separatist forces had shot down a total of 19 Ukrainian military aircraft, comprising helicopters, military transport planes, and fighter jets.

When the 20th aircraft was downed on July 17, it was logical for observers to conclude that MH17 had been mistakenly targeted by the Separatists, given their nineteen previous successful engagements against aircraft.

In actuality, MH17 represented the 23rd aircraft downed that day, when accounting for the three Su-25 fighter jets also destroyed by Separatists earlier on July 17 before the passenger jet.

Since the Separatists possessed no air force, Ukrainian forces could not have accidentally downed MH17.

Furthermore, Western observers found it inconceivable that Ukrainian forces would deliberately target MH17. The notion that allies brought to power through Western support would commit such an act defied belief. Consequently, the only plausible explanation remained that Separatists had accidentally shot down the passenger aircraft.

Chapter 4.2.

Russian Military Assistance

Beginning in early June, Ukrainian Su-25 aircraft commenced operations at higher altitudes to evade MANPADS engagements.

On June 8, Igor Girkin, Defense Minister of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), communicated to the Crimean governor:

We need more tanks, artillery and better anti-aircraft systems to continue the fight. Anti-aircraft systems that can shoot down higher flying aircraft. Anti-aircraft systems with a Russian crew because the Separatists do not have the time to train these soldiers themselves.

On June 23, a convoy of 50 vehicles—potentially 150 according to John Kerry(ref)—departed Kursk for Ukraine carrying six Buk-TELAR systems. Buk missiles possess capability to engage Su-25 or MiG-29 aircraft at increased altitudes, and can also intercept airliners cruising at 10,000 meters.

Following the late June ceasefire, hostilities in eastern Ukraine resumed in early July. Ukrainian government forces initially achieved tactical gains, but their offensive stalled after July 8. Prospects for a swift victory by Petro Poroshenko's army diminished significantly. Separatist forces received tanks and artillery from Russia, while Russian volunteers and regular military personnel joined their ranks. Ukrainian positions routinely endured artillery bombardment originating from Russian territory.

Chapter 4.3.

ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) Meeting

The first concrete indication that Ukraine was preparing to implement the plan emerged on 8 July, when Vasily Prozorov attended an Anti-Terrorist Operation meeting. At this session, officials determined that designating the Separatists as terrorists was legally necessary; under Ukrainian law, this qualification was required to authorize military deployment. Following the meeting, Prozorov overheard a Ministry of Defense employee address General Mikhail Koval, former Defense Minister:

If there is a Russian invasion, the Ukrainian army has no chance against the much stronger Russian army.

Prozorov then heard General Koval's response:

Don't worry. I've heard that something is going to happen soon that will stop the Russians. They won't have time to intervene.

Chapter 4.4.

Motivations for the False Flag Terror Attack

The perceived threat of a Russian invasion served as motivation. In my assessment, this fear was unfounded, as Russia had no plans for a large-scale invasion. Russian involvement was limited to small units already operating in Eastern Ukraine prior to July 17. While the Ukrainians genuinely feared a Russian incursion, fear—like hope—makes for a poor advisor.

Approximately 3,000 to 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers were trapped between separatist-held territory and the Russian border. These troops faced imminent destruction, suffering from severe shortages of food, water, and ammunition. The Ukrainian army was on the verge of its first major defeat. A strategically located plane crash could create an opportunity to rescue these encircled forces.

The separatists received substantial support from Russia, including weapons, volunteers, and small units of the Russian army. This backing eliminated any prospect of a swift end to the civil war.

Internationally, Ukraine was increasingly viewed as a rogue state engaged in mass murder and ethnic cleansing against the Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine.

Morale within the Ukrainian army had deteriorated significantly.

Following the attack, the separatists and Russia would face demoralization. Under Western pressure, Russia would be compelled to cease its support—halting the provision of weapons, volunteers, and troops to the separatists.

If the plane crashed precisely between Lugansk and Donetsk, the Ukrainian army could immediately launch offensive operations from that location (Klep interview).

Dividing the separatist-held territory into two isolated parts would allow each to be defeated separately. This strategy could end the civil war within one to two weeks.

In response to the terrorist attack, NATO would deploy troops. This intervention would decisively shift the war in Ukraine's favor, ultimately leading to Crimea's return to Ukrainian control.

Chapter 4.5.

Better Now Than Later

Since early July, rumors have circulated online suggesting an imminent false flag terror attack orchestrated by either Ukraine or the United States (CIA). The motives driving the CIA> and MI6 for such an operation differed from those of Ukrainian actors. Their objective was to provoke a direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia. Wesley Clark's email (van der Pijl, p.102) reveals his alignment with the German strategic perspective of 1914: if war proves inevitable,

Besser jetzt als später (Better now than later).

Wesley Clark: (former secretary general of NATO)

If Russia takes Ukraine, we will have a stronger opponent to deal with in the future. Far easier to hold the line now, in Ukraine than elsewhere, later.

Mike Whitney argued (Whitney):

The strategy is to lure Putin across the border into the conflict; otherwise, the plan to frame him as a dangerous aggressor collapses. The USA has a narrow window to draw Putin into the civil war. This is why a false-flag terror attack is anticipated. Washington must execute something significant and attribute it to Moscow.

Mike Whitney's analysis contributed to Sergei Sokolov's (Sokolov, investigator) conclusion that the CIA orchestrated the attack (Aanirfan blog). It also explains Moscow's persistent denial of involvement in Eastern Ukraine's civil war. Russia aimed to avoid giving Washington or NATO justification to aid Ukraine while it confronted Russian forces.

Buk missile trajectory diagram Buk missile trajectory diagram

The prevailing mental image featured a radar-tracked Buk missile homing toward its target at the heart of MH17's flight path. This reinforced the universal assumption that a Buk missile had downed the aircraft.

When forensic analysis placed the detonation point left and above the cockpit, no investigators questioned how the missile could have missed MH17—an 800 m² target maintaining constant speed and trajectory, essentially a sitting duck.

Chapter 5.

Preparations

An-26

On July 14, a Ukrainian Antonov-26 aircraft was shot down by Separatist forces. The An-26, flying at an altitude between 3 and 4 kilometers, was struck by either a MANPAD or Strela-1 surface-to-air missile. Evidence suggests the aircraft may have been deliberately deployed as bait preceding a planned attack. If not part of such an operation, the incident was subsequently exploited by Ukrainian authorities by falsifying both the recorded altitude and the weapon system responsible for the downing.

Ukrainian officials reported the An-26 was operating at 6,250 meters—an altitude requiring more sophisticated anti-aircraft weaponry than initially claimed. This discrepancy indicates probable deployment of a Buk missile system, potentially launched from Russian territory.

Following the incident, NOTAM 320 was issued, raising the safe flight altitude to 9,750 meters. During consultations with Western diplomats, Ukrainian authorities confirmed the An-26's downing and declared the airspace unsafe. This official declaration subsequently enabled them to assert:

We warned you. But you kept flying over a war zone

Chapter 5.1.

Phone Calls, Buk Videos, and Photographic Evidence

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) edited and spliced wiretapped communications between separatists and Russian operatives in preparation for the attack. These manipulated recordings were later supplemented with conversations occurring immediately after the incident. The SBU released these selectively edited phone calls remarkably quickly following the attack, creating the false impression that separatists had confessed to downing MH17.

According to Vasily Prozorov, this constitutes further evidence of Ukraine's preparation and execution of the attack. The unprecedented speed of their release remains otherwise inexplicable, as standard judicial procedures typically require several days to secure authorization for both recording and publishing intercepted communications.

Buk missile footage was preassembled prior to the incident. One videographer confirmed creating his recording on July 5 - while his city remained under Ukrainian military control. This footage, along with other Buk videos, was systematically circulated by the SBU post-attack. These materials were presented as conclusive evidence that separatists or Russian forces had downed MH17.

A photograph depicting a missile condensation trail against clear blue skies emerged shortly after the attack. This coincided with the documented launch of a Russian Buk-TELAR missile around 16:15 hours. Additional images showing Buk missile contrails surfaced subsequently.

SBU operatives developed the plan to post messages on Igor Girkin's Twitter account during the days preceding the attack. This premeditated disinformation campaign demonstrates the SBU's advanced preparation for the incident.

The SBU methodically compiled numerous evidentiary elements designed to establish universal conviction regarding the attack's origin:

The separatists or the Russians are behind the attack.

Chapter 5.2.

Bombing

Buk missile evidence Buk missile evidence

Saur Mogila faced daily bombardment. On July 15, Snizhne was also struck. There existed a high probability that a Russian Buk-TELAR would be deployed near Pervomaiskyi, situated midway between these locations. Crucially, Pervomaiskyi lies less than 10 kilometers from the international air route designated L980. Positioning a Russian Buk-TELAR near Pervomaiskyi provided an ideal location for executing a false flag terror attack.

Chapter 5.3.

Battles

Intense combat erupted near Marinovka and Stepanovka on July 15 and 16th. These locations lie approximately 10 kilometers from the agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi. A Russian Buk-TELAR positioned near Pervomaiskyi possessed the capability to intercept Ukrainian Su-25 aircraft conducting attacks against separatist positions in Stepanovka or Marinovka. Intercepted telephone communications indicate that the airstrikes on Marinovka were the primary catalyst prompting separatist forces to request Russian assistance, specifically for a Buk missile system.

Contrary to the daily assaults on Saur Mogila, it was the bombardment of Marinovka that principally led to the deployment of a Russian Buk-TELAR to the agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi by July 17. This location was strategically selected. From this vantage point, the Buk system could engage Ukrainian warplanes conducting bombing runs over Saur Mogila, Marinovka, Stepanovka, Snizhne, Torez, or Shakhtorsk.

Chapter 5.4.

An Altered Flight Path

Strategic locations map An Altered Flight Path

MH17's flight path was modified in the days preceding 17 July. Crucially, only on 17 July did MH17 traverse airspace over a war zone. This is evident from the CNN report titled The timeline before MH17 crashed, published on 18 July and available on YouTube. Approximately 2.5 minutes into the report, a map reveals that on 13, 14, and 15 July, MH17's route lay approximately 200 kilometers to the south. On 16 July, the route shifted 100 kilometers northward. On 17 July, it was adjusted a further 100 kilometers north.

CNN suggests the flight on 17 July deviated 100 km further north compared to 16 July due to storm activity. This raises a critical question: Did MH17 fly over a war zone on 17 July solely because of severe weather conditions, or was the route deliberately planned over that conflict area regardless? Contrasting information appears in an article which states:

Flight MH17 never deviated from flight plan route nor did it take other route than previous days. (Flight path analysis)

The caption for the ninth image in this article asserts:

In reality MH17 flights of July 15, 16 and 17 flew almost the same route

While the routes may appear nearly identical on a map spanning 10,000 kilometers, a mere 2.5-millimeter difference on such a scale represents an actual deviation of 100 kilometers. This map precisely corroborates the CNN data: on 15 July, MH17 flew 200 kilometers south of the 17 July position; on 16 July, it flew 100 kilometers south. Only on 17 July did the flight path enter the war zone. The article's claim that no route deviation occurred contradicts the evidence presented in its own ninth image, which clearly demonstrates a different route was flown on 17 July.

Chapter 5.5.

Additional Evidence

CNN is not a pro-Russia channel. Truth is often reported initially, only to be subsequently replaced by politically correct narratives. The most famous example is Roswell in 1947: a local newspaper reported a UFO crash on the incident day, only to describe it as a weather balloon the following day.

Three other examples from the MH17 incident demonstrate this pattern of initial contradictory reporting:

On July 17, a Malaysia Airlines representative informed relatives at Schiphol Airport that the pilot had issued a distress call (De Doofpotdeal, p. 172). This communication explicitly indicated a rapid descent. Such critical declarations aren't made accidentally. The only logical conclusion is that this emergency transmission occurred. Yet within a day, authorities dismissed it as miscommunication.

Days after July 17, the BBC aired a report featuring local residents who witnessed fighter jets near MH17. That same day, the BBC retracted the segment with an implausible justification: failure to meet editorial standards. No explanation was provided regarding flaws in the eyewitness testimony or why the report violated protocols—raising questions about political motivations.

Initial reports on July 17–18th stated MH17 lost contact with Dnipro Radar (ATC) at 16:15 hours (Fatale vlucht MH17, pp. 14-20). On July 19, this time shifted to 16:20:03. A five-minute discrepancy in critical incident timing is implausible. Why adjust the timeline? Notably, the second Russian Buk missile launch occurred precisely at 16:15 hours.

The aircraft’s deviation from its flight path is uncontested, though the extent remains disputed. At 16:00 Ukrainian time, MH17 requested a 20-nautical-mile (37 km) deviation due to thunderstorms. Russian analysis indicates a maximum divergence of 14 km beyond the corridor (totaling 23 km), with 10 km divergence persisting at 16:20. Conversely, the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) claims maximum divergence was 10 km, reduced to 3.6 NM (6.5 km) by 16:20.

Petropavlivka lies 10 km from the centerline of flight route L980. Proximity to L980 makes the mistake or error scenario increasingly implausible. It is unclear why the Dutch Safety Board provides inaccurate information that further diminishes the likelihood of the error scenario. Could this be an attempt to divert attention from the 100 km route change implemented on July 16?

Chapter 5.6.

July 17

Could MH17 have been shot down on July 16 if Russian forces had positioned a Buk-TELAR near the agricultural field at Pervomaiskyi that day? This scenario was impossible due to the flight route on July 16. To achieve such an interception, the route would have needed to shift not 100 km, but 200 km northward compared to its path on July 15.

From Sunday, July 13 through Tuesday, July 15, MH17's flight path remained approximately 200 km further south than on July 17. When Russian forces provided the separatists with a Buk-TELAR on July 17, the date presented several tactical advantages:

Timing was critical. The SBU had no intelligence regarding when Russian Buk-TELAR support might reappear, and the Russian invasion could commence at any moment.

July 17 coincided with Vladimir Putin's return flight from South America to Russia. The SBU's deception operation against the Ukrainian air force—centered on the plan to shoot down Putin's plane—could only be executed on this specific date.

Notably, MH17 carried numerous passengers from NATO countries and a significant number of children on July 17.

Cloud cover provided essential conditions. For the false flag terror attack, overcast weather was imperative: it would limit visibility of the Buk missile's thick white contrail to below the cloud layer. Cloud cover would also conceal fighter jets should Plan A fail.

The operational code for this false flag attack was 17.17. Why did MI6 and the SBU anticipate Russian Buk-TELAR support arriving specifically on July 17? Such assistance could theoretically have occurred on July 16 or 18th.

July 17 was uniquely suited for the Putin's plane deception. It remains unclear to me why MI6 and Kiev/SBU were certain that Russian forces would deliver Buk-TELAR support to the separatists precisely on this date.

Chapter 5.7.

Putin's Return Flight from South America

Vladimir Putin never intended to return by flying over Ukrainian airspace. Similarly, he had no plans to attend the conference in Rostov, which commenced on July 18. The scheme for his purported attendance at the Rostov conference was fabricated by the SBU. While the Ukrainian Air Force likely had no intention of killing 300 innocent civilians, they were prepared to target Putin's aircraft. Through the SBU's deception, the air force collaborated in preparing this attack.

Statements by Vladislav Voloshin, the Su-25 pilot who launched two air-to-air missiles at MH17, and Igor Kolomoisky, then governor of Dnipropetrovsk, indicate they believed the operation aimed to shoot down Putin's plane. The MiG-29 pilot, who flew directly over MH17 and discharged three gun salvos at close range, recognized it was a civilian airliner. Whether the Ukrainian Buk-TELAR crew identified it as a passenger aircraft remains uncertain. As no Ukrainian Buk missile could engage MH17 due to system failure, I have not pursued resolution of that question.

Chapter 5.8.

Was MH17 Specifically Selected?

Was any civilian aircraft suitable for a false flag terror attack? A plane carrying a few hundred elderly Chinese passengers would not have served the purpose. The desired impact required passengers predominantly from NATO countries, with a higher number of children being preferable. The objective was to generate profound public outrage. Applying maximum pressure on Russia was the ultimate goal. The attack needed to deliver such a demoralizing blow to the Separatists that their will to continue fighting evaporated and their morale collapsed. Furthermore, it was intended to deter Russia from launching an invasion and, ideally, compel them to cease support for the Separatists altogether.

Given that the flight path was altered specifically over a two-day period, the conclusion is evident: MH17 was deliberately chosen by the SBU. The other three aircraft in proximity to MH17 carried far fewer passengers from NATO countries and significantly fewer children. Those flights also had considerably fewer European passengers. Consequently, shooting down any of those alternative commercial planes would have been far less effective in provoking substantial outrage across Europe and America (De Doofpotdeal, pp. 103, 104).

Chapter 5.9.

200 Dutchmen

Was MH17 deliberately targeted because it carried 200 Dutch citizens? Due to relentless pro-NATO and anti-Russia/anti-Putin propaganda disseminated through newspapers and television, the Netherlands ranks among Europe’s most staunchly pro-NATO and anti-Russian nations.

Former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (Secretary General of NATO since 2024) explicitly frames Russia as a threat:

Anyone who does not want to face the threat of Putin is naive. The greatest threat to the Netherlands. The most important threat to Europe at this moment is the Russian threat.

This assessment was conveyed to him by the highest-ranking general in the Netherlands.

My response:

You shouldn't let a butcher inspect his own meat.

A rational analysis based on defense expenditures reveals:

Russia poses no threat whatsoever.

We face no genuine threats, have no enemies, and no longer require a substantial military—least of all anxious generals. The only invasion the Netherlands must fear this century is an influx of war refugees and political or economic migrants. Expensive fighter jets offer no defense against such an influx, unless one intends to deploy missiles and onboard weaponry to repel refugee flows.

NATO members possess an economy 20 times larger than Russia’s and allocate 20 times more to defense spending. European nations alone spend 4 to 5 times more on defense than Russia. We have no rational basis to fear Russia.

Conversely, the Russians have ample reason to fear a NATO alliance that outspends them on defense by a factor of twenty. This military coalition is advancing toward Russia’s borders, encircling the nation, and deploying missiles in Japan, Korea, Turkey, Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States—all aimed at Russia.

By orchestrating a cynical disinformation campaign that blamed the separatists—and particularly Russia—for the murder of 200 Dutch citizens, and then transferring the investigation to the Netherlands, success was nearly assured. It was a shrewd maneuver by Ukraine to assign the investigation to the Netherlands, contingent upon immunity, veto power, and control over the inquiry.

Ukraine is notoriously corrupt, while the Netherlands is—wrongly—ranked among the top ten least corrupt countries. Ukraine retained control while the Netherlands performed the laborious investigative work. An investigation led by Ukraine implicating Russia would have faced intense skepticism; one conducted by the Netherlands carried greater credibility and faced less critical scrutiny.

Had Kiev or the SBU been faced with the choice of downing an aircraft carrying 200 Belgians, 200 Danes, or 200 Dutch citizens, they would have selected the flight with Dutch passengers. The Netherlands was likely more amenable to participating in a cover-up designed to falsely blame Russia, deceive the victims' families, and obscure the truth.

Chapter 6.

The Plan

Shoot down a commercial airliner and blame it on the Russians.

Specific requirements governed this false flag terror attack:

Russian forces needed to supply the Separatists with a Buk-TELAR system to counter high-altitude fighter jets operating at 5 km or higher—altitudes beyond the reach of MANPADs.

The Russian Buk-TELAR had to be positioned where its missile could engage a commercial aircraft.

This objective was achieved through daily bombardment of Saur Mogila and targeted strikes on Marinovka on July 15 and 16. Pervomaiskyi, situated between Saur Mogila and Snizhne and less than 10 km from flight path L980, lies 10 km from Marinovka. A Russian Buk-TELAR stationed at Pervomaiskyi could intercept Ukrainian fighter jets attacking Marinovka or Saur Mogila.

The target needed to be an aircraft carrying citizens from NATO countries, ideally with many children aboard. This was accomplished by shifting MH17's route 200 km northward over two days: on July 15 it flew 200 km further south, on July 16 another 100 km south, and on July 17 it passed directly over the conflict zone.

Cloud cover was essential—preferably dense enough to obscure the Buk missile's thick white contrail above the cloud layer. This would also prevent observation of higher-altitude fighter aircraft should the primary plan (Buk missile) fail.

July 17 was selected because Vladimir Putin was returning to Moscow from South America. The deception of framing Russia for shooting down Putin's own plane wasn't feasible on other dates. If Russian forces provided the Separatists with a Buk-TELAR on July 17, the attack had to occur that day.

The decision was made: MH17 would be destroyed by any means necessary if Russian support materialized on July 17—preferably by Buk missile, alternatively by air-to-air missiles, or as a last resort, cannon fire.

A Buk missile strike was the optimal method. Both Ukrainian and Russian Buk missiles would produce identical results: MH17 would be struck at the radar-targeted midsection, triggering fires and explosions that would break the aircraft apart before it crashed burning to earth.

The primary complication was the visibility of two contrails and satellite detection of dual heat signatures at launch sites. US satellites could record launches from 16:07 onward, requiring American cooperation in the cover-up for any events after that time.

If a Ukrainian Buk missile was fired five minutes after the Russian missile, the time difference would be evident in radar and satellite data.

The rationale for dismissing this risk remains unclear. Had Russia acknowledged their Buk-TELAR's presence in eastern Ukraine on July 17, they could have immediately released radar data showing their missile launch at 16:15—proving it couldn't have hit MH17 at 16:20:03.

For full transparency, radar images from 15:30 (when the first missile was fired) should also be provided. Two missiles are missing from the fleeing Buk-video, with launches occurring at 15:30 and 16:15—eliminating the possibility of a third Russian missile launch around 16:19:30.

Cloud cover on July 17 limited contrail visibility to below the cloud layer and obscured higher-flying aircraft. While conditions were nearly complete overcast at Grabovo and Snizhne at 16:20, Rozsypne had 50% cloud cover, Petropavlivka 40%, and Torez was nearly clear. Conditions were suboptimal but workable.

Minutes before MH17's arrival, Su-25s would bomb Torez and Shakhtorsk, expecting the Russian Buk-TELAR to engage them. Shortly after, a Ukrainian Buk missile would strike MH17. The attack was planned for approximately 16:00, adjusting to 15:50 if MH17 departed on time or 16:05 with a 15-minute delay.

Because MH17 departed 30 minutes late, the attack occurred at 16:20—coinciding with the earliest possible US satellite surveillance over eastern Ukraine starting at 16:07.

To verify the Russian Buk-TELAR's functionality, a Su-25 would bomb Saur Mogila at 15:30 while flying at 5 km altitude, then climb toward Snizhne. If the Russian system engaged this aircraft, the MH17 operation would proceed.

The Su-25 pilot was unaware he served as bait. Crucially, Su-25s lack the Oh Shit Lamp—a cockpit warning light present in other aircraft that illuminates when Buk-TELAR or Snow Drift radars lock on.

This pilot, along with one or two others, would be sacrificed in preparation for the operation. No parachutes were observed after three Su-25s were downed. White fabric rolls mistaken for parachutes by some Separatists after MH17's destruction led to orders to search for pilots.

Minutes before the MH17 strike, two Su-25s would serve as live bait—one bombing Torez, the other Shakhtorsk—to provoke Buk missile launches toward those locations.

Chapter 6.1.

Buk Missiles or Fighter Aircraft

Several factors preclude the possibility of a successful attack using a Ukrainian Buk missile system:

MH17 exceeded the operational range of Ukrainian Buk missiles after deviating more than 10 km northward due to adverse weather conditions or air traffic congestion

The Ukrainian Buk-TELAR had been either disabled or captured by separatist forces

The Ukrainian Buk missile failed to strike MH17

The Ukrainian Buk missile failed to detonate upon approach

The Ukrainian Buk-TELAR experienced critical technical failures

The operating crew had been deliberately misinformed that their target was President Putin's aircraft. Upon recognizing it was a civilian airliner carrying 300 innocent passengers—including children—they refused to execute the launch order

Given the Buk system's impracticality, fighter aircraft became the necessary alternative. Vladislav Voloshin was subsequently tasked with ascending to 5 km altitude in his Su-25 ground-attack aircraft and firing two air-to-air missiles at MH17. Voloshin remained unaware of the aircraft's true identity, having been instructed he was targeting President Putin's plane.

As contingency planning, two MiG-29 fighters would trail MH17 several minutes prior to engagement. Should the Buk option prove unfeasible, one MiG-29 would position itself directly above the airliner while the other withdrew. If the air-to-air missiles proved ineffective, the remaining MiG-29 would complete the operation using cannon fire.

In scenarios where MH17 neither ignited nor disintegrated midair but descended due to missile damage, the MiG-29 would initiate close-range engagement. If missile impacts occurred on the starboard side, the fighter would bank right, acquire target alignment, and deliver cannon salvos to the damaged section from minimal distance.

The MiG-29's radar would specifically target areas compromised by missile fragmentation damage. These cannon salvos were designed to ensure aircraft destruction. Should initial damage manifest on the port side, the MiG-29 would execute a mirrored maneuver: banking left, reorienting, and concentrating cannon fire on the compromised port sector.

Following a starboard engagement vector, the MiG-29 could proceed directly to Debaltseve. A port-side engagement necessitated a U-turn maneuver. Both escape protocols included radar countermeasures: dispersing aluminum chaff to generate false returns and rapid descent below 5 km altitude—beneath the detection threshold of Rostov's civilian primary radar network.

The Ukrainian army's multi-front offensive commencing July 18—employing three army groups across northern, central, and southern sectors—required extensive preparation spanning days if not weeks. This operational timeline further indicates the July 17 attack derived from similarly protracted strategic planning.

Su-25 ground-attack aircraft Su-25 Frogfoot

MiG-29 fighter aircraft MiG-29 Fulcrum

Chapter 7.

Crash Sequence

Photograph of Cor Pan Photograph of Cor Pan: In case he disappears. This is what he looks like.

Chapter 8.

Target

On July 17 at 2:00 hours, a white Volvo truck transporting a Russian Buk-TELAR missile system on a red flatbed trailer crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border. Rather than proceeding directly to the agricultural field in Pervomaiskyi to arrive by 5:00 hours, it took an inexplicable detour. The purpose of this diversion remains unclear, particularly since the Buk was destined for Pervomaiskyi. Was this route change executed at the request or under orders from Russian authorities? Could it indicate that Russian forces preferred their Buk system to remain unused, possibly hoping the Ukrainian Air Force would destroy it?

After waiting several hours in Lugansk, the white Volvo truck with its red low-loader trailer first traveled to Donetsk. From there, it proceeded via Zuhres and Torez to Snizhne. The Buk-TELAR then continued independently to Pervomaiskyi. Having been vulnerable as a target for 9 hours, the system finally reached its destination at 14:00 hours.

The Ukrainian Air Force had a 9-hour window to destroy or disable the Russian Buk-TELAR, yet deliberately refrained from action. Their false flag terror operation required a fully operational Russian Buk-TELAR with its Russian crew. It was essential that the system reach the agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi and maintain capability to engage aircraft.

Undoubtedly, Ukrainian military leadership and the SBU security service must have questioned the intentions behind the Russians' or Separatists' actions. Why such an unusual detour? Why was the Buk system left exposed as a target for 9 hours? Could this have been a trap?

Conversely, Russian forces must have been perplexed by the Ukrainian Air Force's failure to attack their vulnerable Buk-TELAR.

After the Russian Buk-TELAR shot down two Ukrainian Su-25s near Pervomaiskyi and Ukraine subsequently downed MH17, the Russians understood why their system had been permitted to maneuver and remain stationary as a target for nine hours without facing attack. Without a functional Russian Buk-TELAR positioned precisely on that Pervomaiskyi agricultural field, Kiev and the SBU could not have executed their false flag terror operation.

The Russians likely couldn't comprehend why Kiev and the SBU didn't employ a Ukrainian Buk-TELAR to shoot down MH17. This approach would have been far more straightforward, requiring significantly less manipulation, deception, and evidentiary fabrication. Since two air-to-air missiles and three cannon salvos had caused two explosions aboard MH17, investigators had to manufacture evidence of a Buk missile strike to implicate Russia.

During their July 21 press conference, Russian military officials presented two possibilities. They noted significant activity by Ukrainian Buk-TELARs near Donetsk, including one deployed south of Zaroshchenke. Additionally, primary radar had detected a fighter aircraft in close proximity to MH17. While the exact sequence remained unclear, they stated unequivocally: Our Buk-TELAR did not shoot down MH17.

At the conference, officials formally requested the United States release its satellite data. This evidence would demonstrate that the Russian Buk missile had been launched at 16:15 hours - meaning it couldn't possibly have struck MH17 at 16:20:03. The satellite data also showed fighter aircraft near the crash site around 16:20 hours. This explains why Secretary of State John Kerry confined himself to unsubstantiated assertions.

Exposed Buk system Exposed as a target for 9 hours

Processed primary radar video: Su-25 in proximity to MH17. Processed primary radar video: Su-25 in proximity to MH17.

Chapter 9.

Attack

Chapter 9.1.

Ukrainian Buk-TELAR Deployment

On July 16, one or two Ukrainian Buk-TELAR units and a Snow Drift radar ref from the 156th Anti-Aircraft (AA) Regiment departed their base near Donetsk for a special mission ref. Officially, this deployment supported an exercise aimed at assisting Ukrainian troops in liberating their encircled units positioned between the Russian border and territories held by Separatist forces.

In reality, a Buk-TELAR equipped with a Snow Drift radar was positioned approximately 6 km south of Zaroshchenke, awaiting MH17's arrival. It remains unclear whether the commanding officer who ordered the Buk missile launch believed he was targeting Putin's aircraft or knew the target was actually MH17.

Chapter 9.2.

Su-25 Attack

At 15:30 hours, a Ukrainian Su-25 aircraft bombed Saur Mogila from an altitude of 5 km. The pilot had been ordered to climb and proceed toward Snizhne, unaware of what awaited. Crucially, the pilot had no knowledge of the Russian Buk-TELAR positioned in an agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi.

No parachutes were observed at Snizhne/Pushkinski, Torez/Krupskoye, or Shakhtorsk. This leads to the conclusion that these three pilots were unwittingly sacrificed to facilitate the subsequent false-flag terror attack. Notably, the Su-25 lacks an Oh Shit Lamp – a system that alerts pilots when Buk-TELAR or Snow Drift radars activate or when Buk missiles target their aircraft.

The Russian Buk-TELAR's downing of the Su-25 at 15:30 hours enabled the false-flag operation. Multiple witnesses confirm this event at Ukrainian local time:

Commander Som, stationed at Saur Mogila on July 17, reported consistent patterns of dual bombing runs ref. Aircraft typically bombed once during approach and again after turning near the Russian border. However, on July 17, the Su-25 bombed only once before climbing toward Snizhne. A separatist sentry observed a missile launch – likely a Buk system – which ascended before veering eastward toward Snizhne, not Petropavlivka.

Marcus Bennsmann of Correctiv, while investigating the Buk-TELAR's firing position, located the first Su-25 crash site. Residents of Pushkinski interviewed by Bennsmann described hearing a whistling sound followed by two distinct explosions: a moderate bang and an extremely loud detonation. The launch site was 6 km from Snizhne and over 8 km from Pushkinski. The initial sonic boom from the missile's launch and velocity break was less audible, while the warhead detonation occurred directly overhead. Despite the 6-8 km distance, the explosion was exceptionally loud and un-muffled. Eyewitnesses subsequently observed an aircraft crashing kilometers away. Petropavlivka's 20 km distance from Snizhne, combined with the timeline, eliminates MH17 as the observed aircraft.

Russian television reported at 16:30 Moscow time (15:30 Ukrainian time) that separatists had downed a Ukrainian military aircraft. Kharchenko confirmed this in a 15:48 phone call to Dubinsky ref:

We've already taken down a Sushka.

MH17 was shot down at 16:20 hours, when the first Su-25 was destroyed and MH17 remained 750 km distant.

Another Snizhne resident, Nikolai Ivanovich, independently confirmed witnessing an aircraft crash near Snizhne.

Chapter 9.3.

Three Su-25 Aircraft

At 15:30 hours, three Su-25 aircraft departed from Aviatorskoye Air Base. One aircraft carried two air-to-air missiles, while the other two were equipped with air-to-ground missiles or bombs. From 15:45 hours onward, these three Su-25s were observed patrolling the airspace between Torez, Petropavlivka, and Grabovo.

July 17 remains the sole day when three Su-25s circled for thirty minutes. Both Boris (Buk Media Hunt) and Lev Bulatov (Must see interview) document this circling activity. Evidently, the 31 minutes delayed departure of MH17 had not been factored into their operations. Shortly before 16:15 hours, the two Su-25s carrying air-to-ground munitions received orders to bomb targets near Torez and Shakhtyorsk.

Both aircraft were subsequently shot down. The Su-25 targeting Torez was struck by a Russian Buk-TELAR missile system near Pervomaiskyi. Boris witnessed this event, describing a thick white horizontal condensation trail before observing the Su-25 crashing like a leaf whirling down, followed by a distant smoke plume.

Three critical discrepancies confirm this could not have been MH17: Torez lies 15 km from Petropavlivka; MH17 did not descend in a leaf-like manner; and the incident occurred at 16:15 hours. This timing explains why Ukrainian authorities initially reported losing contact with MH17 at 16:15—a narrative that would have implicated the Russian Buk-TELAR. After July 18, this timeline was revised to 16:20:03 hours.

The second Su-25, targeting Shakhtarsk, was destroyed by either a Strela-1, Igla, or Pantsir-S1 system—not the Russian Buk-TELAR. Had the Buk been responsible, three missiles would be unaccounted for in the documented Buk video evidence. Instead, only two Buk missiles are missing, contradicting Bellingcat, the Prosecution, and JIT claims of one missing missile. This aligns with the Buk-TELAR having fired two missiles.

Norair Simonyan (Novini NL) documents the Shakhtarsk shootdown, while Lev Bulatov confirms both losses. Bulatov states that minutes before the third Su-25 began climbing (at 16:18 hours), two Su-25s departed to bomb Torez and Shakhtarsk. He observed both being struck, leaving smoke trails, and saw impact plumes.

Evgeny Agapov's (Key witness) testimony corroborates this sequence: three Su-25s departed, but only one returned—the aircraft carrying air-to-air missiles landed without them. In addition to the Su-25 lost near Snizhne/Pushkinski at 15:30 hours, two more were destroyed at 16:15 hours. Thus, three Su-25s had already been eliminated before MH17 was struck. July 17 ultimately saw four aircraft downed: three Su-25 fighters and one civilian airliner.

July 17 marked peak Ukrainian air force activity. Despite this, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesperson asserted:

There were no fighter planes active that afternoon

This claim is refuted by extensive eyewitness testimony and primary radar surveillance records. With a Russian invasion anticipated, military radar stations were fully operational—primarily to detect hostile aircraft, not to track friendly forces.

Chapter 9.4.

Ukrainian Buk-TELAR II

At 16:07, the Ukrainian Buk-TELAR system and Snow Drift Radar deployed 6 km south of Zaroshchenke were activated (MH17 Inquiry, part 3). Although Zaroshchenke was under Separatist control, the area immediately south remained contested. Shakhtorsk, held by Separatists, was nearly encircled by Ukrainian forces.

The Snow Drift Radar detected MH17 at 16:16, reporting:

Target acquired, azimuth 310, distance 80 km, approaching

One minute later at 16:17, the update followed:

Target tracked, azimuth 310, distance 64 km, speed 250 m/s, approaching

Simultaneously at 16:17, a critical malfunction emerged: the Ukrainian Buk-TELAR missiles couldn't elevate for launch. A 30 amp fuse had blown, with no replacement available in inventory (MH17 Inquiry, part 3).

This Buk system failure—not MH17's position 10 km north—necessitated fighter deployment. The Arena test missile (maximum range 15 km) would have been insufficient for the distance involved.

Ukraine sacrificed three Su-25s with pilots—a significant loss given its limited operational fleet. The deception framing this as involving Putin's aircraft was only feasible on July 17. Kiev/SBU must have finalized Plan B within one minute, by 16:18:

Shoot down MH17 with fighter jets

Chapter 9.5.

The Third Su-25 and Two MiG-29s

The third Su-25 maintained its slow circling pattern. At 16:18, its pilot, Vladislav Voloshin, received orders to ascend to 5 km altitude and launch both air-to-air missiles from that position. Voloshin understood his target to be Putin's aircraft.

Meanwhile, two MiG-29s had departed from a separate military airfield. By 16:17 hours, these fighters were flying wingtip-to-wingtip at matching altitude, trailing MH17 at a distance. This configuration was observed by Spanish air traffic controller Carlos via primary radar. Independent confirmation came from eyewitness Aleksander (JIT witness: Two fighter jets), during his documented interview with investigators Max van der Werff and Yana Yerlashova.

At 16:18, one of the MiG-29s shadowing MH17 received the following directive:

Position directly above MH17. Should the air-to-air missiles cause the aircraft to crash, immediately egress toward Debaltseve. If MH17 remains airborne, deploy cannon fire against the missile impact zone

By 16:19, one MiG-29 had assumed position directly above MH17 while the other departed the area. At precisely 16:19:55, Voloshin reached the designated 5 km altitude, his Su-25 positioned 3-5 km southeast (leftward) of MH17. He launched both missiles, targeting a point 2 km beyond MH17's current position - the projected location of the aircraft 8 seconds later. Both missiles detonated at 16:20:03.

Chapter 9.6.

MH17 and the Third Su-25

MH17 departed half an hour behind schedule at 13:31 hours. At 16:00 hours, the flight requested permission to deviate 20 nautical miles (37 km) northward to avoid thunderstorms. This request was approved, resulting in a maximum diversion of 23 km around the severe weather. A subsequent request to climb from 33,000 feet to 34,000 feet was denied due to unavailable airspace. At precisely 16:19:49 hours, Dnipro Radar controller Anna Petrenko instructed MH17:

Malaysia one seven, due to traffic direct to Romeo November Delta.

Within two seconds, at 16:19:56 hours, MH17 acknowledged:

Romeo November Delta, Malaysia one seven (DSB Prelim. p.15).

While still flying 10 km north of L980's centerline, MH17 was struck by two air-to-air missiles at 16:20:03 hours. The first detonated 1 to 1.5 meters from the center-left cockpit window, causing 102 distinct impact marks. The second missile was ingested into the left engine, detonating at its intake. This resulted in 47 impacts on the intake ring, causing it to shear off completely.

Eyewitness Gennady—interviewed by Jeroen Akkermans—observed the final 3 km of the missile's trajectory, the upward strike on MH17, and the separation of the left engine intake ring (Buk Media Hunt). Following this structural failure, the left engine emitted a roaring noise due to the absence of the inlet ring.

Chapter 9.7.

Ten Seconds Missing from CVR and FDR Data

Between 16:20:03 and 16:20:13, two non-fatal air-to-air missiles struck the aircraft. The left engine sustained damage but remained operational enough to permit controlled shutdown. The cockpit windows—constructed with multiple layers of glass and vinyl—demonstrated remarkable resilience. Though the left windows became opaque upon impact, they prevented fragment penetration. Evidence suggests the pilot may have been struck by metal fragments that pierced two aluminum hull layers. Crucially, no vital systems were compromised. Operating on a single engine, MH17 retained flight capability, enabling the co-pilot to initiate emergency landing procedures. However, maintaining altitude and speed became impossible with only one engine.

To evade potential follow-up attacks—while having no understanding of what had transpired—the co-pilot executed an immediate emergency descent. Within seconds of the impact, he initiated rapid altitude loss. Immediately after this maneuver, he broadcasted a distress call:

Malaysia one seven. Mayday, mayday, mayday, emergency descent.

Without the gun salvos, all passengers and crew would have survived.

Chapter 9.8.

ELT - Emergency Locator Transmitter

Evidence of the rapid descent emerges from the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), which transmitted its first signal at 16:20:36. This indicates activation occurred precisely at 16:20:06. The ELT triggers under two conditions: when an aircraft crashes or initiates an emergency descent, specifically when acceleration or deceleration exceeds the 2g threshold. Following activation, the ELT transmits its initial signal after a fixed 30-second interval.

Had MH17—flying horizontally—been struck by a Buk missile at 16:20:03, causing detachment of the forward 16-meter section, the ELT would necessarily have activated between 16:20:03 and 16:20:04.

Activation at 16:20:06—over two seconds later—is therefore physically implausible.

No additional 2.5-second delay exists in this sequence.

Upon exceeding the 2g threshold, the signal transmits precisely 30 seconds later at light speed.

This signal reaches a ground station 3,000 kilometers from MH17 within 1/100th of a second. When relayed via satellite, arrival occurs within 1/5th of a second. A 2.5-second transmission delay is thus impossible. Consequently, ELT activation at 16:20:06 cannot be reconciled with an in-flight breakup occurring at 16:20:03.

Chapter 9.9.

MH17 and the MiG-29

MH17 was struck on its left side at precisely 16:20:03 hours. At that exact moment or seconds later, the MiG-29 aircraft deviated to the left. The MiG-29 pilot observed MH17 descending and assessed it could still attempt an emergency landing.

At approximately 16:20:13 hours—roughly ten seconds after the detonation of air-to-air missiles—the MiG-29 flying directly above MH17 swerved left before turning back toward the passenger aircraft.

The MiG-29 fired three distinct cannon salvos (recorded as BACH, BACH, and BACH). The third salvo grazed the left wingtip and penetrated the spoiler, which was deployed due to MH17's rapid descent.

These three salvos alternated between high-explosive fragmentation rounds and armor-piercing rounds. The high-explosive fragmentation rounds detonated inside the cockpit.

This accounts for the 500 metal fragments later recovered from the bodies of the three crew members.

It explains the distinctive outward curling of impact holes, creating the appearance that the cockpit had been fired upon from both sides.

It clarifies the origin of the cannon salvo damage and elucidates why a cockpit window, cockpit roof section, and cladding—including the lower part of the left cockpit window frame bearing both whole and half 30mm holes (a critical piece of evidence)—were blown outward.

Chapter 9.10.

1,275 kg of lithium-ion batteries

An explosion triggered by high-explosive fragmentation bullets in the cockpit could account for the initial damage, but not the separation of the cockpit and the forward 16 meters of the aircraft. A second, far more powerful explosion occurred when a bullet from the third gun salvo, or a fragment from a 30 mm high-explosive round, struck 1,275 kg of lithium-ion batteries. In total, MH17 carried 1,376 kg of lithium-ion batteries: 1,275 kg were stored forward in compartment 5 (625 kg) and compartment 6 (650 kg), with the remainder located in the rear. (Kees van der Pijl, p.116)

This secondary explosion caused the forward 16 meters of MH17 to separate. The cockpit detached entirely, while the galley and forward toilets were virtually destroyed. Four doors were blown outward, and two luggage racks sheared off.

The initial 12 meters of the cargo floor, containing the 1,275 kg of lithium-ion batteries, broke away, along with the forward section of the passenger deck above it, which held four rows of business class seats. The combined force of the explosion and aerodynamic stresses tore skin panels from the fuselage.

A Ukrainian Su-27 pilot tracking MH17 from a distance observed this explosion. Sergei Sokolov paid $250,000 for the recording in which the pilot reported the detonation to military air traffic control, following expert authentication of the tape's validity. (Listverse.com)

Only a high-energy explosion within MH17, immediately behind the cockpit, could produce such catastrophic damage. A Buk missile detonating four meters left and above the cockpit could not possibly account for this destruction pattern.

TNO, the Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research, makes no attempt to demonstrate that the blast caused the cockpit separation. Similarly, the detachment of the forward fuselage section remains unexplained and is not even addressed in their analysis.

TNO and DSB significantly understate the pressure wave velocity from 8 km/sec to 1 km/sec—meaning the shockwave would arrive only after the Buk fragment impacts, despite the fragments traveling between 1,250 m/sec and 2,500 m/sec.

At such reduced velocity, the blast wave retains merely 1/64 of its original force, rendering it incapable of causing either the cockpit detachment or the separation of the forward 12 meters of fuselage.

Attributing the comprehensive damage—caused by two air-to-air missiles and three cannon salvos that triggered two distinct explosions aboard MH17—to a single Buk missile remains fundamentally implausible.

The lithium-ion battery explosion not only detached the cockpit but also severed the forward 12 meters of the cargo hold and the passenger deck above it. Thirty-seven adults and children fell through the collapsing floor structure: the three cockpit crew members, twenty-eight First Class passengers, and six flight attendants along with other passengers.

Physics 101

Had MH17 been flying horizontally when struck, the remaining fuselage would not have descended steeply. Instead, it would have decelerated abruptly and maintained near-level flight for several seconds before descending.

In such a scenario, the 48-meter rear section would have assumed a vertical, tail-first orientation within seconds. This shift would occur because the separation of the forward 16-meter section (weighing approximately 25,000 kg) left the rear disproportionately longer and heavier than the remaining forward structure. The wings would significantly decelerate the remaining fuselage, potentially causing partial wing detachment.

This vertical configuration eliminates all aerodynamic lift and flight capability, causing the remnant of MH17 to plunge steeply earthward.

Only if MH17 was already in a steep dive could the remnant have traveled 8 km horizontally before impact.

Empirical evidence shows the remnant descended from 9 km altitude while covering 6 km horizontally. This trajectory confirms disintegration occurred at 16:20:13 hours, not at 16:20:03 hours.

The absence of emergency descent data in the black boxes constitutes one of multiple evidentiary proofs that the official narrative is false, and demonstrates tampering with the flight recorders.

An Impossible Dive?

The descent of MH17, already underway, continued after the explosion due to the remaining 48-meter section of the aircraft – the front 16 meters having broken off. This separation caused the tail section of the remaining fuselage to pitch downwards.

The locations of the wreckage confirm that MH17 was not flying horizontally when the cockpit and forward fuselage section detached.

Had the final 16 meters – comprising the tail and rear fuselage – broken off instead, the aircraft might potentially have landed 8 km further away. However, with the front 16 meters severed, it is physically and scientifically impossible for the remaining 48-meter section of MH17 to enter a dive. Any competent simulation will demonstrate this; basic common sense is sufficient to grasp the principle.

Because MH17 was already descending, the largest section – 48 meters of fuselage with wings and engines, though missing the left engine inlet ring – impacted the ground 6 km away. The aircraft struck the ground inverted, tail-first, whereupon the remaining structure fragmented and the central section, containing kerosene, ignited.

Soot and Fire

One of the bodies that fell through the roof of a house in Rozsypne was severely burned. The body of one of the pilots from the reserve crew showed minor burns. These burns could not have been caused by a Buk missile detonating just four meters away, above and to the left of the cockpit. However, the combination of high-explosive fragmentation warheads and armor-piercing rounds, responsible for two explosions aboard MH17, could potentially account for such burns.

The soot deposits observed around the impact sites on the cockpit plates could not have originated from a Buk missile. The high-velocity Buk fragments propelled by the detonation of its high-efficiency TNT and RDX explosive charge would not produce such soot residue. In contrast, high-explosive fragmentation warheads and armor-piercing rounds fired from cannon artillery are known to generate significant soot.

Chapter 9.11.

Rozsypne and Grabovo (Hrabove)

The three crew members in the cockpit were showered with fragments from high-explosive bullets that detonated after piercing the aircraft's skin, resulting in instantaneous death. Most passengers would have perished on impact with the ground. Due to shock, hypothermia, oxygen deprivation, and wind exposure, they would likely have remained unconscious throughout.

Thirty-seven adults and children fell from the aircraft into Rozsypne. The remaining 261 passengers and crew stayed within the fuselage until MH17's main wreckage impacted near Grabovo. Following the detonation of two air-to-air missiles and the separation of the left engine inlet ring, all aboard must have heard the engine's roar and experienced the ensuing descent.

After three gun salvos, an explosion, and the structural failure of MH17's 16-meter forward section, conditions became catastrophic. Most passengers would have been unconscious during the final 90 seconds of flight.

The initial 16-meter segment of MH17 was recovered near Rozsypne and Petropavlivka, while the subsequent 48-meter section (excluding the left engine intake ring) was located at Hrabove.

Cargo areas 5 and 6 are positioned 6 to 8 meters aft of the cockpit. No substantive cargo information exists beyond a reference identifier.

Chapter 9.12.

The Essence Captured in Two Images

On the following page, the core argument is presented visually through two images. What inaccuracies do these images reveal? The upper image incorrectly depicts MH17 flying horizontally and attributes the gun salvos to a Su-25 aircraft, when in fact they originated from a MiG-29. The lower image shows graves in Jerusalem; however, the victims of this incident were not interred at this location.

Chapter 10.

Timeline: July 17, 2014

02:00 A white Volvo truck with red low loader carrying Russian Buk-TELAR crosses border into Ukraine

06:00 The white Volvo truck with the red low-loader carrying the Russian Buk-TELAR is observed in Lugansk.

08:00 The white Volvo truck and red low-loader transporting the Russian Buk-TELAR arrives in Yenakieve.

10:00 The white Volvo truck with red low-loader carrying the Russian Buk-TELAR reaches Donetsk.

12:00 The white Volvo truck with red low-loader transporting the Russian Buk-TELAR passes through Torez.

13:00 The white Volvo truck with red low-loader arrives in Snizhne with the Russian Buk-TELAR. The Buk-TELAR disembarks from the trailer and proceeds independently toward Pervomaiskyi.

13:31 MH17 departs Schiphol 31 minutes late

14:00 Russian Buk-TELAR achieves combat readiness near Pervomaiskyi

15:00 A Ukrainian Su-25 attack aircraft takes off on a mission to bomb Saur Mogila at an altitude of 5 kilometers.

15:29 The Su-25 commences bombing Saur Mogila

15:30 The Russian Buk-TELAR launches a Buk missile, shooting down the Su-25 after it bombed Saur Mogila and flew toward Snizhne. The Su-25 crashes near Pushkinski/Snizhne.

15:30 Russian media reports that separatists have shot down a Ukrainian military plane (identified as an An-26, potentially a deception by the SBU).

15:30 Three Su-25s take off for a special mission. One is armed with two air-to-air missiles; the other two carry air-to-ground missiles or bombs.

15:48 Kharchenko messages Dubinsky: We have already taken down a Sushka

15:50 Two Ukrainian MiG-29s take off

16:00 MH17 requests Air Traffic Control (ATC) permission to deviate up to 20 nautical miles (37 km) north due to thunderstorms.

16:07 A Ukrainian Buk-TELAR at Zaroshchenke, connected to the Snow Drift Radar, begins a five-minute startup sequence to achieve firing readiness.

16:07 MH17 enters Dnipro Sector 4, under the control of ATC officer Anna Petrenko.

16:14 Two Su-25s receive orders to bomb Torez and Shakhtorsk

16:15 Both Su-25s are shot down. The Su-25 at Torez is destroyed by a Buk missile fired from the Russian Buk-TELAR.

16:16 The Snow Drift Radar, connected to the Ukrainian Buk-TELAR, detects MH17: Azimuth 310, distance 80 km, speed 250 m/s, approaching.

16:17 The two MiG-29s fly close together, positioned just behind MH17 at the same altitude for several minutes. Multiple eyewitnesses observe this.

16:17 The Snow Drift Radar connected to the Ukrainian Buk-TELAR signals MH17's position: Azimuth 310, distance 64 km, speed 250 m/s, approaching. The Ukrainian Buk-TELAR experiences a system failure: a 30 Amp fuse blows.

16:18 Su-25 pilot Vladislav Voloshin, whose aircraft is armed with two air-to-air missiles, is ordered to climb to 5 km and fire his missiles at Putin's plane from that altitude.

16:19 One MiG-29 flies directly above MH17. The other MiG-29 turns and flies away.

16:19:49 ATC officer Anna Petrenko instructs MH17: Malaysia one seven, expect direct to Romeo November Delta.

16:19:55 Vladislav Voloshin fires two air-to-air missiles.

16:19:56 MH17 acknowledges ATC: Malaysia one seven, Romeo November Delta.

16:20:03 Both missiles detonate—102 impacts strike the left cockpit window, 47 impacts rupture the left engine inlet ring, causing it to break off.

16:20:05 The copilot deploys the speed brake, initiating emergency descent.

16:20:06 The Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) activates due to descent forces exceeding 2 g, transmitting its first signal 30 seconds later

16:20:06-10 The copilot makes a distress call to ATC officer Anna Petrenko, informing her of the emergency descent.

16:20:13 A MiG-29 fires three gun salvos; the cockpit and a 12-meter section of the fuselage break off following the explosion of 1,275 kg of lithium-ion batteries.

16:21:00 Carlos tweets: Kiev authorities try to make it look like an attack by the pro-Russians

16:21:30 The 48-meter rear section of MH17 crashes near Grabovo.

16:21:40 The cockpit section crashes near Rozsypne.

16:20:13-22:05 Anna Petrenko alerts both Rostov Radar and Malaysia Airlines about MH17's distress call, specifying the copilot reported rapid descent.

Chapter 10.1.

Emergency Call

A distress call was issued. This is evident from the comment made by the Rostov Radar Air Traffic Controller (ATC) shortly after 16:28:51 hours: He is not responding on the emergency (frequency) either? The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) attempts to reinterpret the pilot's distress call, suggesting instead that the pilot was contacted on an emergency frequency. In reality, the Rostov Radar ATC inquired: Did he respond after the distress call? Did the (co)pilot provide any further response after issuing the distress call? (DSB Annex G, p.44)

Anna Petrenko also informed Malaysia Airlines (presumably at Schiphol Airport) that MH17 had issued a distress call reporting a rapid descent. A Malaysia Airlines spokesperson confirmed this during a meeting for relatives held at Schiphol on the evening of 17 July. (De Doofpotdeal, pp. 103, 104)

The ATC-MH17 recording from 16:20:00 to 16:20:06 captures Petrenko's message:

Malaysia one seven, and after Romeo November Delta, expect direct to TIKNA

This transmission was subsequently re-recorded.

Half this message is absent from the Cockpit Voice Recorder, as no acoustic signals are audible in final seconds (DSB Prelim. p.20). No oral warnings were recorded on CVR, which ceased at 13:20:03 (DSB Prelim. p.19). Human speech constitutes acoustic signal. The CVR contains no audible evidence whatsoever—no missile impact, no detonation blast. This absence is only explicable if black boxes were tampered with and final moments erased.

Chapter 10.2.

Twitter Message from Carlos

Carlos's first Twitter message appeared as early as 16:21 hours, before MH17 impacted the ground. This timing could only be possible if he was physically present in an air traffic control tower in Dnipro with access to primary radar data. Carlos could not have been in Kiev, as Kiev's primary radar was beyond operational range of the incident location.

Chapter 11.

What Didn't Go as Planned?

MH17 departed half an hour late. Its scheduled departure time was 12:00 hours (13:00 hours Ukrainian time). The actual wheels-off time was 13:31 hours, half an hour behind schedule. This delay explains why the three Su-25s were circling. Why these aircraft did not adjust their own takeoff time by half an hour to account for MH17's delay remains unclear to me.

At 16:00 hours, the MH17 pilot requested permission from air traffic control to deviate 20 nautical miles north (1 nautical mile = 1.825 km). Had MH17 deviated more than 15 km, it would have moved beyond the range of the Ukrainian Buk-TELAR system. This would have necessitated switching to Plan B: shooting down MH17 using fighter jets.

MH17 flew at a slightly lower altitude than usual. First, because the flight itself indicated it did not wish to climb to 35,000 feet. Second, because that specific altitude was unavailable. The suggestion that MH17 was deliberately flown lower to facilitate being shot down by an Su-25 is incorrect.

The air traffic controllers were not involved in the plot. Subsequently, the controller, Anna Petrenko, was compelled to cooperate in the cover-up. Had Anna Petrenko been part of the conspiracy, she would not have relayed the distress call to Malaysia Airlines and Rostov Radar.

The Ukrainian Buk-TELAR system, connected to a Snow Drift Radar, experienced technical failure. A blown 30-Amp fuse prevented the launch of any Buk missile.

The fact that MH17 flew 10 km north was not the reason it avoided being shot down by a Buk missile. I accept the scene depicted in MH17 Inquiry, part 3, About what was the BBC quiet? – which may have been reenacted – as accurate.

MH17's half-hour delayed departure had two significant consequences:

Cloud cover diminished significantly. Torez experienced completely clear skies, evidenced by photographic confirmation of condensation trails. Lev Bulatov reported 40% cloud cover in Petropavlivka. Grabovo remained largely overcast according to Alexander I, who described hearing departing fighter jets and the Boeing's left engine roaring due to a damaged inlet ring. He also reported hearing distinct bangs and an explosion, though no aircraft were visually observed.

A U.S. satellite surveilled Donbass from 16:07 to 16:21 hours. American authorities possess satellite evidence exonerating the Russian Buk missile system. Despite this, the United States—pursuing sanctions against Russia—faces reluctance from the EU to cooperate. Consequently, U.S. officials intend to exploit the MH17 attack while misrepresenting satellite imagery.

The two air-to-air missiles did not detonate beneath MH17. Had they done so, the fuel tanks would have been struck and punctured, causing MH17 to catch fire. Subsequent explosions would have caused the aircraft to break apart and fall to the ground in burning pieces.

In such a scenario, the outcome would have differed little from the Buk missile hypothesis, except for the absence of distinctive bow-tie and square-shaped fragments. Air-to-air missiles do not produce such fragments. The absence of these specific pieces required an explanation.

A Ukrainian soldier photographed fighter planes near MH17. Another Ukrainian soldier recorded video footage using a mobile phone. If these photos and video had not been confiscated and instead reached Russian authorities, the operational compromise would have proven catastrophic.

Shortly after the crash, SBU operatives arrived by van and scattered passports around the site. These documents clearly hadn't been carried by victims, exhibiting signs of artificial placement. Notably, one passport contained a hole while another had a triangular section excised—a clumsy contingency measure had all passports been incinerated.

Anna Petrenko, the air traffic controller at Dnipro Radar 4, informed both Rostov Radar and Malaysia Airlines that the MH17 pilot issued a distress call. Several errors occurred during the rerecording of the communication tape: first, Anna Petrenko waited far too long before responding; second, Rostov Radar reacted much too quickly.

Shortly after the crash, SBU operatives arrived by van and scattered passports around the site. Shortly after the crash, SBU operatives arrived by van and scattered passports around the site.

Chapter 12.

140+ Reasons Why It Wasn't a Buk Missile

Chapter 12.1. Buk Particles?

Chapter 12.2. The Buk Missile Hypothesis?

Chapter 12.3. Crucial Piece of Evidence

Chapter 13. Left Wing Tip: Grazing and Puncture Damage

Chapter 13.1. Left Engine Inlet Ring

Chapter 13.2. Left Cockpit Window (Vinyl Layer)

Chapter 13.3. Black Boxes, CVR, FDR

Chapter 13.4. Photographic Evidence in the Final Report

Chapter 13.5. In-Flight Break-Up

Chapter 14. ELT – Emergency Locator Transmitter

Chapter 14.0.1. Distress Call

Chapter 14.0.2. Flight Path

Chapter 14.0.3. Radar, Satellite

Chapter 14.1. The Error/Mistake Scenario

Chapter 15. Buk Missile Track

Chapter 15.1. Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) Report

Chapter 15.2. Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)

Chapter 16. Kiev/SBU's Cynical Disinformation Campaign

Chapter 17. Public Prosecution / JIT

Chapter 28.1. DSB

The next images reveal the impossible deformation of steel butterfly and bow-tie fragments into flattened metal pieces. The entire Buk missile scenario hinges on these four fabricated Buk particles: two entirely distinct butterfly/bow-tie pieces and two flattened squares.

Forensic evidence comparison Comparative analysis of missile impact patterns

The deformation of steel butterflies and squares into the metal fragments shown on the next page is physically impossible. The entire Buk missile scenario hinges on these four fabricated Buk particles—two entirely distinct butterfly or bow-tie pieces and two flattened squares.

Metal fragment analysis Microscopic examination of aircraft debris

Forensic evidence - metal fragments Alleged Buk missile fragments found at crash site

The body of the captain contained fragments consistent with 30 mm bullets, but no butterflies, bow ties, or squares—thus, no Buk particles were present.

Fragments of 30 mm bullets were found in the captain's body

Chapter 12.1.

Buk Particles?

Excessive fragmentation was observed in the bodies of the three cockpit crew members. Positioned 5 meters from the Buk missile's detonation point, the pilot would have been struck by approximately 32 Buk particles, with an estimated half remaining embedded in his body. This would correspond to finding roughly 4 bow-tie fragments, 4 filler particles, and 8 square fragments. The co-pilot and flight engineer, situated 6 meters away, would have sustained fewer impacts. Reported fragment counts—pilot: 100s,DSB, pp. 84,85 co-pilot: 120+, flight engineer: 100+—total roughly 500 metal fragments. This volume is inconsistent with a Buk missile origin.

Insufficient Buk particles were recovered from both the cockpit crew and the aircraft. While metal fragments ranged from 0.1 grams to 16 grams,DSB, p.92 none exhibited the characteristic weight or thickness of Buk particles. A few fragments bore superficial resemblance, but were demonstrably too light, thin, inconsistent in form, and excessively deformed. A 16-gram fragment definitively rules out a Buk missile origin, as no single Buk particle approaches this mass. This fragment must necessarily originate from a different weapon system.

The recovered ratio of Buk particle types is anomalous. The expected ratio upon finding 2 bow-tie fragments would be 2 filler particles and 4 squares.

Excessive weight loss. Buk particles are steel (specific density: 8). The cockpit skin comprises two 1 mm aluminum layers (specific density: 2.7). High-speed penetration of 2 mm aluminum by significantly harder steel Buk particles should result in 3% to 10% weight loss. Observed losses of 25% to 40% are physically impossible.

Almaz-Antei testing confirms: Buk particles penetrating 5 mm of steel exhibit weight loss up to 10%.DSB Appx V

Excessive deformation. The deformation, distortion, or wear exhibited by the much harder steel Buk particles after penetrating only 2 mm of aluminum cannot be as severe as that shown in the DSB's four purported Buk particles.

Excessive thinning occurred. An 8 mm thick bow-tie fragment cannot lose nearly 50% of its thickness solely by piercing 2 mm of aluminum.

Excessive dissimilarity. The four alleged Buk particles presented by the DSB vary drastically in shape and dimensions. Penetration of 2 mm aluminum followed by embedment in human tissue or cockpit structures cannot produce such extreme morphological differences.

Absence of characteristic penetration holes. A Buk warhead contains bow-ties, fillers, and squares. Hundreds of corresponding bow-tie-shaped and square-shaped holes should be evident in the cockpit skin. None were found on MH17. By contrast, Almaz-Antei tests demonstrated hundreds of such characteristic holes in cockpit skin after Buk missile detonation.

Buk particles do not fragment upon impact. There are no dumdum Buk particles. Standard bullets do not shatter or fragment upon entering a human body; only banned dumdum bullets exhibit this behavior. Almaz-Antei does not manufacture dumdum Buk missiles with secondary-fragmenting particles.

Inconsistent trace evidence. Only 20 metal fragments bore traces of glass or aluminum. (DSB, pp.89-90) In a Buk strike scenario, all fragments would have penetrated cockpit glass or aluminum skin, meaning nearly 100% should show such traces, not merely 4%. This low percentage aligns, however, with an air-to-air missile or onboard cannon scenario.

Chapter 12.2.

The Buk Missile Hypothesis?

image-placeholder Buk missile

Condensation trail from a Buk missile. Condensation trail from a Buk missile.

Appearance after detonation of a Buk missile Appearance after detonation of a Buk missile

No thick, white condensation trail was observed extending from Pervomaiskyi to Petropavlivka. While a condensation trail did exist from Pervomaiskyi to Torez, it terminated at Torez and did not continue onward to Petropavlivka. Crucially, no eyewitness reported seeing a condensation trail reaching as far as Petropavlivka.

There was no observable signature at Petropavlivka consistent with the detonation of a Buk missile.

Sergei Sokolov led a search team of over 100 men during the initial days following the incident, meticulously scouring all wreckage sites for any parts of a Buk missile. No such parts were discovered.Knack.be Sokolov's unequivocal statement:

It is impossible that MH17 was hit by a Buk missile, because we would have found Buk missile parts.

All Buk missile parts reportedly discovered at the wreck sites later were planted evidence, deliberately deposited after the fact to falsely support the claim that MH17 was downed by a Buk missile.

The condition of the 1-meter-long Buk missile fragment presented as evidence is highly suspect. Its pristine state – notably clean, green, and entirely unblemished – is inconsistent with having originated from a detonated missile. The Belgian KMA's attempt to explain this anomaly was unconvincing and lacked scientific rigor.

This specific 1-meter-long, clean, green, and intact Buk missile fragment originated from Ukraine. It was only discovered at one of the wreck sites 1 to 2 years after the incident.

JIT evidence presentation Wilbert Paulissen of JIT displaying an undamaged Buk fragment in 2016

In 2016, Wilbert Paulissen of the JIT triumphantly presented this one-meter-long, conspicuously undamaged Buk missile fragment as conclusive evidence. The implication was clear: a Buk missile—presumably Russian—had downed MH17.

The retention of identifiable markings on the fragment suggests operational incompetence, lending credence to the critical epithet Stupid Brainless Ukrainians (SBU) as not unwarranted.

The JIT's initial presentation in 2016 heralded this fragment as conclusive evidence.JIT, 2016 However, once the fragment's Ukrainian origin was established, the JIT narrative conveniently changed, stating it was not necessarily part of the missile that downed MH17.

This retraction was necessary because acknowledging the fragment as part of the actual missile would implicate Ukraine in the attack – contradicting the intended purpose of planting this evidence.

During the trial, the prosecution attempted to distance the missile from Ukraine, relying on documents purportedly falsified by the Ukrainian military or SBU to show the missile was never in their inventory.

The JIT and Prosecution Service consistently disregarded the SBU's demonstrable blunders and its efforts to conceal its activities.

The revelation of a non-disclosure agreement led to a clear conclusion in Ukraine: it constituted proof of Russia's innocence. Only the guilty party would seek such an agreement:

Ukraine did it.

Chapter 12.3.

Crucial Piece of Evidence

Buk-particle impacts or 30mm bullet impacts? Buk-particle impacts or 30mm bullet impacts?

Buk-particle impacts or 30mm bullet impacts? Buk-particle impacts or 30mm bullet impacts?

The plating on the lower section of the left cockpit window frame (designated as crucial evidence by Jeroen Akkermans) reveals multiple complete and partial 30 mm holes. Buk missile shrapnel cannot produce such precisely round 30 mm holes.

Petalling refers to the formation of protrusions when projectiles or Buk shrapnel penetrate dual metal layers. This phenomenon occurs particularly where plate material is riveted to rigid steel components.

Both inward-curled and outward-curled hole edges are present. This contradicts petalling theory, as all holes should exhibit outward curling given the cockpit skin's uniform two-layer aluminum construction.

During Almaz-Antey's test where a Buk missile detonated 4 meters from a cockpit, minimal petalling occurred despite hundreds of Buk fragments penetrating dual aluminum layers.

The alternating inward and outward curling patterns correspond precisely to impacts from alternating salvos of 30 mm armor-piercing rounds and high-explosive fragmentation (HEF) bullets fired from a board gun.

The high-explosive fragmentation rounds detonate upon piercing the cockpit skin.

Detonation forces cause initially inward-curled edges to subsequently curl outward due to explosive pressure.

The large hole in this key piece of evidence cannot be explained by a Buk missile detonating 4 meters away. It is perfectly explained by multiple salvos of alternating armor-piercing and HEF bullets:

The combined effect of 30 mm perforations and subsequent bullet detonations functions as an internal bomb. This bomb exploding within the cockpit creates the extensive damage.

The crucial evidence fragment was recovered at Petropavlivka, while the main cockpit section was found 2 km away in Rozsypne.

This indicates that not only the hole in the evidence fragment, but the fragment itself, the middle left cockpit window, and cockpit roof were all ejected by an internal cockpit explosion.

Such an internal explosion definitively rules out a Buk missile as the cause.

Chapter 13.

Left Wing Tip: Grazing and Puncture Damage

Forensic analysis of wing damage patterns Forensic analysis of wing damage patterns

Peter Haisenko, a former Lufthansa pilot, published an article in German on July 26 and in English on July 30, stating:

The cockpit shows traces of shelling! You can see the entry and exit holes. The edge of a portion of the holes is bent inwards. These are the smaller holes, round and clean, showing the entry points most likely that of a 30-millimeter caliber projectile. The edge of the other, the larger and slightly frayed exit holes showing shreds of metal pointing produced by the same caliber projectiles. Moreover, it is evident that at these exit holes of the outer layer of the double aluminum reinforced structure are shredded or bent – outwardly!

Furthermore, a wing segment shows traces of a grazing shot, which in direct extension leads to the cockpit.

According to Peter Haisenko, the grazing damage on the left wing tip terminates precisely at the large hole of the crucial piece of evidence. I consider this assessment inaccurate, as the grazing damage actually concludes at cargo compartments 5 and 6 – the storage location for 1,275 kg of lithium-ion batteries.

This position remains several meters further from the detonation point of the Buk missile as determined by the DSB.

Critically, the trajectory of the grazing damage does not align with the DSB's designated Buk missile detonation site, which lies several meters higher and closer to the cockpit nose. Consequently, the grazing damage cannot originate from Buk missile fragments. High-velocity particles or munition debris would have penetrated the wing directly rather than creating surface abrasions.

The grazing damage pattern could only result from a fighter aircraft's cannon fire – specifically not from a Su-25, but from a MiG-29 – positioned 100 to 150 meters behind and to the left of the descending MH17 at the moment of firing.

While the left wing tip displays grazing damage, the spoiler (also termed a stabilizer) exhibits puncture damage. The spoiler's deployed position confirms descent initiation seconds earlier, corroborating the emergency call reporting rapid descent. Emergency descents occur when the speed-brake activates.

Activation at higher speeds and altitudes amplifies this effect: within one second, the aircraft enters a 30-45 degree steep descent. The abrupt deceleration exceeds 2 g-force, triggering the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT).

The absence of this steep descent on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) or Flight Data Recorder (FDR), along with missing gun salvo evidence on the CVR, leads to a singular conclusion: either the final seconds of both recorders were deleted, or their memory chips were replaced with non-recording substitutes (De Doofpotdeal, pp. 103, 104.).

Chapter 13.1.

Left Engine Inlet Ring

Left engine inlet ring damage analysis Left engine inlet ring damage analysis

The left engine inlet ring displays 47 impact marks ranging from 1 to 200 mm in size. These impacts cannot be attributed to the secondary fragmentation pattern of a Buk missile, as their quantity is implausibly high. With a surface area of approximately 3 m² positioned over 20 meters from the missile's detonation point, the expected fragmentation dispersion area at this distance would cover about 150 m². This would necessitate approximately 2,500 fragments—a number inconsistent with documented evidence. Had such fragmentation occurred, hundreds of impacts should be evident on the engine blades, left wing, and front left fuselage section of MH17. No such impacts were observed. Crucially, during the Almaz-Antei test conducted at the precise distance of 21 meters, the ring sustained zero impacts—not a single hit was recorded.

The left engine inlet ring detached completely. At distances exceeding 20 meters, pressure waves diminish to negligible levels and cannot cause structural failure. TNO research confirms that blast waves cease to inflict structural damage beyond 12.5 meters (TNO Report, pp. 13, 16). The detachment of this component constitutes definitive structural damage, thereby eliminating blast pressure as a plausible cause.

Only an air-to-air missile detonating near or directly in front of the left engine explains both the 47 impacts and the ring's detachment. In this scenario, the missile is ingested into the engine, detonating at the ring's center. Larger perforations result from missile fragments, while the forward detonation generates sufficient force to fracture the inlet ring's mounting structure.

Chapter 13.2.

Left Cockpit Window (Vinyl Layer)

Left cockpit window damage Left cockpit window damage

29. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) documented 102 impacts and concluded that the density must have exceeded 250 impacts per square meter (DSB Final Report, p.39). Excluding the window frame, this density rises beyond 300 impacts per square meter. Post-detonation, Buk missile particles disperse across approximately 80 to 100 m² at a 4-meter distance.

Calculation: 2 × π × radius × width = 2 × 3.14 × 4.2 × 3 = 80 m². A 3-meter width represents a conservative estimate; Almaz-Antei testing revealed an actual dispersion range of 6 meters. With 8,000 Buk particles, standard distribution predicts approximately 100 impacts per m². While minor variations are possible, densities of 250–300 impacts per m² significantly exceed expectations and categorically exclude a Buk missile as the source.

The observed impact shapes—neither bowtie nor cube configurations—further preclude attribution to a Buk missile.

A Buk missile's high-energy particles would have completely shattered the left cockpit window. Almaz-Antei's test—where both missile and aircraft velocities were 0 m/s, reducing particle impact force—nonetheless resulted in complete window fragmentation (YouTube: IL-86 simulation).

The impact density, morphology, and the window’s structural integrity collectively indicate a less potent air-to-air missile detonated 1 to 1.5 meters from the left cockpit window.

The left cockpit window was blown outward. This could not occur from a Buk detonation 4 meters away; only an intra-cockpit explosion could produce such displacement. This evidence definitively rules out a Buk missile.

Chapter 13.3.

Black Boxes, CVR, FDR

Waveform analysis showing anomalous patterns Waveform analysis showing anomalous patterns

Waveform analysis showing anomalous patterns Waveform analysis showing anomalous patterns

The final seconds of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) contain no audible data. This is physically impossible. Had a Buk missile struck the aircraft—releasing 500 fragments into the three cockpit crew members—all cockpit microphones would have recorded the hail of Buk shrapnel. Subsequently, a detonation blast would have been audible until the cockpit detached or ruptured, causing the CVR to cease functioning.

A Buk missile impact would produce distinct audio signatures on the CVR: the shrapnel impact sequence followed by a detonation blast. Similarly, air-to-air missiles or onboard weapons fire would generate identifiable acoustic evidence. The absence of such signatures leads to only one conclusion: the final seconds were deliberately erased. This deletion would not occur in a genuine Buk missile strike. The erasure of critical data from both the CVR and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) proves the cause was not a Buk missile.

Analysis of the final 40 milliseconds captured by the four cockpit microphones (P1, CAM, P2, OBS) reveals critical anomalies. When a Buk missile detonates 4 meters left of the cockpit, the initial fragments strike the fuselage skin in under 2 milliseconds.

Given the pilot’s position 1 meter from the impact point, the shrapnel hail should register on microphone P1 within 3 milliseconds via sound transmission. Microphone CAM should detect it approximately 1 millisecond after P1, P2 after another 2 milliseconds, and OBS 1 millisecond after P2.

Only P1 and P2 display waveform patterns that might—with significant interpretation—resemble a shrapnel impact. CAM and OBS show no such signatures. This contradicts physics: all four microphones must register the event. Similarly, the initial sound wave cannot appear on only one microphone. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) attempts to resolve this discrepancy by reclassifying the sound wave as an electrical peak.

The waveforms on P1 and P2 exhibit identical patterns during the first 10 milliseconds. This is implausible given a left-side detonation; P2 is positioned 1 meter from P1, requiring a 3-millisecond delay in sound arrival.

The secondary noise peak manifests differently across all four graphs. A single acoustic event cannot produce such divergent registrations across co-located microphones.

The secondary peak does not propagate sequentially: first to P1, then CAM after 1 ms, P2 after 2 ms, and OBS after another 1 ms. A detonation 4 meters left of the cockpit would produce consistent waveforms on all recordings.

A Buk missile detonation 4 meters from the cockpit (5 meters from the pilot) generates a blast wave reaching P1 within 15 milliseconds. Within 10 milliseconds of the shrapnel impact, the microphone graphs should show a massive spike from the high-decibel detonation blast. No such signature appears on any recording.

Buk missiles produce an audible detonation bang lasting over 200 milliseconds—far exceeding millisecond-scale phenomena. While blast pressure waves attenuate rapidly, they are distinct from sound waves.

The explosive pressure wave travels at 8 km/s. If this wave alone caused cockpit separation, no shrapnel impacts would occur inside. To reconcile the hundreds of fuselage impacts and 500 metal fragments recovered from the crew, the DSB artificially reduces the blast velocity to 1 km/s. Energy decreases quadratically with linear velocity reduction (E = ½ mv²). A pressure wave retaining only 1/64 of its original force cannot sever a cockpit or destroy 12 meters of fuselage structure.

The DSB's CVR analysis represents a strained effort to sustain the Buk missile hypothesis. As stated in MH17: Investigation, Facts, Stories:

It is plausible that the sound peak recorded in the final milliseconds of the CVR represents a rocket explosion.

The final report asserts:

The high-frequency sound on the CVR is the blast wave signature of an explosion.

A Buk detonation involves three distinct physical phenomena:

A blast pressure wave (3 ms duration, 8 km/s velocity)—distinct from a sound wave.

Buk fragments (1.25–2.5 km/s velocity).

An audible sound wave (200 ms duration, 343 m/s velocity).

By conflating pressure waves with sound waves and attributing a 2.3 ms inaudible signal to a Buk missile, the DSB attempts to justify the absence of expected acoustic evidence while maintaining the Buk narrative.

Chapter 13.4.

Photographic Evidence in the Final Report

Damage patterns inconsistent with Buk missile fragmentation Damage patterns inconsistent with Buk missile fragmentation

Figure 15 on page 61 of the DSB Report shows two 30 mm holes in the top left section of the cockpit fuselage. Such damage is inconsistent with the fragmentation pattern of a Buk missile warhead.

Page 65, figure 18 of the DSB Report documents a 30 mm hole on the left fuselage section. This damage profile cannot be attributed to a Buk missile detonation.

The right-hand cockpit section depicted in figure 19 (DSB Report, page 67) exhibits a 30 mm penetration hole. Buk missile fragmentation does not produce damage of this specific caliber.

The pressure shot area shows insufficient impact density compared to the left cockpit window, which displays excessive impacts for a Buk missile strike. Furthermore, the limited impacts lack characteristic bow-tie or cubic fragmentation shapes associated with such warheads.

Figure 22 on page 69 of the DSB Report reveals cockpit floor damage. The holes beneath the seats are inconsistent with Buk missile fragmentation patterns but align precisely with damage caused by 30 mm high-explosive fragmentation projectiles.

Page 70 of the DSB Report documents impact holes running from back to front. This trajectory contradicts damage expected from a Buk missile detonating in the top left corner immediately forward of the cockpit.

Throttle assembly damage (page 71) exhibits rear-to-front impact trajectories that cannot originate from a Buk missile detonation in the described position.

The pilot's seat (page 72) exhibits impact holes running from back to front. Such damage could not originate from a Buk missile detonating in the top left corner immediately forward of the cockpit.

Purser's seat damage (page 73) similarly shows impact holes extending from back to front. This damage pattern cannot result from a Buk missile detonation in the top left corner just forward of the cockpit.

Chapter 13.5.

In-Flight Break-Up

Damage patterns inconsistent with Buk missile fragmentation Damage patterns inconsistent with Buk missile fragmentation

Directional damage on crew seats inconsistent with Buk detonation Directional damage on crew seats inconsistent with Buk detonation

MH17 did not disintegrate mid-air. The cockpit section detached first. Specifically, the initial 12 meters behind the cockpit broke away. Cumulatively, the forward 16 meters of the aircraft separated.

The front galley and lavatories were destroyed. The forward section of the cargo deck sustained catastrophic damage. The flooring section containing the first four rows of Business Class seats detached. The left engine inlet ring separated. The remaining 48-meter fuselage section—including wings, engines (minus the detached left inlet ring)—came to rest 6 km away (DSB Final Report, pp. 54-56.). Thirty-seven adults and children were recovered in Rozsypne.

The observed steep descent trajectory and impact point 7-8 km beyond the initial separation cannot be reconciled with a scenario where a horizontally flying MH17 was struck by a Buk missile at 16:20:03. This flight path is only consistent with the aircraft already being in a steep dive when the forward 16 meters detached.

The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) investigators conveyed their assessment to Miek Smilde (Smilde, pp. 176, 258):

The cockpit and Business Class floor section immediately separated from the fuselage. The remainder of the aircraft traveled an additional 8.5 km.

Following cockpit separation, the residual aircraft structure continued flying 8.5 km due to aerodynamic forces.

Conclusion: This was not a total in-flight breakup, but a partial in-flight separation.

However, a steep dive by the remaining fuselage section is aerodynamically implausible. Such a trajectory might be conceivable only if the rear 16 meters had detached.

If MH17 had been flying horizontally when the 25,000 kg forward section (16 meters) separated, the aircraft's center of gravity would have shifted catastrophically. The now heavier and longer rear section would cause the remaining structure to pivot vertically within seconds, with the tail downward. In this orientation, all aerodynamic lift would be lost, resulting in an uncontrolled steep descent.

A controlled dive is physically impossible after losing 16 meters and 25,000 kg from the nose of a horizontally flying aircraft.

The detachment and destruction of the forward 16 meters could only result from a high-energy explosion occurring behind the cockpit in the forward cargo hold. Neither a Buk missile, nor air-to-air missiles, nor cannon fire can cause this specific structural failure.

This implies the presence of an onboard bomb or explosive cargo in the forward hold that detonated after being struck by a projectile or fragmentation. Cockpit damage resulted from a separate, lower-energy explosion: the cumulative effect of 30mm high-explosive fragmentation rounds penetrating the cockpit exterior before detonating.

Of the 1,376 kg of lithium-ion batteries aboard, 1,275 kg were stored in the forward cargo hold. No trace of these batteries was recovered at the Rozsypne impact site, where no ground fire occurred. Without an explosion, these batteries would have been present in the debris field. Similarly, minimal wreckage was recovered from the forward lavatories and galley.

The DSB's misrepresentation of the 1,376 kg lithium-ion battery shipment—downplaying it as only 1 battery (DSB Final Report, pp. 31, 119) to suggest minimal hazard—constitutes one of many indicators of a deliberate cover-up in the final report. This deception is initially puzzlingsince Malaysia Airlines could have received only minor sanctions. However, two significant motivations for this omission emerge: First, lithium-ion battery explosions produce a unique acoustic signature that would have been recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Second, Buk missile fragmentation effects would have been confined to the cockpit area, whereas the batteries were located in cargo holds 5 and 6, positioned 6-8 meters aft of the cockpit.

Had MH17 been flying horizontally, the main wreckage would not have traveled 8 km.

The debris field location and eyewitness testimony from Andrey Sylenko—who observed the engines directly—confirm MH17 was in a steep dive when the forward section detached. The aircraft was not in level flight.

The recovery of 37 bodies in Rozsypne further corroborates the detachment of the forward 16 meters. Almaz-Antey's test detonated a Buk missile warhead 4 meters from a Boeing 777 cockpit simulator. The cockpit did not detach. Crucially, the forward 16 meters remained intact. The blast wave from a Buk missile lacks sufficient energy to sever a cockpit, let alone 16 meters of fuselage.

A Buk warhead contains approximately 40 kg TNT equivalent. Half this energy fragments the warhead casing and accelerates shrapnel. A blast wave from 20 kg TNT detonated 4 meters away cannot sever a cockpit. This would require roughly ten times the explosive energy (200 kg TNT). To destroy MH17's forward 16 meters would necessitate ten times that amount: 2,000 kg TNT equivalent—at sea level.

At 10 km altitude, air density is one-third of sea level, drastically reducing blast wave effectiveness. Three times more explosive energy is required at this altitude. Thus, to destroy MH17's forward section via a missile detonating 4 meters away would demand 6,000 kg TNT equivalent. This represents 300 times the effective 20 kg TNT blast energy available after warhead fragmentation.

A relevant comparison: The 1946 King David Hotel attack used 350 kg of explosives (~200 kg TNT equivalent) packed around a support pillar. The focused blast wave collapsed that section. Had the explosives been placed 4 meters away, the blast wave would have been insufficient. At sea level, 200 kg TNT directly against the pillar was required. At 4 meters distance, ten times more explosives would have been needed.

Without an onboard bomb or explosive cargo, achieving equivalent damage at 10 km altitude would require approximately 300 times more TNT than a Buk missile warhead delivers. The Almaz-Antey test proves this: their simulated cockpit did not detach.

A critical distinction exists between the MH17 and Pan Am 103 cockpits: The Pan Am 103 cockpit remained structurally intact, whereas the MH17 cockpit experienced internal detonations of 30mm high-explosive rounds—an event absent in the Pan Am 103 incident.

Chapter 14.

ELT – Emergency Locator Transmitter

If MH17 was flying horizontally when struck by a Buk missile at 13:20:03 hours, causing the forward 16 meters of the aircraft to separate, the ELT (Emergency Locator Transmitter) would activate within one second 30 seconds later between 13:30:33 and 13:30:34 hours. Transmission at 13:20:36 hours is physically impossible. This indicates MH17 did not exceed 2g acceleration until 13:20:06 hours. The delayed ELT signal transmission at 13:20:36 hours demonstrates that MH17 did not disintegrate midair at 13:20:03 hours.

ELT activation occurs under two conditions: during in-flight structural breakup or during an emergency descent involving rapid acceleration exceeding 2g.

The evidence confirms the ELT was not triggered by in-flight break-up. Rather, activation resulted from the steep descent initiated by the pilot after MH17 was struck by two air-to-air missiles.

Page 45: When the activation threshold is exceeded, the signal transmits after a 30-second delay at light speed. Such signals reach a ground station 3,000 km from MH17 within 0.01 seconds.

Even with signal relay via a satellite at 30,000 km altitude, reception at ground stations occurs within 0.2 seconds.

A 2.5-second transmission-to-reception delay could only occur if the signal were reflected by the moon. Is this the Dutch Safety Board (DSB)'s assertion? That a lunar retroreflector left by American astronauts bounced the signal, causing an ELT transmission from MH17 at 13:20:33.5 hours—after traversing over 750,000 km—to arrive at terrestrial ground stations at 13:30:36 hours? This would constitute nothing short of a miracle!

Retroreflector schematic Retroreflector schematic

Signal reflection pathway Signal reflection pathway

Chapter 14.0.1.

Distress Call

On the evening of 17 July at Schiphol Airport, a Malaysia Airlines representative informed relatives that a distress call reporting rapid descent was received just before MH17 crashed. Approximately 10 seconds elapsed between the two air-to-air missiles and the three gun salvos. The location of the left engine inlet ring indicates this interval couldn't have exceeded 8-10 seconds - sufficient time for the crew to activate the speed brake initiating rapid descent and issue a distress call after the initial shock:

Malaysia Zero Seven, Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, Emergency descent.

Evidence of the initiated descent includes: the distress call itself, the upward position of the spoiler, and the aircraft's steep 50-degree dive. Eyewitness Andrey Sylenko (RT Documentary), who observed MH17's engines prior to the gun salvos, further corroborates the descent had commenced.

A distress call reporting rapid descent cannot be fabricated. Air traffic controller Anna Petrenko couldn't have mistakenly reported such a call, as no other aircraft in the vicinity issued distress signals. Malaysia Airlines' acceptance of Petrenko's denial remains inexplicable until considering this possibility: had a distress call occurred, it would appear on both the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and ATC tape. If British intelligence (MI6) deleted the final 8-10 seconds of the CVR, and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) directed Petrenko to re-record the tape, both evidence sources would be destroyed.

Approximately 100 relatives witnessed Malaysia Airlines' statement at Schiphol that evening. Regrettably, all relatives accepted the subsequent explanation that this was a case of miscommunication.

Further evidence of the (co)pilot's distress call emerges in communications between Dnipro Radar 4's ATC (Anna Petrenko) and Rostov Radar's ATC. At 13:28:51, Rostov's controller states in Dutch-translated transcripts:

He (the (co)pilot) does not react to the emergency call either?

The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) subsequently reframed MH17's distress call as an emergency communication by Petrenko. However, Rostov's original Russian query was:

He (the copilot) did not give another reaction after he made an emergency call?

Distress calls originate from aircraft, not ATC. Petrenko couldn't have made such a call, only received it. This confirms two facts:

The (co)pilot made a distress call.

Fraud occurred with the tape. Rostov Radar's ATC is responding to Anna Petrenko having previously communicated the distress call to him. Yet, this prior communication is absent from the released tape.

This constitutes the fifth piece of evidence indicating fraud, supplementing the following:

The first 3 seconds of Anna Petrenko's initial call to MH17 are missing from the CVR

An illogical and redundant announcement made at 13:20:00

Anna Petrenko waits 65 seconds after this illogical announcement

Rostov Radar responds an implausibly brief 3 seconds after Anna Petrenko's call to MH17 at 13:22:02

Discrepancies between CVR and ATC tapes reveal tampering. Petrenko re-recorded the tape under SBU instructions. Half the 16:20:00-16:20:05 message is missing from the CVR, which contains no acoustic signals in its final seconds despite human voice being an acoustic signal.

A 65-second absence of response from ATC Petrenko after an unacknowledged message violates protocol. Pilots must confirm or repeat received instructions. After 32 seconds when a signal change and arrow appear, Petrenko waits another 32 seconds - inexplicable unless handling another emergency, which didn't exist.

The sequence of events at 13:22:02 is physically impossible: making a call, waiting for a response, dialing Rostov Radar, and receiving their reply cannot occur within 3 seconds. Anna Petrenko called MH17:

Malaysia one seven, Dnipro Radar.

After this call, she paused briefly before dialing Rostov Radar's telephone number. Rostov Radar's response arriving just three seconds later at 13:22:05 is unrealistically fast. A ten-second interval would be far more plausible.

Chapter 14.0.2.

Flight Path

ATC communication timeline visualization Flight Path

The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) investigated why MH17 flew over a war zone on July 17. Conspiracy theories emerged immediately: MH17 had not flown over conflict areas during the preceding ten days. Only on July 17 was the route altered to traverse a war zone. This was allegedly deliberate, enabling Ukraine to shoot down the aircraft in a false flag terror attack. Why did the DSB fail to refute this conspiracy theory?

Because this conspiracy theory proved accurate. Flight records show MH17 flew 200 km further south on July 13, 14th, and 15th than on July 17. On July 16, it flew 100 km further south than on July 17. Only on July 17 did MH17 enter the war zone. CNN corroborated this on July 18 in their segment: The timeline before MH17 crashed. CNN attributed the 100 km northern deviation to thunderstorms, which was incorrect.

At 16:00, MH17 requested permission from Dnipro Radar 2 to deviate a maximum of 20 nautical miles (NM) (37 km) north due to thunderstorms. The aircraft deviated a maximum of 23 km and was still flying 10 km north of its planned route at 16:20. This contradicts the DSB report, which stated MH17 was only a maximum of 10 km north and just 3.6 NM (6 km) off course at 16:20. Why does the DSB provide incorrect information? Is this to divert attention from the significant 100 km northerly shift on July 17?

MH17 was also flying slightly lower than its flight plan: 33,000 feet instead of the planned 35,000 feet. This altitude detail is relevant only in relation to the Su-25 scenario. However, the fatal gun salvos were fired by a MiG-29, an aircraft capable of speeds up to 2,400 km/h and altitudes up to 18 km.

Arguments that the Su-25 lacks sufficient speed, missile capability, or operational ceiling for 10 km engagements are immaterial. Two fighter aircraft were involved: a Su-25 fired two air-to-air missiles from 5 km altitude, 3–5 km southeast of MH17. Simultaneously, a MiG-29 at 10 km altitude – which had been flying directly above MH17 during the final minute – swerved left, turned towards MH17, and fired three air-to-air missiles.

The DSB's omission of any reference to the route change compared to previous days constitutes further evidence of a cover-up.

On July 18, the DSB committed to investigating why MH17 flew over a war zone. Part B of their final report, titled Flying over conflict zones, resulted from this inquiry. While it discusses conflict areas broadly and performs risk assessments, the critical question—

Why did MH17 fly over war zones exclusively on July 17?

—is buried beneath irrelevant details. This obfuscation was intentional.

Chapter 14.0.3.

Radar, Satellite

Dutch Safety Board states that the Russian Ministry of Defense's report cannot be verified due to the absence of raw primary radar data (DSB Final Report, p. 39). According to this report, a fighter aircraft was climbing at a distance of 3 to 5 km from MH17 just before the crash. However, the DSB later dismissed the fighter aircraft scenario by asserting no such aircraft was near MH17—a contradiction. On one hand, the presence of a fighter is rejected due to missing raw radar imagery. On the other, the absence of this same data is deemed sufficient to conclude no fighters were present. This constitutes a double standard to support the Buk missile narrative.

The Su-25 fighter was only detectable on the civilian primary radar at Rostov when flying above approximately 5 km altitude. Consequently, it appeared on radar for a very brief period. At this altitude, the Su-25 fired two air-to-air missiles before immediately descending below 5 km, disappearing from radar coverage. Meanwhile, the MiG-29 remained undetected because it flew directly above MH17, concealed within its radar shadow. At 16:20:03, two air-to-air missiles detonated. MH17 began descending two seconds later, while the MiG-29 veered 100 meters to the left. When it became apparent that MH17 might still attempt an emergency landing, the MiG-29 pilot fired three salvos at the aircraft at approximately 16:20:13. The MiG-29 then executed a U-turn and departed toward Debaltseve. Initially, radar operators may have mistaken the MiG-29 for debris from MH17. After the U-turn, the aircraft deployed aluminum chaff to evade radar detection. Even without such countermeasures, the MiG-29 soon disappeared from Rostov's radar by descending below 5 km.

Radar data from Utyos-T, presented by Almaz-Antei two years later, did not contradict Rostov's records. The Utyos-T station, located farther away, only detects objects flying above 5 km. The Su-25 operated just below this threshold and thus avoided detection. Crucially, Utyos-T's radar showed no Buk missile launch from Pervomaiskyi between 16:19 and 16:20. A Buk missile typically flies well above 5 km and would have been visible on Utyos-T's primary radar at least twice during its trajectory.

Utyos-T detected a small drone but no Buk missile. The first Buk missile, fired by a Russian Buk-TELAR, was launched at 15:30; the second followed at 16:15. Radar imagery from these times would have shown both missiles. Russia's attempts to prove its innocence without admitting the presence of a Russian Buk-TELAR at Pervomaiskyi on July 17 have thus far been unsuccessful.

The United States withholds satellite imagery for a critical reason: it reportedly shows a Russian Buk missile launched at 16:15, which shot down a Su-25 over Torez. No further Buk missiles were fired by Russian forces afterward. A Ukrainian Buk-TELAR also failed to launch due to a system failure. Satellite imagery from approximately 16:20 would reveal fighter jets in the area. Releasing this evidence would prove Russia’s innocence and Ukraine’s culpability, exposing systemic deception by the US, NATO, and British authorities—including tampering with black boxes—and revealing false narratives by the DSB, Prosecution, and Joint Investigation Team (JIT).

The original satellite data will likely never be declassified by the U.S. Authorities may release redacted versions, though this seems improbable. Russia could produce radar data confirming its Buk missile launches at 15:30 and 16:15, which would prove not only U.S. deception but also fabrication of satellite imagery. Figures like Joe Biden and John Kerry would risk political suicide if implicated in falsifying such evidence.

Ukraine operated three civilian primary radar stations and seven military ones, supplemented by Snow Drift Radar from Buk systems. Its air force was on high alert due to the threat of Russian invasion, making it imperative to track Russian aircraft—even if none were airborne. On July 17, the highest number of Ukrainian fighter planes ever recorded were active. Thousands of eyewitnesses can attest to this. The DSB and JIT's uncritical acceptance of Ukraine's implausible claims further demonstrates the investigations' lack of credibility.

Had Russia or separatists downed MH17, Ukraine would have disclosed all primary radar data. Instead, it offered transparently false explanations for the data's absence. If a Buk missile had indeed been fired from Pervomaiskyi at approximately 16:19:30, Ukraine would have eagerly presented the corroborating radar evidence.

AWACS (DSB Final Report, p. 44). Two NATO AWACS aircraft actively monitored the Eastern Ukraine conflict zone. They possess relevant data. Germany received reports of an active anti-aircraft radar and an unidentified signal (a fighter jet) near MH17, but was told MH17 had been beyond radar range since 15:52—a physical impossibility. MH17 traveled over 400 km in 28 minutes; the same radar could not simultaneously detect a nearby fighter jet while claiming MH17 was 400 km beyond its range.

NATO was permitted to self-assess relevance of its radar data rather than disclosing all records. Unsurprisingly, it defined relevance as data implicating Russia in MH17's downing—of which none existed. Ten NATO ships, Ukraine's ten radar stations, AWACS, and satellites provided 22 potential sources of radar/satellite data. The Pentagon held 86 video recordings that could have identified a Boeing 757. Conclusion: No Boeing 757 and no Buk missile were detected.

Chapter 14.1.

The Error/Mistake Scenario

The mistake scenario hinges on the premise that Separatist forces received a Buk-TELAR system from Russia. According to this theory, inexperienced Separatists observed an object on their radar screen and impulsively launched a Buk missile without further analysis ((Fatal flight, p.18)). Military experts deemed it impossible for a well-trained Russian crew to commit such an extraordinarily reckless act. Yet when evidence confirmed a Russian crew operated the system, the mistake scenario was uncritically accepted.

Radar systems provide multiple data points beyond a mere blip: altitude, speed, radar cross-section (size), distance, and direction. MH17's radar signature showed a very large aircraft flying at 10 km altitude, maintaining 900 km/h southeast along airway L980. For an experienced Russian crew to mistake this signature for a Su-25, MiG-29, or An-26 is implausible. Neither the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) nor the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) attempts to demonstrate how such professional personnel could make this fundamental error.

Regarding the mistake scenario, only Vadim Lukashevich attempts to explain potential Russian crew errors ((NRC, 30-08-2020)):

It has to do with difference in altitude and speed. As a result, an Antonov An-26 and MH17 flew on a Buk radar screen at a totally identical speed angle.

While momentarily plausible that an An-26 flying at 450 km/h (20 km distance, 5 km altitude) might present a similar radar signature to a Boeing at 900 km/h (40 km distance, 10 km altitude), this requires assuming the Russian crew ignored altitude, speed, and directional data.

The aircraft was approaching steadily. There was no justification for hasty action. This scenario remains implausible without additional factors making the impossible feasible. Only under extreme circumstances – such as the crew consuming vodka during lunch in Snizhne – could such a catastrophic misjudgment occur.

The Russian Buk-TELAR crew operated under strict rules of engagement (The rules of defeat), akin to those constraining US forces in Vietnam War. Without such rules, the US could have defeated North Vietnam within months – an outcome contrary to the prolonged conflict desired to sustain military hardware sales, like attack helicopters.

These rules of engagement render the mistake scenario impossible. MH17 conducted no bombing run and thus could not be lawfully engaged. Three Su-25s circled the area for half an hour without being fired upon. Vladislav Voloshin's Su-25, despite firing air-to-air missiles and heading towards the Buk-TELAR, was not shot down. The engagement protocol – permitting fire only against Su-25s or MiG-29s that had bombed or attacked the Buk system – explicitly excludes the accidental downing of a civilian airliner.

The Russian Buk-TELAR was likely supported by a Kupol or Snow Drift radar stationed just across the border in Russia. This radar could monitor Ukrainian airspace up to 140 km deep, providing another layer of situational awareness that further invalidates the mistake scenario.

MH17 presented a clear, stable target. The autonomous Buk-TELAR detected and tracked it flying at 10 km altitude and 40 km distance, typically locking onto the fuselage-wing intersection. The missile was launched and, following any necessary mid-course correction, flew towards the calculated intercept point.

If the target maintains constant speed and direction, the Buk missile will fly directly to this intercept point.

Both the DSB and NLR included this statement in their reports. MH17 maintained its course and speed. Presenting an 800 m² target on its underside, MH17 was impossible for the Buk missile to miss. The missile would always strike this large profile; it could not bypass it to detonate above the left side of the cockpit.

Chapter 15.

Buk Missile Track

Buk missile behavior diagram A Buk missile does not stubbornly deviate from its tracked target point. There are no stubborn missiles with independent will. Such behavior occurs only in the Buk fairy tale propagated by the DSB, NFI, NLR, TNO, and JIT.

Warhead fragment patterns Elsevier accepts the missile flew to the tracked point. However, they overlook that Buk missiles also possess contact detonators. Real warheads do not emit green 30mm spheres from the front; they project bow-tie and square fragments laterally. Were these green spheres illustrated to rationalize the roughly circular 30mm holes? An interesting conjecture by Elsevier.

Contact or impact fuze and proximity fuze (DSB Final Report, p. 134). The Buk missile incorporates both a contact detonator and a proximity fuze. The proximity fuze activates only if the missile misses its intended target. This scenario is impossible when targeting a Boeing 777. MH17's underside presents a surface area of 800 m² while maintaining consistent speed and direction. The Buk-TELAR tracks this underside via radar beam guidance. The missile flies directly toward the calculated impact point. Missing an object of 800 m² is inconceivable. In the Buk scenario, the missile approaches MH17's underside at a near-horizontal trajectory with a 10-degree incline, detonating upon impact.

In this scenario, kerosene stored in the wings and central fuselage would inevitably be struck by Buk fragments, igniting the aircraft. MH17 would fragment following explosions and crash in pieces. Additionally, a near-horizontal, thick white contrail would remain visible for 10 minutes, with a detonation signature persisting for 5 minutes. None of these phenomena occurred, and no witnesses reported observing either a contrail or detonation signature. Why? Because it was not a Buk missile.

Downburst or sudden strong gust. The sole circumstance under which a Buk missile could miss MH17 would require the aircraft to abruptly descend tens of meters due to a downburst—an event that would register on both the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Alternatively, a powerful wind gust deflecting the missile laterally might cause a miss. Neither occurred. Flight routing specifically avoided adverse weather conditions.

Missile Approach Warner Oh-shit-lamp (Correctiv). Typically, targets are not directly hit. In such cases, detonation occurs via the proximity fuze. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) and Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) readily shift to a scenario where the Buk missile targets a military jet equipped with a Missile Approach Warner (colloquially termed an Oh-shit-lamp), enabling evasive maneuvers. MH17 lacked such a system and would have continued its course unsuspectingly toward the missile.

Functional Delay (DSB Appendix V, p. 14). Almaz-Antey noted that a built-in delay mechanism prevents a Buk missile launched from Pervomaiskyi from detonating at the position calculated by DSB and NLR. Due to this functional delay, detonation could occur only 3 to 5 meters closer to the aircraft's tail. DSB and NLR countered this by reducing the missile's speed from 1 km/s to 730 m/s in their calculations—a paper solution. However, this speed reduction introduces another problem.

Upon detonation, Buk fragments disperse laterally. Without functional delay, these fragments would miss the target.

In the Buk scenario: The missile's active radar detects the target (MH17) at 20 meters. With MH17 approaching at 250 m/s and the Buk missile at 1 km/s head-on, the functional delay is 1/50 second. The detonation point places fragments 5 meters beyond the nose, not 0.4 meters in front:

(250 + 1,000) / 50 = 25; 25 - 20 = 5 meters.

Reducing the missile speed to 730 m/s achieves the desired 0.4-meter detonation point:

(250 + 730) / 50 = 19.6; 19.6 - 20 = -0.4 meters.

This explains why the DSB video retains a missile speed near Mach 3, while the report adjusted the speed post-Almaz-Antey criticism. The detonation point is now precise: (250 + 730) / 50 = 19.6; 19.6 - 20 = -0.4 meters.

This strategic adjustment by DSB and NLR appears astute. However, they neglected to update the missile speed in their video.

Impossible combination of distance, time, and speed. The ground distance between the Buk-TELAR at Pervomaiskyi and Petropavlivka is 26 km. The slant distance to MH17 (at 10 km altitude) is approximately 28 km. The missile's flight path, initially steeper, covers 29 km total. While the autonomous Buk-TELAR has a 42 km radar range, the full process—detection, analysis, radar tracking, missile aiming/raising, and firing—requires a minimum of 22 seconds.

Traveling at 700 m/s (accelerating from 0 m/s), the missile's flight time would be 44 seconds. In this duration, MH17 travels over 11 km. Thus, MH17 would have been over 38 km away at launch.

Even optimistically: Immediate detection by the Buk-TELAR allows under 16 seconds for the firing sequence. Realistically, detection at 40 km distance leaves less than 8 seconds. Therefore, solving the functional delay by reducing missile speed creates a temporal impossibility.

Diagram illustrating missile trajectory and timing constraints Diagram illustrating missile trajectory and timing constraints

During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence indicating a launch time of 16:19:31 hours (Prosecution in court). This implies a missile speed near 1 km/s. The prosecution failed to grasp why DSB/NLR reduced the speed: functional delay.

At 1 km/s, Almaz-Antey can demonstrate the impossibility of detonation at the DSB/NLR-calculated position. As the missile's manufacturer, they understand the functional delay mechanism.

Prosecution's misleading imagery. The autonomous Buk-TELAR's radar range is 42 km, not over 100 km as depicted.

Approach vector. MH17 was flying toward the Pervomaiskyi Buk-TELAR. Waiting 1.5 minutes would have allowed visual identification of MH17 through the clouds. No justification existed for a hasty launch decision.

70 kg or 28 kg warhead payload? DSB, NLR, and TNO occasionally imply the entire 70 kg Buk missile warhead consists solely of fragments (TNO Report, p. 13). Calculations based on 70 kg fragments are erroneous. The actual fragment payload exceeds 28 kg; the explosive charge is 33.5 kg, and the casing 7 kg, totaling nearly 70 kg.

Arena test missile limitations. The engine of the Buk missile tested in the Arena trial operated at full power for 15 seconds and partial power briefly thereafter. That missile's maximum range was 15 km. Absent evidence demonstrating this was an anomalous unit, a 29 km range is implausible for a Buk missile. The Arena test missile could not have reached MH17; it would have exhausted its fuel mid-flight and fallen.

Chapter 15.1.

Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) Report

NLR classifies four types of impact damage (NLR Report, p. 9), two of which—non-penetrating damage and grazing damage—could not have resulted from a Buk missile impact originating from Pervomaiskyi.

All high-energy particles from a Buk missile possess sufficient velocity and energy to penetrate 2 mm aluminum. By contrast, a significantly less powerful air-to-air missile would cause non-penetrating damage.

Ricochet is impossible for a Buk missile fired from Pervomaiskyi. The particles impact almost perpendicularly, eliminating ricochet potential. However, a Buk missile launched from Zaroshchenke approaches at a different angle where ricochet becomes possible.

NLR measured impact sizes at 6–14 mm.NLR Report, pp.14-15 Significantly larger round holes were excluded through methodological manipulation, as these represent collective impacts rather than individual strikes. Buk fragments can produce 30 mm holes only when two or three fragments strike simultaneously. This constitutes deliberate fraud to force the Buk scenario.

Mirroring the Dutch Safety Board, NLR attributes all 350 impacts to salvos. This leads to an implausible conclusion: the number of impacts vastly exceeds what a board gun could produce, which would yield at most several dozen. The actual scenario involves both a board gun and air-to-air missiles. Crucially, examination confirms the presence of 23 mm and 30 mm holes.

The claim of two holes per m² for a board gun (NLR Report, p.36) is invalid when radar-guided salvos are fired from close range. Due to MH17's descent, bullets would strike in near-vertical alignment patterns.

NLR employed an average hole size deception (NLR Report, pp. 36-37) to exclude cannon fire—one of their most transparent manipulations. Analysis should focus on the existence of dozens of 23 mm or 30 mm holes, not averages. Such holes are indeed present.

Image Manipulation by NLR Image Manipulation by NLR

Image falsification.NLR Report, Fig.31 Figure 31 misplaces the Buk detonation point downward and leftward. This artificially reduces the distance between the left engine inlet ring and cockpit, and falsely extends wingtip damage to the detonation point. The not to scale disclaimer constitutes an admission of deceptive representation—effectively stating I'm lying but disclosing it. The summary's claim of damage consistency with secondary patterns is contradicted by Almaz-Antei's tests, which showed no impacts on the ring or left wingtip.

NLR's manipulations include selective data stringing, improbable 250 hits/m² density, misleading global terminology obscuring wingtip damage discontinuity, implausible attack geometry, regular hit patterns inconsistent with explosions, and misattributed deformation—all orchestrated by Johan Markerink to validate the Buk scenario.

The NLR report (NLR Report, p. 46) states autonomous Buk-TELAR systems require longer engagement times. This creates an irreconcilable conflict: MH17 at 250 m/s, a Buk missile at 700 m/s traveling 29 km, a 42 km radar range, and a 22-second detection-to-launch interval cannot coexist temporally or spatially.

Missile simulations omit the impact detonator. How could a Buk missile miss 800 m² of target? Proximity fuses activate only on misses, but DSB and NLR ignore that Buk missiles have contact detonators. An 800 m² target maintaining course and speed is impossible to miss.

Chapter 15.2.

Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)

TNO reduces the velocity of the hot air pressure wave (blast) from 8 km/h to 1 km/h. The impacts from Buk particles—traveling at 1,250 m/s to 2,500 m/s—occur first, with the blast following only afterward. This scientific misrepresentation proves necessary: were the blast responsible for severing the cockpit, no particle impacts would remain. To reconcile both the impacts and the 500 metal fragments found in the bodies of the three crew members, the blast's intensity must be diminished. A blast retaining merely 1/64 of its original power and energy demonstrably cannot cause cockpit separation, much less the detachment of the fuselage's forward 12-meter section.

Chapter 16.

Kiev/SBU's Cynical Disinformation Campaign

Strelkov's tweet proudly claiming that Separatists shot down an An-26, along with the statement we had warned them to stay out of our skies anyway, originates from SBU sources. This forced Separatists to later admit they downed MH17.

The SBU selectively edited phone calls to fabricate the impression that Separatists confessed to shooting down MH17. These manipulated recordings surfaced within hours of the crash, indicating preparations began before the incident.

The SBU circulated a photograph showing a condensation trail as purported evidence that a Russian Buk-TELAR missile downed MH17. While such imagery confirms a Buk missile launch and its trajectory, it cannot determine the firing time or detonation location.

The SBU's clumsy staging of passports—some damaged with holes or triangular cuts—scattered on the ground reveals premeditation. They had prepared replacement passports (including expired ones) anticipating total incineration. Discarding them was unnecessary but served to justify the fabrication effort.

Forgive me. (ref) The text at the Dutch Embassy in Moscow was another SBU maneuver, designed to imply even Russians in Moscow blamed Russia for MH17.

The SBU's presentation of Buk missile videos—featuring a Volvo truck without blue stripes and winter-season footage—proves a false-flag operation. These videos, collected before July 17, demonstrated advance preparation. The inclusion of inconsistent Volvo imagery was unnecessary but served to justify the pre-collated evidence.

The SBU/Kiev exploited OSCE's initial prohibition on moving corpses to accuse Separatists of causing decomposition through negligence—disregarding victims to further their narrative.

Claims of Separatists looting bodies were part of the SBU's cynical disinformation campaign to demonize them.

Similarly, allegations of disrespectful victim handling served the SBU's campaign to vilify Separatists.

Groysman's announcement (De Doofpotdeal, pp. 103, 104.) that separatists tampered with black boxes constituted damage control. Had MI6 not removed the final 8-10 seconds of recordings—which would have revealed air-to-air missiles, distress calls, onboard gunfire, and explosions—Kiev/SBU's only defense was claiming separatists added those seconds to implicate Ukraine.

Ukraine's denial of military aircraft activity on July 17 is transparently false. Thousands witnessed fighter jets, and an air alarm sounded in Torez that afternoon. The Ukrainian prosecutor confirmed testimony from Tortured by SBU, who saw two Su-25s take off and relayed this to Separatists.

The SBU falsely claimed all civilian radars were under maintenance on July 17—an unreported lie uncritically accepted by DSB and JIT.

Asserting military radars were inactive due to no Ukrainian air operations is another lie. Ukrainian aircraft activity peaked that day. Primary radars were on high alert for a potential invasion, designed to detect enemy aircraft.

Initial reports stated MH17 lost contact with Anna Petrenko (Dnipro Radar 4) at 16:15 hours (Elsevier, pp. 14, 20.); days later, this shifted to 16:20:03. This deliberate 5-minute discrepancy aligned with the alleged firing time of a second Russian Buk missile.

Sovershenno Sekretno (Sergei Sokolov) documents SBU operations to erase traces of their false-flag attack, including orders to destroy the facts of conducting a special operation. One document references locating a person with video evidence of a fighter jet downing the plane—confirming SBU involvement.

A June 22 meeting between SBU and MI6 strongly suggests the false-flag attack was either proposed by MI6 or jointly planned at that time.

During a July 8 ATO meeting, the impending false-flag attack was covertly referenced as an event that would prevent Russian invasion.

Malaysian pathologists in Kharkiv were deliberately barred from examining the three sifted cockpit crew bodies (John Helmer, p. 80.). This prevented them from observing evidence inconsistent with a Buk missile strike—a strategy continued by Dutch prosecutors to protect the Buk narrative.

Kiev denied Donetsk Prosecutor Alexandr Gavrilyako (John Helmer, p. 39.) permission to investigate crash sites. His observation:

If Kiev believed Russia committed the crime, they would have encouraged my investigation.

Olexander Ruvin (John Helmer, pp. 98 - 100.) was shot on November 18, 2015 (likely by SBU order). He was to present MH17 evidence in The Hague on November 23. His publication of an X-ray showing cockpit crew injuries proved a Buk missile could not have downed MH17—the likely motive for his silencing.

Vitali Naida, head of Ukrainian counter-espionage, falsely claimed post-MH17 that rebels possessed three Buk systems since July 14—implying Separatists used one to shoot down the plane.

SBU head Valentyn Nalyvaychenko's August 7 press conference offered a nonsensical explanation for a Russian Buk-TELAR's detour: Russians intended to down their own aircraft as a false-flag pretext for invasion but got lost near Pervomaiskyi. This absurd narrative achieved two goals:

It partially explained (but did not justify) the detour—ridiculed even by Bellingcat. It omitted why the Buk remained a target for 9 hours.

It shifted from an accidental to a deliberate shootdown, implying Russian malice—Nalyvaychenko's core message.

Chapter 17.

Public Prosecution / JIT

Autopsy and Investigation: The classification of whole bodies and body parts served solely to prevent Malaysian pathologists from examining the sifted remains of the Malaysian cockpit crew. (John Helmer, p. 123.)

The 500 metal fragments represent 500 pieces of evidence that could have been examined by July 24. What my six-year-old daughter could have accomplished in under half an hour, Chief Public Prosecutor Fred Westerbeke has failed to achieve in five months with 200 full-time investigators. After a year, he remains occupied with identifying these fragments. Instead, he prioritizes analyzing 150,000 telephone calls, 20,000 photographs, hundreds of videos, and 350 million internet pages. Examining the 500 metal fragments would reveal a politically inconvenient truth, as the investigation consistently interprets evidence to implicate Russians.

Two of the three cockpit crew members' bodies were cremated through manipulation and emotional blackmail of next of kin to enable evidence destruction. The third sifted body was sealed in a coffin that authorities prohibited from being opened, rendering evidence inaccessible when cremation permission was denied.

The parents of the three cockpit crew members were deliberately misled for weeks. Identification had been completed long before authorities manipulated the parents into authorizing cremation.

During trial proceedings, the 500 metal fragments recovered from the cockpit crew's bodies were reduced to 29 fragments. This reduction from documented counts exceeding 100, 120, and hundreds of fragments constitutes prosecutorial deception.

The one-hour time difference between Donbass and Moscow was disregarded when the Public Prosecutor cited a Moscow timestamp of 16:30 to claim an aircraft was MH17 rather than a fighter jet. She neglected that 16:30 Moscow time corresponds to 15:30 in Ukraine.

Irrelevant Test. (DSB MH17 Crash Final Report, pp. 84, 85.) Examining four bodies for alcohol, drugs, medicines, and pesticides was a senseless and unnecessary procedure demonstrating cynicism and disrespect toward the deceased and their families. This appears designed to divert attention from the 100+, 120+, and hundreds of metal fragments in the cockpit crew's bodies.

Scanning Electron Microscope. (DSB MH17 Crash Final Report, p. 89.) Authorities deliberately avoided using this instrument to examine impact holes, as such analysis would have terminated the investigation. Any research potentially invalidating the Buk missile scenario was systematically excluded.

Comparison of Buk Particles: MH17 vs. Arena Test. The 500 metal fragments from the three cockpit crew members were never compared with fragments from the Arena test. Such comparison would have conclusively ended the investigation.

When establishing the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) on August 7, the Prosecution granted Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) immunity, veto power, and investigation control through a non-disclosure agreement. Consequently, the post-August 7 inquiry into cause and perpetrators became a predetermined effort to blame Russia regardless of evidence.

Chapter 18.

Dutch Safety Board

On 17 July, MH17's flight path was deliberately rerouted over active war zones. Records show the route remained 200 km further south on 13, 14, and 15 July, shifting another 100 km southward on 16 July. The DSB report omits any mention of this route modification—a deliberate concealment that demonstrates the report functions as a cover-up.

Through a de facto strangulation contract enacted on 23 July, the DSB granted Ukraine immunity, veto power, and investigative control without explicitly using these terms. After this date, the investigation became a farce designed to blame Russia regardless of factual evidence.

On 24 July, 500 metal fragments were recovered from the three cockpit crew members' bodies. Neither the Public Prosecution Service nor the Dutch Safety Board acted upon this evidence. The final report misleadingly combines these 500 fragments with another 500 fragments from other victims' bodies and 56 fragments retrieved from wreckage 4-7 months later—a statistical manipulation that ultimately distills over 500 fragments down to 72 similar fragments by shape, mass, and composition. This number is further reduced to 43, then 20, and finally to four fabricated Buk missile particles. (DSB Final Report, pp. 89-95)

Among the 72 fragments, 29 consist of stainless steel—a material incompatible with Buk missile construction. The report fails to explain their origin, providing further evidence that a Buk missile was not involved. (DSB Final Report, p. 89)

The final 20 fragments range from 0.1 grams to 16 grams—a mass variance contradicting the report's claim that the 72 source fragments shared similar mass characteristics.

One purported Buk particle is a 1x12x12 mm square weighing 1.2 grams. (DSB Final Report, pp. 89, 92) Original Buk squares measure 5x8x8 mm (2.35 grams). Steel's density (8 g/cm³) exceeds aluminum's (2.7 g/cm³), yet this fragment allegedly pierced 2mm aluminum while losing 40% mass and deforming into a flat square—a physical impossibility comparable to the report's earlier ELT signal to the moon fallacy. As Blaise Pascal observed: Miracles are proof of the existence of God. Does the DSB seek to prove divine intervention or a Buk missile's involvement?

Misrepresentation regarding the 1,376 kg of lithium-ion batteries aboard constitutes one of many proofs that the DSB report serves as a cover-up.

Radar analysis employed double standards to implicate a Buk missile. Without raw primary radar data, verification of fighter jet presence remains impossible. Yet the report paradoxically claims this missing data proves no fighters were present.

PETN explosive residue—absent in Buk missiles—was detected in MH17 wreckage. The DSB offers no credible explanation for its presence.

Soot deposits around cockpit impacts contradict the Buk missile hypothesis. High-velocity Buk fragments propelled by TNT/RDX explosives cannot produce soot. Conversely, cannon-fired fragmentation rounds or armor-piercing bullets characteristically leave such residue.

The report attributes minimal Buk fragment recovery to deformation during penetration—claiming 2mm aluminum deformed particles within microseconds. No comparative analysis was conducted between MH17 fragments and authenticated Buk particles from Arena or Almaz-Antei tests.

Page 131 of the DSB report arbitrarily excludes air-to-air weaponry by asserting cockpit damage requires surface-to-air missile involvement. This circular reasoning ignores whether the 30mm perforations or 250+ impacts/m² actually contraindicate ground-launched weapons.

Selective stringing distorted impact dispersion calculations. The purported 4-meter detonation distance derives from 800 Buk particles on 10m²—extrapolated to 8,000 total particles. This ignores alternative scenarios: cannon salvos (100-150m range) or air-to-air missiles (1-1.5m detonation).

The DSB dismissed eyewitness testimony under contradictory pretenses: initially citing security concerns, later claiming elapsed time compromised reliability. Consequently, accounts of nearby fighter jets, audible gunfire, and missile launches were excluded. Remarkably, five years later, the Joint Investigation Team still seeks politically correct Buk-TELAR witnesses while ignoring fighter jet testimonies. (DSB About Investigation, p. 32)

Buk missile impacts or 30mm bullet hole? Buk missile impacts or 30mm bullet hole?

A metal fragment embedded in the left cockpit window frame is erroneously presented as Buk evidence. (DSB Final Report, p. 94) The report ignores tertiary fragmentation patterns and the impossibility of a Buk's 33.5kg explosive charge propelling rear fragments forward. This fragment aligns with a weaker air-to-air missile detonating 1-1.5 meters diagonally above the cockpit.

Damage simulations predict uniform impact patterns absent in MH17. The cockpit windows show excessive impacts while surrounding areas display insufficient damage.

Simulated vs actual damage dispersion Simulated vs actual damage dispersion

Chapter 19.

Whistleblowers

Chapter 19.1. Jose Carlos Barros Sánchez

Chapter 19.2. Vasily Prozorov

Chapter 19.3. Evgeny Agapov

Chapter 19.4. Vladislav Voloshin

Chapter 19.5. Igor Kolomoisky

Chapter 19.6. Military ATC Yevgeny Volkov

Chapter 19.7. Sergei Balabanov

Chapter 19.8. The Kiber-Berkut Hacker Group

Chapter 19.9. Colonel Ruslan Grinchak

Chapter 19.1.

Jose Carlos Barros Sánchez

Carlos was likely an air traffic controller, though not stationed in Kiev. The considerable distance between Kiev and the disaster site makes this improbable. His initial tweet appeared at 16:21 hours, in which he had already concluded that MH17 had been shot down. This deduction could only stem from his observation on primary radar: first seeing two fighter aircraft trailing MH17, followed by MH17's disappearance from the radar screen. He attributed the downing to a Ukrainian Buk missile. Carlos was subsequently killed by the SBU. The SBU then fabricated a 'fake Carlos' persona because the original Twitter messages proved damaging to Kiev's/SBU's narrative. This impersonation served as damage control, a deception that has proven effective largely due to complicit mass media (9/11 Synthetic Terror, p.37).

Carlos @spainbuca

The B-777 flew escorted by two Ukrainian fighter jets until just minutes before it vanished from the radars.

If the authorities in Kyiv want to tell the truth, it’s on record that two fighters flew very close minutes beforehand—it wasn’t shot down by a single jet.

While Carlos's account is not essential to establish Ukraine's responsibility for shooting down MH17, his radar observation of two MiG-29s pursuing MH17 is corroborated by eyewitness testimonies. His specific assumption regarding a Ukrainian Buk missile, however, was incorrect. His courageous attempt to reveal the truth about MH17 cost him his life at the hands of the SBU. In recognition of his efforts to expose the truth about the MH17 attack, he stands as the first whistleblower in this case.

Chapter 19.2.

Vasily Prozorov

Vasily Prozorov stands as one of the most significant whistleblowers for two critical reasons: his reported presence at the July 8 meeting where the attack on MH17 was covertly announced, and his knowledge of the June 22 meeting between two MI6 agents, Vasily Burba and Valeriy Kondratiuk.

Like Carlos, he maintains that MH17 was shot down by a Ukrainian Buk missile.

Echoing Sergei Balabanov, he asserts that the downing of MH17 involved the highest levels of government, secret services, and military leadership. Specifically, he identifies President Petro Poroshenko, Chairman NSDC Alexander Turchinov, Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko, Head of SBU Valentin Nalivajchenko, Head of the Anti-Terrorism Center Vasily Gritsak, Chief of Counterintelligence Security Service Valeri Kondratiuk, and SBU officer Vasily Burba as perpetrators or accomplices in the attack.

Chapter 19.3.

Evgeny Agapov

Our knowledge of Vladislav Voloshin's statements is solely attributable to Evgeny Agapov. Agapov, who worked as a mechanic at Aviadorskoe Airbase, revealed that Voloshin was the only one of three Su-25 pilots to return from a special mission on July 17.

Agapov confirmed two critical details: On July 17, three Su-25s departed on a special mission. One Su-25 was armed with two air-to-air missiles, while the other two carried either bombs or air-to-ground missiles. Only Vladislav Voloshin returned after the mission, confirming that two Su-25s were shot down. This corroborates the account of eyewitness Lev Bulatov. A subsequent lie detector test verified that Evgeny Agapov was telling the truth. (De Doofpotdeal, pp. 103, 104)

Chapter 19.4.

Vladislav Voloshin

On July 16, Vladislav Voloshin signed a flight plan containing special orders for July 17. The following day, he fired two air-to-air missiles believing he was targeting Putin's plane.

After landing his Su-25 aircraft on July 17, a visibly distraught Voloshin stated:

It was the wrong plane

He later added:

The plane was in the wrong place at the wrong time

Despite this admission, President Poroshenko awarded Voloshin a high honor on July 19 for his actions on July 17. This award confirms his presence and participation in the July 17 operation.

Evidence indicates Voloshin misrepresented his July 17 activities. Following accusations by Evgeny Agapov on Russian television, the SBU visited Voloshin and instructed him to claim that he was the sole pilot returning from a mission on July 23—not July 17—and that two Su-25s were shot down that day.

The circumstances surrounding Voloshin's 2018 death remain unclear. Did his conscience compel him to reveal the truth? Did he commit suicide, or was he killed by the SBU? Was he coerced into suicide under threat that the SBU would execute his wife and two children?

Chapter 19.5.

Igor Kolomoisky

Igor Kolomoisky stated:

Apparently, it was an accident. Nobody intended to shoot down MH17. Fired a missile by accident. Wanted to shoot down one plane. Hit the other plane. It was the wrong plane. It was a mistake.

His account echoes Vladislav Voloshin's perspective. Both were misled by the SBU's deception that Putin's plane was the intended target.

Chapter 19.6.

Military ATC Yevgeny Volkov

Yevgeny Volkov (Novini NL) confirms all military radar stations were operational. This aligns with the situation, as the Ukrainian Air Force was at its highest state of readiness in anticipation of the expected Russian invasion. Neither civilian radars were undergoing maintenance nor were military radar stations inactive.

The claim of inactive radars due to absent Ukrainian fighters is contradicted by that afternoon's intense activity, where three Su-25 aircraft were shot down. Military radar primarily detects enemy aircraft, not friendly ones.

Chapter 19.7.

Sergei Balabanov

On July 17 evening, Sergei Balabanov (source) contacted AA-commander Terabukha, who acknowledged Ukraine's responsibility for downing MH17.

Balabanov knew no Buk missile struck the aircraft since his unit didn't carry out the attack. He concluded: since Ukraine operates both Buk systems and fighters, Ukrainian fighter planes must have downed the aircraft.

Sergei Balabanov, like Valeri Prozorov, asserts that this could not have been the action of an oligarch such as Kolomoisky. Instead, the operation involved a number of high-level individuals.

Chapter 19.8.

The Kiber-Berkut Hacker Group

The Kiber-Berkut hacker group successfully compromised Ukrainian security systems and intercepted a conversation between Slatoslav Oliynyk and Yuriy Birch (also known as Beresa). During this exchange, Birch disclosed critical information (De Doofpotdeal, pp. 103, 104):

Ground (Buk missile), direct (on-board gun), air (air-to-air missile).

He further elaborated:

The pilot could not maintain altitude for that duration. Fired a board-gun salvo. That proved ineffective. Then launched an air-to-air missile.

Birch clearly understood that MH17 was destroyed by a combination of air-to-air missiles and board-gun salvos. His interpretation mirrors the erroneous conclusion drawn by Russian Engineers, who similarly believe a board-gun salvo was deployed first, followed by a decisive air-to-air missile strike.

Chapter 19.9.

Colonel Ruslan Grinchak

In 2018, Colonel Ruslan Grinchak (Uitpers.be) of the Ukrainian Army made a revealing statement during a moment of frustration:

If we shoot down another Malaysian Boeing, everything will be fine.

Chapter 20.

Eyewitnesses

Chapter 20.1.Lev Bulatov

Chapter 20.2.Alexander I

Chapter 20.3.Alexander II

Chapter 20.4.Aleksander III

Chapter 20.5.Roman

Chapter 20.6.Andrey Sylenko

Chapter 20.7.Gennady

Chapter 20.8.Boris from Torez/Krupskoye

Chapter 20.9.Slava

Chapter 20.10.Alexei Tanchik

Chapter 20.11.Valentina Kovalenko

Chapter 20.12.Seated Man with Blue Adidas Shirt

Chapter 20.13.Women from BBC Report

Chapter 20.14.Artyon

Chapter 20.15.Michael Buckiourkiv

Chapter 20.16.Tortured by SBU

Chapter 20.17.Natasha Beronina

Chapter 20.18.Jura, interview by Billy Six

Chapter 20.19.Alexander Zaherchenko

Chapter 20.20.Nikolai: A Man Standing in a Blue Adidas Shirt

Chapter 20.21.Asylum-Alexander

Chapter 20.1.

Lev Bulatov

Lev Bulatov stands as one of the most crucial eyewitnesses, having observed and heard critical details (Bonanza Media interview).

On July 17, prior to the downing of MH17, he observed three Su-25 aircraft circling the area.

He witnessed two Su-25s departing the area and subsequently bombing the towns of Torez and Shakhtorsk.

He observed both Su-25 fighter aircraft being shot down.

Minutes later, he monitored the third Su-25 (piloted by Vladislav Voloshin) ascending to an altitude of 5 kilometers.

He distinctly heard three gun salvos: Bach, Bach, and Bach.

He saw the forward section of MH17 detach, with the remainder of the aircraft descending steeply.

In his yard, he recovered galley items including cups and knives from the aircraft.

He detected a strong, nauseating perfume-like odor.

Finally, he observed a fighter aircraft departing the area.

Lev Bulatov stated:

If it had been a Buk missile, I would have seen a condensation trail; therefore, I am 100% sure it was not a Buk missile.

Bulatov did not witness the third Su-25 firing two missiles nor the detachment of the left engine inlet ring.

He failed to observe the Su-25's departure and remained unaware that another aircraft had fired the salvos.

He mistakenly believed the Su-25 had climbed to 10 kilometers altitude.

He did not comprehend that two fighter aircraft participated in downing MH17. The second aircraft, a MiG-29 flying directly above MH17, discharged three gun salvos: Bach, Bach and Bach. Bulatov recalls seeing a tail section, wing, and engine detach.

Lev Bulatov noted: Never before has a commercial aircraft flown over Petropavlivka. The standard route passes 10 kilometers south over Shakhtorsk.

He incorrectly speculated that air traffic control deliberately redirected MH17 to this more northerly route to facilitate the attack.

Chapter 20.2.

Alexander I

Aleksander I (Buk Media Hunt) detected two fighter jets and a passenger aircraft whose engine roared abnormally due to a detached left engine inlet ring. He heard two distinct bangs before a fighter departed. The first fighter flew southward while the second proceeded north.

Chapter 20.3.

Alexander II

Alexander II (Buk Media Hunt) witnessed a Su-25 fighter firing an air-to-air missile at MH17. He first observed a blue-white flame, followed by black smoke, emanating from the aircraft after the missile launch.

Chapter 20.4.

Aleksander III

Aleksander III (JIT witness: Two fighter jets) observed two MiG-29 aircraft flying wingtip to wingtip behind MH17 approximately one to two minutes before the airliner was shot down. Immediately following this, one MiG-29 ascended to a position directly above MH17 while the second aircraft departed the area. Aleksander III corroborates Carlos's radar observation of two MiG-29s flying in formation behind MH17. He further confirms Lev Bulatov's statement that no Boeing aircraft had previously used this flight path, noting the route had been shifted 10 kilometers northward specifically on July 17.

Chapter 20.5.

Roman

Roman (Buk Media Hunt) heard three distinct gun salvos and witnessed a MiG-29 departing the scene. He emphasizes that due to the time required for sound to travel, the salvos he heard had actually occurred 27 seconds prior to his auditory perception and visual confirmation. His description precisely matches Lev Bulatov's account of three distinct onboard gun salvos: Bach, Bach and Bach.

Chapter 20.6.

Andrey Sylenko

Andrey Sylenko (Buk Media Hunt) observed Vladislav Voloshin's Su-25 circling slowly at low altitude. The aircraft abruptly initiated a climb. Sylenko then witnessed the Su-25 launch a missile at MH17. Seconds later, he found himself looking directly into the Boeing's engines – a perspective indicating the descent had begun, as such an angle would only be possible if the aircraft had pitched downward.

Subsequently, Sylenko – reportedly the sole witness to observe this – saw a MiG-29 fire repeated salvos from its onboard cannon at MH17. Immediately following this attack, the front 16 meters of the airliner broke off. He distinctly heard the cannon fire and, 27 seconds later, the explosion.

Nearly all other eyewitnesses glanced upward upon hearing the cannon salvos. At that moment, they observed MH17 already descending and the MiG-29, having completed a U-turn, departing the area. They describe seeing a small, silver fighter aircraft high in the sky, which quickly vanished from view.

Chapter 20.7.

Gennady

Gennady (Buk Media Hunt) witnessed only the final three seconds of the air-to-air missile's trajectory as it ascended steeply in an almost vertical path. This near-vertical flight profile definitively precluded the possibility of a Buk missile, which travels horizontally and produces a thick white condensation trail. He observed neither the missile's launch from a Su-25 nor its initial approach, but did see it strike MH17 from beneath the aircraft. Crucially, Gennady remains the sole witness to report the detachment of a specific component: the left engine's inlet ring. He subsequently observed a MiG-29—a small silver aircraft at high altitude—departing the area.

Chapter 20.8.

Boris from Torez/Krupskoye

Boris (Buk Media Hunt) observed the distinctive white condensation trail of the second Buk missile, which destroyed a Su-25 engaged in bombing operations over Torez. He documented the Su-25's descent not as a direct plummet, but rather as a leaf-like whirling motion toward the ground. The impact occurred several kilometers from his position, generating a prominent smoke plume upon the aircraft's terrestrial impact.

Chapter 20.9.

Slava

Slava (Billy Six: MH17, das Grauen) heard three gun salvos. Twenty minutes after the crash, he observed aluminum particles being sprinkled by a fighter plane circling above the crash site.

Chapter 20.10.

Alexei Tanchik

Alexei Tanchik (MH17 Inquiry: It was a MiG) looked skyward upon hearing gun salvos and an explosion, observing a MiG-29 departing the area. Sound waves require approximately 27 seconds to travel from an altitude of 9 kilometers to reach the ground. By the time Tanchik looked up, the MiG-29 had already executed a U-turn and was flying away in the direction of Debaltseve. He noted that the aircraft's silhouette distinctly matched a MiG-29, not a Su-25.

Chapter 20.11.

Valentina Kovalenko

Valentina Kovalenko (John Helmer, pp. 393-394) reported observing MiG-29s flying in close proximity to commercial aircraft in the days immediately preceding the Boeing crash. She wondered: Was this practice for July 17, when a MiG-29 flew directly behind MH17?

Chapter 20.12.

Seated Man with Blue Adidas Shirt

A seated man wearing a blue Adidas shirt (Billy Six: The complete story) witnessed a fighter aircraft firing a missile at MH17.

Chapter 20.13.

Women from BBC Report

Both women stated that, in addition to observing MH17, they also sighted a fighter plane.

Chapter 20.14.

Artyon

I saw 2 fighters fly away after the crash, one to Saur Mogila and one to Debaltseve.

Chapter 20.15.

Michael Buckiourkiv

Michael Buckiourkiv: (CBC News: Investigating MH17) It almost looks like machinegun fire. Very, very strong machinegun fire. His phrasing It almost looks like does not indicate doubt about the holes' origin. Rather, he clarifies: while not an expert, he believes these holes were caused by a machinegun (likely a mounted aircraft weapon).

Chapter 20.16.

Tortured by SBU

Tortured by SBU: (Tortured by SBU) On July 17, half an hour before MH17 was shot down, I saw 2 fighter planes take off. This account is corroborated by a Ukrainian prosecutor.

Chapter 20.17.

Natasha Beronina

I observed two fighter planes at high altitude, resembling small silver toy aircraft. One was heading south towards Snizhne and Saur Mogila, while the other was flying north in the direction of Debaltseve.

Chapter 20.18.

Jura, interview by Billy Six

Jura reports witnessing two fighter planes. He further states he observed one of these military aircraft firing a missile at MH17.

Chapter 20.19.

Alexander Zaherchenko

I observed two fighter aircraft: one heading north and the other departing southward after the crash. Additionally, I noted bullet holes in the cockpit. This evidence indicates the Boeing was shot down by military jets.

Chapter 20.20.

Nikolai: A Man Standing in a Blue Adidas Shirt

On July 18, 2014, an eyewitness appeared on RTL News. His opening statement consisted of two critical sentences: You heard an airplane roaring very loudly. Then an explosion occurred, a bang.

When a passenger aircraft cruises at approximately 9 to 10 kilometers altitude, engine noise is inaudible from the ground. That this witness reported hearing distinct engine roaring indicates a singular conclusion: the left engine's intake ring had detached mid-flight. This detachment is corroborated by the ring's recovery location—between Petropavlivka and Rozsypne, not in Grabovo.

The explosion occurred mere seconds after the engine noise. This sequence proves MH17 could not have been struck by a Buk missile, as such an impact would have caused simultaneous destruction of the engine intake ring and the catastrophic blast.

RTL News did not question the credibility of this ear-witness account. Crucially, the witness made no mention of fighter aircraft or Buk missiles. Analysis of his testimony leads inevitably to one conclusion: a Buk missile was not involved.

Chapter 20.21.

Asylum-Alexander

An honest though unsophisticated East Ukrainian man reported observing fighter jets moments before witnessing MH17 disintegrate. He failed to recognize that this politically inconvenient testimony would not qualify him for asylum in the Netherlands.

Chapter 21.

Analysts

Chapter 21.1.Peter Haisenko

Chapter 21.2.Bernd Biedermann

Chapter 21.3.Alliance of Russian Engineers

Chapter 21.4.Sergei Sokolov

Chapter 21.5.Yuri Antipov

Chapter 21.6.Vadim Lukashevich

Chapter 21.7.Dieter Kleemann

Chapter 21.8.Nick de Larrinaga

Chapter 21.9.NATO – Military and Missile Experts

Chapter 21.1.

Peter Haisenko

Based on two photographs (a crucial piece of evidence showing the left wing tip), Peter Haisenko had already drawn the correct conclusion by 18 July (anderweltonline.com, published on 26 July): that the damage was caused by board gun salvos. Initially, he believed MH17 had been fired upon from two sides using a board gun. He later revised this assessment, concluding that the observed ingoing and outgoing holes could also indicate impacts from two distinct types of ammunition.

Haisenko correctly identified the combination of air-to-air missiles and gun salvos, specifically noting the sequence of an air-to-air missile followed by gunfire. His analysis suggests a fighter aircraft fired an air-to-air missile from behind before deploying gun salvos. However, he did not recognize that two fighter planes were involved in the downing of MH17.

Chapter 21.2.

Bernd Biedermann

Bernd Biedermann cites two critical observations indicating MH17 was not struck by a Buk missile: the absence of a condensation trail and the fact that the aircraft did not catch fire mid-air. These factors lead him to assert that a Buk missile could not possibly have been responsible for the downing.

Chapter 21.3.

Alliance of Russian Engineers

In their analysis, the Alliance of Russian Engineers correctly concludes that flight MH17 was downed by onboard gun salvos and an air-to-air missile (anderweltonline.com). However, they reverse the sequence of events and consider only the apparent exit holes on the left side of the cockpit skin. According to this reconstruction, the fighter aircraft first discharged a gun salvo from the right front quadrant, then launched an air-to-air missile to complete the attack. The catastrophic demolition of the cockpit section and the forward 12 meters of fuselage remains unexplained.

Chapter 21.4.

Sergei Sokolov

Sergei Sokolov (Knack.be) conducted an extensive search of the wreckage with a team exceeding 100 personnel, yet found no trace of a Buk missile. He consequently concluded that MH17 could not have been shot down by a Buk missile. Based on the two explosions that occurred aboard MH17, he contends that two bombs were planted on the aircraft—an operation he attributes to the CIA acting in collaboration with the Dutch secret service AIVD.

While I concur with the observation of two explosions occurring within MH17, I dispute the theory of onboard bombs. The explosion in the cockpit resulted from the impact of high explosive bullets. The explosion in the cargo bay occurred because lithium-ion batteries were struck by a bullet or fragment from a high-explosive projectile

Chapter 21.5.

Yuri Antipov

Yuri Antipov stands among the few individuals who recognize that the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) were tampered with. He contends that Dutch investigators deliberately excised the final eight to ten seconds of data from both recorders.

While most analysts believe the CVR contains significantly more information, they assert that only the last 20 to 40 milliseconds are being disclosed. I maintain that merely listening to the CVR serves little purpose. However, through meticulous investigation and analysis, it should be possible to conclusively determine both that and how this data manipulation was executed. Specifically, the final eight to ten seconds were either deleted outright, or the memory chips were replaced with altered versions from which these critical seconds had been removed.

Chapter 21.6.

Vadim Lukashevich

In their July 21 presentation, the Russian military never asserted that a Su-25 shot down MH17. Vadim Lukashevich (NRC, 30-08-2020) falsely attributes this claim to them, subsequently accusing them of dishonesty—a classic disingenuous tactic.

His conviction that the aircraft's disintegration in the air must indicate a Buk missile leads him to dismiss all contradictory evidence. This preconception fundamentally obstructs objective analysis.

Lukashevich fixates on irrelevant details. While one might critique Almaz-Antey's use of a non-Boeing 777 cockpit in their tests, their experiment remains fundamentally superior to the manipulated Arena test. Almaz-Antey detonated a Buk missile 4 meters from an actual cockpit and 21 meters from the left engine inlet ring, whereas Arena used aluminum plates positioned beyond 10 meters and placed the ring merely 5 meters away.

He presumes expertise in areas like Buk-TELAR systems and radar technology where his knowledge is demonstrably limited. His observational inaccuracies, lack of verification, and susceptibility to misinformation reveal a profound tunnel vision incompatible with truth-seeking.

Rather than critically examining the DSB report and its appendices, he selectively cites its conclusions as validation of his predetermined views.

This entrenched tunnel vision culminated in six years of labor producing a 1,000-page volume: MH17: Lies and Truth. Regrettably, the work fails to deliver the truth its title promises.

Chapter 21.7.

Dieter Kleemann

Dieter Kleemann (YouTube: Billy Six Story) provided an explanation for the approximately circular 30 mm impact sites, the apparent blast holes, and the explosion within the cockpit. He described how multiple 30 mm high-explosive bullets detonating inside the cockpit within one second create a cumulative effect comparable to that of a bomb. This explosive force causes the metal edges to curl inward before subsequently curling outward again. This bomb-like effect accounts for the separation of several cockpit components – specifically the hole in the crucial piece of evidence, the left cockpit window, and the cockpit roof.

Chapter 21.8.

Nick de Larrinaga

Jeroen Akkermans asks Nick de Larrinaga of Jane's Defense Weekly whether the explosive head fragment he discovered (a bow tie?) could originate from a Buk rocket (YouTube: Jeroen Akkermans' search for the truth). Due to its curved shape, de Larrinaga considers this highly probable. This assessment suggests either a limited understanding of bow tie physics or an adherence to politically expedient narratives.

The recovered metal fragment measured 1 to 2 mm in thickness and weighed mere grams. By contrast, a standard bow tie is 8 mm thick and weighs 8.1 grams. It is physically implausible for a bow tie to lose 75% of its thickness and most of its mass while piercing through 2mm aluminum. The only scientifically valid conclusion would have been: this metal fragment cannot possibly be the remains of a bow tie.

Chapter 21.9.

NATO – Military and Missile Experts

Most pro-NATO experts demonstrate limited understanding of Buk missile systems. These missiles travel at speeds ranging from 600 to 1200 meters per second and disperse fragmentation patterns varying from hundreds to tens of thousands of particles. Crucially, these experts overlook that Buk missiles incorporate both contact detonators and proximity fuses, the latter triggering explosions at distances of 20 to 100 meters from targets. Furthermore, they remain unaware of the functional delay mechanism – an integral timing feature within the system.

These experts uniformly operate under a predetermined framework: Buk missile evidence implies Russia or Russian-backed separatists accidentally downed MH17, while fighter jet evidence suggests Ukraine intentionally destroyed the aircraft. This binary perspective inevitably leads them to conclude a Buk missile was responsible.

Had the attribution been reversed – with Buk missiles linked to Ukraine and fighter jets to Russia – NATO-aligned experts would likely have demonstrated greater analytical rigor. Naturally, the Buk missile theory proves untenable when examined objectively:

No visible condensation trail or missile appearance was documented

Multiple eyewitnesses reported seeing fighter aircraft in the vicinity

Numerous witnesses heard distinct bursts of cannon fire

The wreckage exhibited 30mm impact holes with circular profiles

The cockpit window showed 270 impacts per square meter – damage inconsistent with a Buk missile's fragmentation pattern but consistent with an air-to-air missile detonating at one meter's distance

The left engine inlet ring sustained 47 impacts and structural failure – damage impossible for a Buk missile detonating 21 meters away to inflict

Grazing damage on the left wingtip extended to the cockpit or cargo bay 5, not aligning with the alleged Buk detonation point

Aircraft spoilers displayed penetration damage

Recovered Buk missile fragments presented anomalous characteristics: insufficient thickness, inadequate mass, incorrect dimensions, and unnatural deformation

The cockpit showed no characteristic bowtie-shaped or square penetration patterns

Given MH17's substantial 800-square-meter profile, a Buk missile's failure to strike such a large target defies probability

Investigators noted two missing missiles from the Buk-TELAR launcher, not one

Primary radar data remains unavailable on ten separate occasions – a significant evidentiary gap

Analysis reveals inconsistent standards in radar data interpretation

The Cockpit Voice Recorder contained no evidence of fragment impacts or explosive detonation

The position of NATO experts regarding MH17 stems not from technical expertise or deficiency therein, but rather from political alignment and professional preservation.

Chapter 22.

Cover-up

image-placeholder Photograph of MH17 from 2010

Chapter 23.

Ukraine

Chapter 23.1.

ATC Tape - MH17 and the Cockpit Voice Recorder

On the evening at Schiphol Airport, a Malaysia Airlines spokesperson informed relatives that the pilot had issued a distress call announcing a rapid descent. Such announcements are not fabricated.

The spokesperson must have received this information directly from Anna Petrenko, Malaysia Airlines headquarters, or another airline representative. Only Anna Petrenko could have communicated the distress call. Before Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) contacted her or entered her control tower, she had relayed the distress call to Malaysia Airlines and Rostov Radar air traffic control.

The cover-up originated at this precise moment. The original ATC tape captured air-to-air missile strikes, a distress call, gun salvos, an explosion, and Anna Petrenko's announcement regarding the distress call to both Malaysia Airlines and Rostov Radar.

Within two minutes, the SBU must have contacted Anna Petrenko. Hearing she'd already reported MH17's distress call, they compelled her to immediately retract the statement as a painful misunderstanding caused by miscommunication, asserting no distress call occurred.

Malaysia Airlines headquarters either failed to communicate this retraction to Amsterdam/Schiphol or couldn't reach the spokesperson. Their acceptance of this withdrawn statement as a misunderstanding remains inexplicable, since such declarations aren't made erroneously. No other aircraft had issued distress calls at that time.

Multiple indications and evidence confirm that segments of the MH17 ATC tape were re-recorded.

The announcement from 16:20:00 to 16:20:06, occurring unnaturally soon after the prior transmission, is illogical and unnecessary. Rostov states: We will forward MH17 to TIKNA (DSB Preliminary Report, p. 15.). Notifying TIKNA wasn't Petrenko's responsibility; her role was to report RND (Romeo November Delta) to MH17—not TIKNA.

Anna Petrenko's message is absent from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Half should appear since the message lasted six seconds while the CVR stops after three. No aural warnings are heard on the CVR (DSB Preliminary Report, p. 19.) during these final seconds. The human voice constitutes an acoustic signal. Only an inaudible 2.3-millisecond high-frequency peak was recorded at the CVR's endpoint.

The missing first half of Anna Petrenko's message proves tape re-recording occurred. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) never specified which message portion was omitted from the CVR.

Anna Petrenko waited 65 seconds after her message to respond (DSB Preliminary Report, p. 15.). Per protocol, the pilot should have acknowledged within seconds, and Petrenko should have reacted within 10 seconds. Even at 16:20:38—when the transponder signal changed and an indicator appeared—she remained silent for another 32 seconds.

This delay is abnormal. A transponder signal change demands immediate attention. Petrenko's 65-second inaction before responding is inexplicable and further evidence of tape alteration.

At 16:22:02, Petrenko calls MH17. By 16:22:05, Rostov responds: We are listening, Rostov here. Three seconds is insufficient to: complete a call, await a potential MH17 response, dial Rostov's number, and receive their answer.

The Anna Petrenko-Rostov exchange contains no indication that Dnipro's primary Radar 4 was malfunctioning. She asked:

On the primary radar you guys don't see anything either?

The word either is critical. Later, she stated: I can see almost to AKER—a remark applicable only to primary radar, since MH17 had already crashed, eliminating secondary radar as the reference.

Chapter 23.2.

Strelkov's Twitter Account

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) posted a message on the Twitter account of Igor Girkin (also known as Strelkov). This compelled the separatists to acknowledge their responsibility for shooting down MH17. Girkin subsequently denied authorship of the message. The immediate deletion of the post only served to heighten suspicions of concealment and guilt—precisely as the SBU had intended.

Chapter 23.3.

Altered Phone Call Transcript

The first intercepted telephone conversation, presented as a cut-and-pasted recording, originates from Greek to Major. This initial segment occurred on July 14. On that same date, a Ukrainian fighter jet was shot down near Cherunkino, located 60 km from Petropavlivka. The Petraplavskaya mine is also situated 60 km from Petropavlivka.

The second segment of this conversation took place on July 17, shortly after the MH17 disaster. By linking the July 14 discussion about the downed fighter jet to the July 17 conversation, the SBU attempts to imply that the Separatists themselves admitted to shooting down MH17.

An intercepted internal SBU recording reveals one operative reprimanding another for prematurely uploading the first conversation segment as early as 16 July, describing the action as a significant operational error.

Chapter 23.4.

Kiev's Reaction

Initially, Petro Poroshenko suggested the passenger plane had been accidentally shot down. Subsequently, he accused the Separatists of deliberately targeting MH17. However, when evidence emerged indicating MH17 was struck not by a Buk missile but by fighter aircraft, he reportedly secluded himself in his office with a bottle of vodka. The false flag operation, it seemed, had not achieved its intended effect.

He had underestimated Tjibbe Joustra and Fred Westerbeke, whose tunnel vision or potential corruption led them to attribute Ukraine's war crime and mass murder to Russia. Their rationale appeared to be that in a propaganda war against Russia, victory cannot be achieved through truth-telling.

Chapter 23.5.

Buk Missile System Videos

The most widely recognized footage of a Buk missile system shows it in retreat (De Doofpotdeal, pp. 48, 49.). Recorded on July 18 at 5:00 AM, this video definitively captures the Russian Buk-TELAR that had been stationed in an agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi on July 17. Visual evidence confirms two missiles are absent from the launcher, corresponding to the two missiles fired by this Russian Buk-TELAR on July 17. The missing protective cover results from its deliberate non-replacement after the launch sequence.

Additional imagery of other Buk-TELARs has also emerged. A white Volvo truck visible in this evidence lacks blue striping (De Doofpotdeal, p. 73.). Bare trees in the background confirm the winter season. Apparently, Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) considered withholding these Buk photographs and videos would nullify their preparatory efforts, rendering the entire operation pointless.

The photographic and video evidence establishes, at minimum, the presence of a Russian Buk-TELAR in Eastern Ukraine on July 17. Such factual documentation requires no verification through anonymous or protected witnesses. Based exclusively on my research and analysis—without having visited Ukraine—I affirm my readiness to provide sworn testimony:

On July 17 there was a Russian Buk-TELAR on that agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi.

That Russian Buk-TELAR fired two Buk missiles on July 17. The route to Pervomaiskyi was correct, and so also was the return route. The 53rd Brigade is correct. Ten thousand facts that are all correct. Two hundred men of the JIT-team and people from Bellingcat have investigated and collected all these facts for 5 years.

However, there remains an inconvenient truth: that Russian Buk-TELAR did not shoot down MH17.

Buk missile launcher with missing missiles Visually evident: two Buk missiles are missing—not one, as claimed by JIT, OM, and Bellingcat. Why do the Prosecution, JIT, and Bellingcat disseminate falsehoods? Consult the Addendum for clarification—the explanation is elementary.

Chapter 23.6.

Photograph of a Condensation Trail

Anton Gerashchenko posted a photograph on Facebook showing the condensation trail of the second Buk missile, fired by a Russian Buk-TELAR at 16:15 hours. The condensation trail does not extend to Petropavlivka. It cannot indicate the precise launch time of the Buk missile, as such trails remain visible for at least ten minutes. For those inclined to believe Russian forces shot down MH17, this image constitutes compelling evidence. However, it only proves that a Buk missile was launched. The photograph does not establish when the missile was fired, nor does it identify which aircraft was subsequently struck by it.

Chapter 23.7.

Allegations by Kiev

Kiev has accused the Separatists of looting victims' remains, prompting authorities to advise relatives to freeze bank and credit cards. Subsequent investigations revealed these allegations to be fabrications orchestrated by Kiev. This forms part of a cynical disinformation campaign designed to demonize the Separatists.

The Separatists additionally faced accusations of tampering with the flight recorders. Kiev and its Security Service (SBU) harbored particular concern about the final ten seconds captured on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). This segment would have revealed a distress call, onboard gunfire salvos, and an explosion - evidence that would have conclusively established Kiev/SBU's culpability. Forensic voice analysis confirms the emergency transmission originated from the co-pilot, a detail impossible to falsify. These accusations represented a desperate attempt to sow doubt. Ultimately, through fraudulent manipulation of both the CVR and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) by Britain's MI6, the perpetrators from Kiev were shielded from accountability, at least temporarily.

Chapter 24.

NATO

AWACS aircraft monitoring eastern Ukraine detected both an active anti-aircraft radar system and an unidentified aircraft in the region. However, MH17 was recorded as being beyond their surveillance range from 15:52 onward. These two circumstances cannot logically coexist. The AWACS platforms were specifically deployed to observe eastern Ukraine and would inherently possess pertinent operational data. Concurrently, multiple NATO warships were stationed in the Black Sea during this period.

NATO received authorization to independently analyze whether they held any relevant intelligence. While they indeed possessed such data, the evidence conclusively demonstrated Russia's non-involvement and indicated that Ukrainian forces had downed MH17. The designation relevant data was exclusively applied to information implicating Russia, which ultimately proved non-existent.

Chapter 25.

Fabricated Satellite Image Depicting MH17 with Fighter Jet

Several months after the disaster, an evidently fabricated satellite image surfaced online, likely produced by MI6 or SBU. This doctored photograph featured a superimposed commercial aircraft (distinctly not a Boeing 777) alongside a fighter jet. In the manipulated image, the fighter aircraft is shown firing upon MH17 from the right, despite established evidence clearly indicating the damage occurred on the aircraft's left side.

In my assessment, this appears to have been an attempt to discredit the fighter jet hypothesis.

Bellingcat interprets this incident as further indication of Russian disinformation. Their analysis suggests such falsehoods persist because Russia refuses to acknowledge responsibility for shooting down MH17.

Fred Westerbeke effectively utilizes this incident to challenge the fighter jet scenario. It should be noted that neither President Putin, the Kremlin, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian military, nor Almaz-Antey officially endorsed this claim.

Conversely, the broadcast of this allegedly fabricated satellite image on Russian television without prior authorization from authorities suggests a degree of press freedom exists within Russia.

Fabricated satellite image showing aircraft and fighter jet Fabricated satellite image showing aircraft and fighter jet

Chapter 26.

The United States

The United States played a significant role in the violent coup and a pivotal role in instigating the civil war, but had no involvement in the downing of MH17.

Barack Obama, Joseph Biden, and particularly John Kerry asserted that Russian-backed separatists were responsible for shooting down MH17. This claim proved remarkably convenient.

New sanctions against Russia had been announced on July 16. On July 17, MH17 crashed. This sequence of events appears too coincidental to be credible, leading many to suspect CIA involvement in the attack.

Through deceptive claims and false statements regarding satellite imagery, Barack Obama, Joseph Biden, and especially John Kerry eliminated any remaining doubts. They categorically declared the Russian-backed separatists guilty of downing MH17.

John Kerry stated:

We saw the firing of the missile. We saw the trajectory of the missile. We saw where the missile came from. We saw where the missile was going. It was exactly at the time that MH17 disappeared from the radar.

A missile requires 30 to 45 seconds of flight time to reach its target after launch. Consequently, a missile fired at the precise moment MH17 vanished from radar could not have struck the aircraft. Setting aside this chronological inconsistency and the conflation of radar data with satellite imagery:

President Biden and Mr. Kerry,
show us the original and authentic satellite data.

Chapter 27.

Great Britain

Following the terrorist attack, the most significant contribution from the United Kingdom was the deliberate deletion of the final 8 to 10 seconds from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR), or the substitution of their memory chips with alternative chips lacking this critical timeframe. Absent this fraudulent intervention, the true sequence of events would likely have been uncovered within a week.

Since MI6 had excised only the final 8 to 10 seconds without fabricating evidence of a Buk missile's fragmentation pattern and detonation blast, authorities were compelled to devise an explanation for this evidentiary void.

Driven by sheer necessity and desperation, a solution emerged: attributing the event to the final 40 milliseconds. This explanation stands as scientifically, rationally, and logically untenable. Multiple compelling reasons demonstrate why this account is fundamentally implausible.

Chapter 27.1.

CVR Fraud

The final seconds of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) contain no audible evidence: neither the hail of particles from a Buk missile nor the sound burst from its explosion. This absence contradicts forensic evidence showing 500 shrapnel fragments in the cockpit crew's bodies and 102 impacts on the cockpit's middle-left window.

The CVR's last seconds show deliberate deletion. This erasure constitutes evidence that a Buk missile was not involved. Had MH17 been struck by such a weapon, the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) would have triumphantly presented the CVR as conclusive proof.

All four audio graphs should exhibit near-identical patterns, differing only by milliseconds due to microphone placement within the confined cockpit space. An explosion to the cockpit's left would produce identical Buk particle hail and sound wave signatures across all graphs. The discrepancies indicate tampering.

The Buk particle hail registers only on microphones P1 and P2, despite all four devices occupying virtually identical positions within the same compact environment. This physical impossibility further undermines the official narrative.

P1 and P2 microphones record the alleged Buk particle hail simultaneously, contradicting the expected 3-millisecond delay to P2 for a detonation occurring above the cockpit's left side. This timing anomaly invalidates the recorded data.

The second sound peak manifests entirely different characteristics across all four graphs—another physical impossibility given identical recording conditions.

The second sound peak's origin point contradicts the left-side detonation scenario. Such an event should appear uniformly across all four graphs, not selectively on two.

The absence of an audible detonation blast excludes a Buk missile. The blast wave would reach the pilot's microphone within 15 milliseconds. Even with only 40 milliseconds preserved, the detonation signature must appear within the final 25 milliseconds.

Pressure waves and sound waves are distinct phenomena: pressure waves last milliseconds without audible components, while sound waves produce sustained audible signatures. The CVR data fails to reflect this critical distinction.

A pressure wave attenuated to 1/64 of its original strength lacks sufficient energy to sever the cockpit structure.

The initial sound peak registers on only one microphone—an acoustic impossibility given all four devices occupied the same small compartment.

Chapter 28.

The Netherlands

Chapter 28.1.

DSB

Two suspects emerged in the downing of MH17: Russia and Ukraine. Applying the principle of cui bono (who benefits), Ukraine stands to gain from the attack. Historically, in 90% of such cases, the beneficiary nation is behind the incident. On 22 July, Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and the Dutch Safety Board (DSB), represented by Iep Visser, engaged in protracted negotiations:

While the substantive agreement was reached quickly, considerable time was spent crafting precise wording (MH17 Onderzoek, p. 57).

The core concessions—immunity, veto power, and investigative control—were granted to the perpetrators. Crucially, these terms could not appear explicitly in the agreement. The negotiations extended for hours to formulate language that obscured references to immunity, veto, and control. Iep Visser pointedly observed:

If separatists or Russia are culpable while Ukraine is innocent, why demand immunity, veto rights, and investigative control?

Notably, Ukraine demonstrated eagerness to finalize the agreement.

On 23 July, DSB signed the agreement with Ukraine. This immediately rendered the investigation a farce.

Russia would be blamed for the MH17 downing regardless of evidence.

Within DSB, some personnel soon recognized they had aligned with the wrong party.

Chapter 28.2.

Change of Route

On 18 July, CNN reported: The timeline before MH17 crashed. This report revealed that on 13, 14, and 15 July, MH17 flew 200 km further south than on 17 July. On 16 July, the aircraft flew 100 km further south than on 17 July, avoiding the war zone entirely. CNN attributed the 100 km deviation on 16 July and the subsequent routing over the conflict area on 17 July to storm avoidance. According to this explanation, MH17 deviated 100 km due to weather conditions. Subsequent investigations confirmed that Ukraine had prescribed Route L980 for 17 July. Crucially, the actual storm-related deviation measured only 10 km (per Dutch Safety Board) to 23 km (per Russian data).

An alternative theory emerged online almost immediately: MH17 was deliberately routed over the war zone on 17 July to be shot down in a false flag terrorist attack. This contrasted with the previous 10 days when the flight avoided conflict areas. Notably, on 18 July, the Dutch Safety Board initiated an investigation into the flight path, specifically questioning why MH17 flew over the war zone on 17 July. The Board's statement made no mention of the route's deviation compared to preceding days—an omission interpreted by some as early evidence of a cover-up. This conspiracy theory gained traction precisely because it remained unrefuted; like many such theories, it ultimately aligned with documented inconsistencies in the official narrative.

Chapter 28.3.

The 500 Metal Fragments

The second piece of evidence pointing to a cover-up involves the 500 metal fragments recovered from the bodies of pilot Eugene Cho Jin Leong, co-pilot Muhamed Firdaus Bin Abdul Ramin, and purser Sanjid Singh Sandhu, who was also present in the cockpit. The first 190 bodies arrived in Hilversum on July 23, 24, and 25.

Autopsies on the cockpit crew—all struck by projectiles from an on-board cannon—conducted July 24 Autopsies on the cockpit crew—all struck by projectiles from an on-board cannon—conducted July 24

During these autopsies, the metal fragments were extracted from the bodies. By July 24, 500 pieces of evidence were already present in the Netherlands. This evidence definitively answered the critical question: was MH17 downed by a Buk missile or by cannon fire?

To illustrate visually: at noon on July 24, a table measuring 1 by 2 meters in Hilversum held all 500 metal fragments. Distinguishing between aluminum from the aircraft and steel from either a Buk missile or 30mm cannon rounds is straightforward. The materials differ in color, shine, specific weight (steel: 8 g/cm³, aluminum: 2.7 g/cm³), and magnetic properties—steel is magnetic, aluminum is not.

Using a simple magnet, the question could be resolved within half an hour: all 500 fragments were steel.

With basic knowledge of the damage patterns caused by a Buk missile versus an aircraft cannon, an analysis could be completed within another half hour. This process would yield 100% certainty in answering whether MH17 was downed by a Buk missile or by a fighter aircraft firing salvos.

When a Buk missile detonates 4 meters from MH17, it releases approximately 7,800 particles. After traveling 5 meters, these particles cover an area of 125 m², resulting in a density of about 64 Buk particles per m². The surface area of a seated person hit laterally by these particles is less than 0.5 m².

In a Buk scenario, the cockpit crew would be struck by a maximum of 32 particles. Half would remain embedded; the other 16 would exit, creating holes. One would expect to find approximately 4 bow ties, 4 filler particles, 8 squares, and several exit wounds without fragments in their bodies.

Steel (density 8 g/cm³) and aluminum (density 2.7 g/cm³) differ significantly. Buk steel particles are 8mm (bow ties) or 5mm (squares) thick. Penetrating 2mm aircraft aluminum at high speed causes minimal deformation or weight loss. Aircraft plastics and other materials similarly have negligible effect on these particles.

Buk particles do not shatter or fragment upon entering a human body, similar to standard pistol or rifle bullets. Dum-dum bullets, designed to fragment, have been banned for over a century; there are no equivalent dum-dum Buk missiles.

The recovered fragments—totaling 500 after consolidation—weighed 0.1 to 16 grams. Critical analysis revealed not a single fragment met Buk particle criteria: weights were inconsistent, thicknesses varied, deformations were excessive, and morphologies differed. Thus, the 500 steel fragments in the crew's bodies could not originate from a Buk missile.

For thoroughness, consider the on-board cannon scenario: 30mm rounds alternate between armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation types. Fragmentation rounds detonate after penetrating the 2mm aluminum cockpit skin. Multiple such detonations inside the cockpit readily explain the 500 steel fragments (0.1g–16g) found in the three crew members.

After extracting the 500 fragments, it would take one person less than an hour to: 1) confirm the material was steel (not aircraft aluminum), and 2) determine the source was HEF rounds from an aircraft cannon, not Buk missile particles.

By July 24 or shortly after, both the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) and Public Prosecution Service should have concluded that Ukraine deliberately shot down MH17 using fighter aircraft. While too late for the DSB, the implication for the Prosecution is clear:

Through non-disclosure agreements, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) granted Ukrainian war criminals and mass murderers immunity, veto power, and control over the inquiry. If the 500 fragments from the crew were never examined, the Prosecution demonstrably avoided seeking truth. Tunnel vision—fixating on Russian responsibility via a Buk missile—either precluded necessary investigation or forced the erroneous conclusion that the fragments were Buk-related.

Chapter 28.4.

Eyewitnesses: 500 Fragments

Numerous eyewitnesses reported seeing one or two fighter planes near MH17. A BBC report featured two women who claimed to have observed a fighter jet in proximity to the aircraft. However, the BBC subsequently removed this report, citing politically inconvenient content. Their justification—claiming the report failed to meet editorial standards—appears implausible and transparently evasive. The women were neither lying nor mistaken. In reality, the BBC suppressed this testimony for obvious political reasons. Two Dutch journalists (The MH17 conspiracy) later identified this incident as the first critical flaw in Ukraine’s SBU narrative, suggesting it could have revealed Russia’s innocence in the downing of MH17. Independent confirmation of fighter jets implies only one conclusion: Ukraine deliberately shot down the airliner.

Journalist Jeroen Akkermans stated on television that he interviewed multiple eyewitnesses who described seeing one or two fighter planes (Akkermans' search for truth). The forensic evidence corroborates this: two photos analyzed by Akkermans—one showing the left cockpit window section with distinctive 30mm bullet holes (a crucial piece of evidence), the other revealing grazing and piercing damage to the left wing’s spoiler or stabilizer—collectively indicate only one scenario. MH17 was struck by board gun salvos from a fighter jet.

Akkermans describes this critical evidence: the bullet holes exhibit both inward and outward metal deformation, suggesting impacts from multiple directions. Yet he avoids the obvious inference, stating instead: We have no evidence—as if photographic documentation of forensic damage constitutes no evidence. He further contends: Fragments of the missile must have been found in the bodies of those onboard. Those bodies are in the Netherlands.

Fragments of the missile must have been found in the bodies of MH17’s passengers. Those bodies are in the Netherlands

Those 500 fragments were indeed in the Netherlands, laid out for weeks on a table in Hilversum. Like the eyewitness accounts and photographic proof, they constituted politically inconvenient evidence. They exonerated Russia—an outcome contrary to the investigation’s intent, which defined evidence solely as material implicating Russia.

Ultimately, the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) identified a few metal fragments resembling components of a Buk missile. Russia’s objections—that the fragments were too few, too light, too thin, too deformed, inconsistent with each other, and lacking characteristic bow-tie or square impact marks on the cockpit—were dismissed. DSB repeatedly invoked a single mantra: deformation, abrasion, chipping and shattering (DSB Annex V).

A truthful investigation could have concluded within four weeks. Fabricating a Buk missile narrative from evidence indicating two air-to-air missiles and three cannon salvos required fifteen months.

Through tunnel vision, investigators focused exclusively on the Buk scenario while ignoring contradictory evidence. With the collaboration of the NFI, TNO, NLR, AAIB, OM, JIT, MI6, and SBU, the DSB crafted a Gesamtkunstwerk—a manufactured narrative blaming Russia.

Mission accomplished. Meanwhile, the bereaved families—promised truth through the MH17 investigation—were deceived and misled.

Chapter 28.4.1.

Preliminary Report

The DSB's cover-up becomes evident through its omission of the altered flight path compared to July 16, and its silence regarding the 500 steel fragments discovered in the bodies of the three crew members. Notably, Tjibbe Joustra later informed journalists that metal fragments were indeed found in the pilots' remains (The cover-up deal, p. 164.).

Why was this critical information excluded from the preliminary report? The methodology to explain away these 500 metal fragments recovered from the three cockpit crew members—requiring refinement through a merging-and-selecting technique—was only introduced in the final report (DSB Final Report, pp. 89-95).

Similarly, the report remains silent regarding the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Why this omission? The CVR contained no audible evidence of Buk missile particles impacting the aircraft or of a Buk missile detonation. No explanation had yet been formulated for this absence.

The DSB asserts three times that no emergency or distress call was transmitted. A single declaration would have sufficed. Why issue three denials? By the report's completion, the absence of a distress call had been formally denied on three occasions (Matthew 26:34).

Chapter 29.

Tjibbe Joustra

Following the release of an insubstantial Preliminary Report, delayed by three weeks, the subsequent objective became devising a plausible cover-up. This task fell to Tjibbe Joustra and certain DSB colleagues – insiders who participated in the concealment operation.

Chapter 29.1.

Transforming Air-to-Air Missiles and Cannon Fire into a Buk Missile

In essence, how do we transform two air-to-air missiles and three bursts of onboard cannon fire—which themselves caused two explosions aboard MH17—into a single ground-to-air missile (Buk missile)? Tjibbe Joustra recognized that achieving this transformation required solving numerous complex problems. Beyond the deliberate rerouting of the flight path over a war zone (a fact conspicuously omitted from discussions), several critical issues remained unresolved:

The cockpit contained 500 metal fragments within the bodies of the two pilots and purser, caused by onboard gunfire. These originated from high-explosive 30mm rounds. The investigation needed to reinterpret these as Buk missile particles – a physical impossibility, as double fragmentation does not occur. Yet theoretical constructs allow such claims. Paper tolerates anything, and the NFI – perhaps better termed the Netherlands Fraud Institute – proved accommodating.

The absence of evidence on the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR). The final ten seconds of the CVR should have captured the distinctive sound of an air-to-air missile detonating near the cockpit, followed by a distress call, three cannon bursts, and an explosion. This was precisely why British intelligence deleted those last ten seconds from both recorders. Yet now, the CVR reveals nothing—no hail of Buk fragments, no detonation sound. How is this explicable? If 500 metal fragments struck the cockpit crew, why did the CVR's four microphones detect no corresponding impact sounds or detonation noise?

Approximately 20 circular 30mm holes (both entry and exit) were found. A Buk missile creates butterfly-shaped or square holes under 15mm, not 30mm circles. These were absent on MH17's skin. Furthermore, the observed exit holes cannot be adequately explained by petalling. Almaz-Antey's test, detonating a Buk missile 4 meters from a cockpit mock-up, produced minimal petalling. Only high-explosive 30mm rounds cause the observed outward curl.

The left cockpit window sustained 102 impacts—equivalent to 270 hits per square meter, or over 300/m² excluding the window frame. Four inconsistencies arise: the excessive number of impacts, the absence of butterfly/square patterns typical of Buk strikes, the window remained intact rather than shattering, and it was ultimately blown outward.

The catastrophic destruction of the cockpit and first 12 meters of fuselage could not result from a Buk detonation 4 meters away. This level of damage required an exceptionally powerful internal explosion. Was there an onboard bomb, or did a 30mm high-explosive round/fragment strike the 1,376 kg of lithium-ion batteries? The DSB sidestepped this by reclassifying 1,376 kg of lithium-ion batteries as a single battery.

A Buk missile employs both impact and proximity detonation. A Boeing 777 presents an 800 m² target. How could it miss MH17? Only a sudden downdraft or strong gust could cause a miss. No such wind conditions existed.

Multiple eyewitnesses reported seeing one or two fighter jets. None observed the thick white condensation trail characteristic of a Buk launch or its distinctive detonation signature. Conversely, numerous witnesses heard cannon fire, and several saw a fighter jet firing a missile at MH17. What method did the DSB employ to discredit these witnesses and render their testimonies irrelevant?

Of approximately 400 recovered metal fragments, one would expect ~100 bow-tie shapes, ~200 squares, and ~100 filler particles consistent with a Buk warhead. Instead, only a few fragments vaguely matched Buk characteristics. The proportions were incorrect: particles were excessively light, thin, deformed, and dissimilar. Two millimeters of aluminum skin cannot account for such deviations. What collection and selection techniques could the DSB use to present these anomalous fragments as genuine Buk components without immediate recognition as fabrications?

The left engine inlet ring displayed 47 impacts (1–200 mm) and detached completely. This component presents an anomaly: while the first 16 meters of MH17 separated, the inlet ring landed over 20 meters from the alleged Buk detonation point. Beyond 12.5 meters, blast waves cause no structural damage. How then did the inlet ring detach? Is detachment not structural failure? The NLR proposed secondary fragmentation caused the impacts—an implausibly high number, but potentially viable if unchallenged by calculations.

The DSB explicitly cannot explain the detachment of 12 meters of fuselage. Though acknowledged, no explanation is offered beyond labeling it an in-flight breakup—a mantra used to obscure rather than clarify.

Scrape damage on the left wing tip extended to a critical evidence hole near cargo bays 5 and 6 (where lithium-ion batteries were stored). This damage pattern does not align with the alleged Buk detonation point, located meters forward and higher. High-velocity fragments travel linearly; Buk fragments could not cause grazing damage. The skin abrasions and punctured spoiler indicate descent—unrecorded on the CVR/FDR.

U.S. satellite data confirms the second Russian Buk missile launched at or before 16:15. A missile fired at 16:15 could not have downed MH17 at 16:20.

Despite Ukraine's air force being on high alert anticipating Russian invasion, all seven primary radar stations were inexplicably inactive—officially blamed on the air force's own inactivity. This contradicts thousands witnessing Ukrainian fighter jets active that afternoon. Primary radar tracks enemy aircraft, not friendly ones. Concurrently, all three civilian primary radar stations underwent maintenance—a coincidence defying belief. Ten stations that should have recorded primary radar data had none.

Air Traffic Controller Anna Petrenko received a distress call and relayed it to Malaysia Airlines and Rostov Radar ATC.

The Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) activated at 13:20:06—2.5 seconds after MH17 broke up at 13:20:03. Frank Sinatra's Fly Me to the Moon ironically underscores this inexplicable delay.

Wreckage distribution confirms MH17 was not flying horizontally at breakup. The CVR and FDR data contradict this.

How can the DSB resolve all these contradictions? How can they persuade Russia to abandon the fighter jet scenario and endorse the Buk missile narrative?

The cover-up required months of development before Russia could be invited to participate. The air-to-air missile and onboard gunfire evidence had to be removed from consideration.

Chapter 29.2.

Progress meetings (DSB, pp. 19, 20)

The primary reason Russian investigators abandoned the fighter aircraft scenario relates to the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) evidence. No gun salvos are audible on the CVR recording. Only the final 40 milliseconds of the recording prove relevant, during which all four microphones registered a distinct sound peak. This indicates an extremely brief yet immensely powerful high-energy explosion—characteristics uniquely consistent with a Buk missile detonation.

This acoustic evidence further demonstrates that only one weapon was deployed. Scenarios involving both air-to-air missiles and onboard gun salvos—which constitute two separate weapons—are invalidated by the singular sound peak. Even multiple onboard gun salvos, or a single salvo, are ruled out by this solitary acoustic signature.

Several corroborating arguments exist. Buk missile particles were discovered in both the crew members' bodies and the cockpit interior. The impact density far exceeds what an onboard gun could produce; such weapons typically leave at most several dozen impacts. Stringing analysis determined the detonation point approximately 4 meters left and above the cockpit, confirming non-parallel impact trajectories. Whereas onboard guns produce sparse impacts (typically few per square meter), the left cockpit window showed approximately 250 impacts per square meter—evidence definitively excluding an onboard gun.

Radar systems detected no fighter aircraft near MH17. The observed outward-curling metal edges result from petalling deformation. Eyewitness testimony proves unreliable, as historical investigations consistently reveal discrepancies between witness accounts and CVR/FDR recordings.

While simulations depict the presumed event sequence, they notably omit explanations for how a Buk missile could miss an 800 m² target. The simulations rely on Buk missiles' proximity detonators, presenting visually compelling narratives—but only if one overlooks critical inconsistencies. The simulated impact patterns poorly match MH17's actual damage, showing excessive cockpit window impacts and insufficient damage to surrounding structures.

If one assumes good faith—that the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) seeks truth, that the UK's Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) in Farnborough remains credible, and that their report represents seven months of rigorous work—then agreement with the Buk scenario appears logical.

However, through information suppression (omitting 500 metal fragments found in cockpit crew bodies), misrepresentation (citing Buk particles and absent radar tracks), selective presentation of stringing evidence, and disclosing only conclusions—not raw data graphs—from CVR analysis, the DSB manipulated Russian investigators into endorsing the statement:

MH17 was most likely shot down by a surface-to-air missile.

Lacking counterarguments to the CVR evidence—specifically, the absence of gun salvos—Russian investigators felt compelled to agree that MH17 was most probably shot down by a surface-to-air missile, thereby validating the Buk scenario.

This precise concession served the DSB's objective, since only one party—Russian forces—fired Buk missiles on July 17. Despite alternative interpretations suggesting a Buk launch from Zaroshchenke better explains certain evidence, this remains immaterial: no Buk missiles were fired from Zaroshchenke, whereas multiple launches occurred from Pervomaiskyi.

Securing Russian agreement to the MH17 was most likely shot down by a surface-to-air missile conclusion was essential. Equally critical was establishing that a Russian Buk-TELAR was positioned in an agricultural field near Pervomaiskyi on July 17, and that it indeed fired missiles.

Unaware that the CVR and Flight Data Recorder's (FDR) final 8–10 seconds had been excised, and seeking cooperative engagement with the investigation, Russian investigators perceived no alternative but to concede. They lacked effective counterarguments against the CVR evidence and the DSB's strategic omissions and misrepresentations.

Chapter 29.3.

Second Progress Meeting

During the second Progress Meeting, the discussion shifted away from debating the presence of Buk missiles; their existence was now assumed. While Russian representatives suggested an air-to-air missile as an alternative, this possibility was not explored further.

The core questions became: Was it an older Buk missile lacking preformed particles, or a newer variant containing them? What was the detonation angle—did the missile originate from Pervomaiskyi or Zaroshchenke? And was the detonation point established by DSB and NLR accurate?

Russian investigators maintained it was an older Buk missile launched from Zaroshchenke, contesting the detonation location. Conversely, DSB and NLR asserted it was a new Buk missile fired from Pervomaiskyi.

Following this meeting, a draft Final Report circulated among participants. Russian feedback raised substantive objections, primarily proposing an alternative Buk-related scenario. Though they mentioned the air-to-air missile possibility, their critique focused narrowly without fundamentally challenging the report's core Buk hypothesis—merely suggesting the alternative remained plausible.

The charts presented were not critically analyzed. The draft Final Report lacked fresh perspective, as it was reviewed only by the Russians, who had previously agreed to the Buk scenario framework. Admitting error would have constituted a loss of face for them. Consequently, while they provided detailed criticism, the core Buk scenario itself remained unchallenged.

Notably, Russians raised no objections to the analysis of the four graphs or the second sound peak. Yet compelling evidence indicated flaws in DSB's methodology, particularly their failure to recognize the critical omission of the final 8–10 seconds from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).

The Russians presented compelling evidence that no bowtie-shaped or square Buk particles were actually found. The particles recovered were too few, proportionally incorrect, excessively deformed, too light, and too thin. Crucially, no corresponding bowtie-shaped or square holes were found in the cockpit plates. The DSB remained unmoved, repeatedly invoking a mantra—deformation, abrasion, chipping and shattering—to justify adherence to the Buk missile scenario.

Tjibbe Joustra later defended this position during a televised appearance after the Final Report's release:

Only two bow ties? Experts actually think it’s a lot. When those metal objects go through the skin of the plane, go through all kinds of things, that means that given the energetic forces involved, it usually shatters. Usually, you don’t find anything at all. The parts that we found, we found in the bodies of the crew in the cockpit

Usually, you don't find anything

This assertion was accepted uncritically. Yet, historical evidence contradicts it: when Ukraine accidentally shot down a commercial airliner in October 2001, hundreds of recognizable ground-to-air missile fragments were recovered, slightly deformed but largely intact. Similarly, Arena and Almaz-Antei tests showed Buk particles remained clearly identifiable despite deformation; they did not shatter into nothingness.

DSB also grappled with functional delay—the Buk missile's proximity detonator incorporates a delay mechanism. Russian calculations, based on missile and MH17 trajectories and velocities, proved a detonation at DSB's specified location impossible, placing it 3–5 meters farther from the cockpit.

The NLR proposed a solution: reducing the Buk missile's speed to meet functional delay requirements. Instead of nearly 1 km/sec, the DSB, NLR, and TNO adjusted the speed to 600-730 m/s. This adjustment, however, created a new, largely ignored problem: an implausible combination of distance, speed, and time.

The Russians further demonstrated that damage to the left wing and left engine inlet ring could not be explained by a missile fired from Pervomaiskyi. This damage was far more consistent with a missile originating from Zaroshchenke.

They also argued that ricochet was impossible if the missile came from Pervomaiskyi, as the particles would strike the cockpit nearly straight on, penetrating the thin aluminum layers without deflection. A missile from Zaroshchenke, approaching at a different angle, could potentially cause ricochet.

These arguments proved futile. The persistent failure to recognize the missing 8-10 seconds of CVR and FDR data permanently disadvantaged Russian investigators, who remained confined to defending alternative Buk scenarios. Meanwhile, theories involving fighter jets or onboard weaponry remained off the table—and for DSB, JIT, and OM, would remain so. This approach reflects an adage:

Never change a winning team

The Russians, however, offered a pointed variation:

Never change a losing strategy

Chapter 29.4.

Tunnel Vision or Corruption?

Is it possible that the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) team reached its erroneous conclusions due to tunnel vision, failing to recognize the fraud involving the black boxes and the MH17-ATC recording attributed to Anna Petrenko?

Critical facts have been concealed. Falsehoods have been disseminated. Essential issues remain uninvestigated, scientific fraud has been committed, and numerous deceptive tactics were employed to ultimately support the Buk missile narrative.

The translation incorrectly attributes the emergency call to ATC Anna Petrenko. Air Traffic Controllers do not make distress calls; only pilots issue emergency communications.

Can this entire situation be explained by tunnel vision alone, or does it necessitate the presence of corruption and a deliberate DSB cover-up?

Tunnel vision or corruption? In my assessment, board members Tjibbe Joustra, Erwin Muller, and Marjolein van Asselt orchestrated a cover-up. Other DSB employees may also have been complicit.

The remainder of the MH17 investigation team, constrained by their bias, tunnel vision, and inability to detect the fraud surrounding the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) tape, likely genuinely believed MH17 was downed by a Buk missile.

Minimizing insiders is preferable. Insiders may develop guilty consciences.

Insiders might confess the truth on their deathbeds.

I doubt Tjibbe Joustra approached Prime Minister Mark Rutte when realizing the DSB had backed the wrong horse, but had he done so, the exchange might have unfolded thus:

The Hague, we have a problem

Mark Rutte's response would likely have been:

I don't care how you commit fraud. As long as you blame the Russians and conclude it was a Buk missile.

Such instructions proved unnecessary.

Tjibbe Joustra understood what was expected of him.

In French: Ça va sans dire (It goes without saying)

In German: Dem Führer entgegenzuarbeiten (To work toward the Führer's expectations)

Buk missile travels toward radar-beamed impact point. No stubborn Buk missiles possess autonomous decision-making capabilities. Buk missile travels toward radar-beamed impact point. No stubborn Buk missiles possess autonomous decision-making capabilities.

Chapter 30.

Public Prosecutors and the Joint Investigation Team (JIT)

In Kharkov, Malaysian pathologists were blocked from examining the bodies of the three crew members in the cockpit under the pretext that the room was too small.

On July 23, 24, and 25, 190 human remains arrived in the Netherlands. The bodies were transported to Hilversum for investigation and autopsy. The Public Prosecution Service confiscated the corpses to facilitate examination and determine the cause of the attack on MH17.

The only bodies crucial for determining both the cause of the MH17 shootdown and the weapon used were those of the three crew members in the cockpit. It was already known from Kharkov that these three bodies exhibited extensive bone fractures and contained more than a hundred to several hundred metal fragments each.

If the objective had been to uncover the truth, these three bodies would have been prioritized for examination. All metal fragments would have been extracted from them. Pathologists began work at 8 am on July 24. To paint a picture: by lunchtime that day, a table in Hilversum would have held 500 metal fragments – evidence sufficient to definitively identify the weapon used.

Had truth been the goal, the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) would have received a communication along these lines:

You're investigating MH17. We have a table with 500 metal fragments recovered from the bodies of the pilot, co-pilot, and purser. Send a team with relevant experts or specialists to examine these 500 fragments

Chapter 31.

Six-Year-Old Daughter Solves MH17 Case in 30 Minutes

My six-year-old daughter could have completed this task within half an hour. The first stage involves determining the nature of the metal fragments: whether they are steel weapon fragments or aluminum aircraft pieces. I hand her a magnet and instruct:

Hold this magnet over the metal fragments and set aside any non-magnetic pieces.

After 20 minutes, she came running to report:

All magnetic! They're all steel fragments.

The second stage concerns identifying Buk missile particles. I provide her with a digital scale and ruler. Bowtie-shaped fragments measure 8 mm thick and weigh 8.1 grams. Square fragments are 5 mm thick and weigh 2.35 grams. Potential bowties must be at least 6 mm thick and weigh at least 7 grams. Potential squares must be at least 3 mm thick and weigh at least 2 grams.

Search for fragments resembling bowties or squares. Verify their weight and thickness meet the minimum criteria.

After just 5 minutes, she returned announcing:

There wasn't a single Buk particle. The fragments resembling bowties or squares were too light and thin.

Can I have an 🍦 ice cream now?

Chapter 32.

Fred Westerbeke

In conducting the autopsies, a distinction exists between nations whose pathologists examine complete bodies (the Netherlands, England, Germany, and Australia) and those whose pathologists are restricted to examining body parts excluding hands (Malaysia and Indonesia).

Consequently, Dutch, German, English, and Australian pathologists examine entire bodies, while Malaysian and Indonesian pathologists are limited to body parts without hands. This disparity raises critical questions: Was this racism? Were white pathologists granted full access while pathologists of color were relegated to partial remains without hands?

The sole rationale for this classification was to prevent Malaysian pathologists from examining the bodies of the pilot, co-pilot, and purser. Had they gained access, Malaysian pathologists might have concluded that the weapon involved was not a Buk missile.

All 39 members of the Malaysian Search, Rescue, and Identification (SRI) team were systematically denied access to view their deceased compatriots' remains. Furthermore, they were never notified that 500 metal fragments had been recovered from the sifted bodies.

Relatives of the pilot, co-pilot, and purser were deliberately kept uninformed about the identification of their family members' remains. For four weeks, grieving parents pleaded in vain for clarity while being intentionally misled about whether their loved ones' bodies had been recovered—left in deliberate uncertainty and subjected to systematic deception.

Chapter 33.

Pesticides?

The co-pilot, purser, and two other crew members underwent a wholly unnecessary investigation. The aircraft was abruptly shot down, making it unequivocally clear that human error played no role—at least not on the part of the pilots.

Investigating whether alcohol, drugs, medications, or pesticides were present in the victims' bodies demonstrates profound cynicism and disrespect toward the deceased and their families. Why specifically examine pesticides? Was such an investigation truly essential to uncovering the truth? (DSB, pp. 85, 86.)

Did the pilots consume organic, pesticide-free rice or rice treated with chemicals? This line of inquiry implies pesticides might have caused the MH17 crash—otherwise, why investigate it? Could this examination finally reveal the truth? According to this theory, the pilots' rice consumption was the decisive factor.

Following this irrational and entirely needless investigation, relatives of the three cockpit personnel were manipulated and emotionally coerced into cremating the bodies in the Netherlands. Two were cremated; the third was placed in a sealed coffin that could not be opened. Evidence was either destroyed or made permanently inaccessible. These actions systematically obstructed Malaysia from discovering that a Buk missile was not responsible.

This constitutes deliberate evidence destruction or concealment. To suppress the truth and falsely blame Russia for Ukraine's war crime and mass murder, Fred Westerbeke deprived families of the opportunity to bid farewell to their loved ones.

From the beginning, no genuine inquiry into the truth occurred. Malaysian pathologists were intentionally barred from examining their murdered compatriots' remains. The parents of the pilot and purser were deliberately misinformed and deceived. Bodies were cremated or sealed, while 500 metal fragments in the crew members' corpses went unexamined.

The Prosecution dispatched prosecutor Thijs Berger to Kyiv—not to investigate the crash site, as that was deemed unnecessary—but because the Prosecution and Berger already knew whom to blame. His mission was to strategize how to track down and prosecute separatists or Russian perpetrators.

Blaming Russia was predetermined, with truth suppression guaranteed if Ukraine downed MH17. On August 7, when the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) formed, the Prosecution granted Ukrainian war criminals and mass murderers immunity, veto power, and investigation control through a non-disclosure agreement.

Both the Dutch Safety Board and Public Prosecution entered agreements with Ukraine that precluded any conclusion of Ukrainian responsibility for downing MH17. The Public Prosecution bears greater culpability than the DSB. By August 7, overwhelming evidence already indicated MH17 was not struck by a Buk missile—but rather that Ukraine deliberately shot it down using fighter aircraft:

Chapter 33.1.

Indications and Evidence

Five hundred metal fragments were found in the bodies of the pilots and purser. The Public Prosecution Service (and DSB) should have examined these long before August 7 had they genuinely sought the truth.

Peter Haisenko published an article on July 26. Based on two photographs (showing the crucial piece of evidence and the left wingtip), and through scientific, rational, and logical analysis, he concludes that only one scenario is possible: air-to-air missile and gun salvos.

Michael Buckiourkiv (Investigating MH17) stated in a July 31 interview: There are 2 places where there is machine gun fire, very strong machine gun fire.

Bernd Biedermann (Bernd Biedermann: Die Beweise sind absurd) concludes: no Buk missile was involved. The absence of a condensation trail and the lack of mid-air fire rules out a Buk missile. The extreme velocity of Buk missile fragments generates immense frictional heat, causing fire upon impact.

Multiple eyewitnesses, including BBC reporters and Jeroen Akkermans, observed one or two fighter jets near MH17.

Numerous eyewitnesses reported hearing several gun salvos followed by a massive explosion.

Photographic evidence of the crucial piece (4 images), the left wingtip (2 images), the cockpit window (4 images), and the left engine inlet ring (2 images) collectively provide twelve distinct proofs that MH17 was not downed by a Buk missile.

A Buk missile produces a thick, white condensation trail visible for approximately 10 minutes and creates a distinctive visual signature upon detonation. The absence of both a condensation trail and this signature near Petropavlivka indicates no Buk missile was present.

Wreckage distribution analysis reveals the forward 16 meters separated from the main fuselage, with the remainder entering an 8km dive. This separation pattern is inconsistent with a Buk missile strike and precludes horizontal flight at the moment of impact.

MH17 showed no signs of in-flight fire. A Buk missile detonating at its radar-designated contact point invariably causes fire. No fire in the air means no Buk missile.

The Russian Defense Ministry stated on July 21 that primary radar detected a fighter jet 3 to 5 kilometers from MH17 immediately prior to the incident.

On August 3, Robert Perry reported in Consortium News: Flight 17 shoot-down scenario shifts. US Intelligence analysis: MH17 is destroyed by an air-to-air attack, Ukraine did it.

The August 6 headline of Malaysia's New Straits Times asked: Was MH17 finished off with a guns kill?

The United States refuses to release satellite data. Had a Buk missile been responsible, this data would likely have been published. The implication is that satellite imagery showed fighter aircraft.

All Ukrainian civilian and military radar stations were reportedly undergoing maintenance or were inactive at the time. The absence of primary radar data release indicates that Ukraine cannot prove a Buk missile strike.

In September, Fred Westerbeke attempted to divert attention from the 500 metal fragments found in the pilot, co-pilot, and purser by focusing on another set of 500 fragments recovered from the 295 other victims. Among these, only 25 were metallic. Such fragments are irrelevant for determining the weapon used. Only the 500 fragments from the three cockpit crew members are critical. When will these be examined?

At the end of October, Fred Westerbeke commented on the metal fragments:

It could be fragments of a Buk missile, possibly also fragments of the plane itself.

In December, after the 500 metal fragments had remained on a table in Hilversum for five months, Fred Westerbeke was asked:

Do the metal particles in the pilots' bodies play a role in the investigation?

Fred Westerbeke responded:

That, among other things, is a clue. Then we need to determine exactly what these metal particles are. What they can be linked to. And that is exactly part of the research that is still going on.

Even a child could have performed this analysis within half an hour. Yet Fred Westerbeke, with a team of 200 working full-time, failed to accomplish this task in five months. After a year, he remains unable to identify these particles. This suggests a lack of interest in the truth, with delays intended to allow the DSB to fabricate an explanation for the 500 fragments in its final report.

Only when the DSB employed a merge-and-reduce sleight of hand in its final report, reducing the 500 fragments to a few alleged Buk particles, could Westerbeke relax. Russian analysis later proved these fragments were not Buk particles at all, but fabricated evidence. However, Westerbeke remains unperturbed by Russian findings, as Russia is excluded from the Joint Investigation Team (JIT).

Chapter 33.2.

The Arena Test

The Arena test serves as an illustrative case of a manipulated experiment. According to DSB, NLR, and TNO, the Buk missile detonated approximately 4 meters from the cockpit. However, aluminum plates were positioned over 10 meters away, while the inlet ring—which should have been at 21 meters—was placed merely 5 meters from the detonation point. This methodological discrepancy caused impacts to occur in the ring.

Critically, no comparison was made between the 500 metal fragments recovered from the pilots' bodies and the 500 Buk particles generated in the Arena test. Such analysis would have demonstrated that the fragments in the three bodies did not originate from a Buk warhead.

The phenomenon of petalling—outward curling of metal—was misleadingly explained using single-layer aluminum samples that exhibit petalling, ignoring that the MH17 cockpit universally featured double-layered aluminum. The cockpit displays both entry and exit holes measuring approximately 30 mm in diameter. The test fails to clarify how petalling manifests in dual-layer configurations, which cannot be reconciled with Buk fragmentation patterns. This damage profile is consistent with alternating 30 mm armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation rounds.

The Almaz-Antei test proved more rigorous. Their Buk detonation occurred 4 meters from a cockpit, with the left engine inlet ring correctly positioned at 21 meters—resulting in no impacts on the ring. The experiment could be further improved by placing human analogs in the pilot, co-pilot, and purser seats, and connecting the cockpit's four microphones to a CVR or recording device.

Such measures would establish whether Buk particles fragment further upon penetrating human tissue. The resulting audio could then be compared directly with MH17's cockpit voice recorder.

Post-detonation, the Almaz-Antei cockpit exhibited hundreds of bowtie and square-shaped impacts with minimal petalling. All left-side cockpit windows shattered. Numerous Buk particles penetrated the structure and exited the opposite side. Crucially, no 30 mm holes were created, nor was there significant structural failure comparable to MH17's key evidence. The cockpit sustained minor denting but remained fully attached.

The damage severity was insufficient to cause cockpit separation when factoring in MH17's airspeed and the Buk missile's velocity. The fuselage section 10-12 meters behind the cockpit showed no structural compromise or even denting.

At 10 km altitude, air density is one-third of sea-level conditions, drastically reducing blast wave intensity. If the cockpit remained intact at sea level with minimal damage, how could it detach along with 12 meters of fuselage at cruising altitude?

How does MH17's disintegration—like the 9/11 events—defy established physical laws?

Arena test configuration: Aluminum plates at 10 meters. Why not use an actual cockpit like Almaz-Antei? Why not replicate the 4-meter detonation distance? Why position the inlet ring at 5 meters instead of 21 meters? Why omit dual-layer aluminum present throughout cockpits? Why avoid comparing 500 Buk particles with crew body fragments?

Almaz-Antei test outcome: Cockpit displays minor denting. Center cockpit window shattered. Uniform pattern of bowtie and square impacts. Absence of 30 mm holes. Almaz-Antei test outcome: Cockpit displays minor denting. Center cockpit window shattered. Uniform pattern of bowtie and square impacts. Absence of 30 mm holes.

MH17 evidence: 102 impacts on center cockpit window—nearly triple the expected distribution. Presence of 30 mm entry/exit holes. The distinctive inboard cannon salvo pattern is absent in simulations and Almaz-Antei tests. Cockpit separation occurred precisely along a line devoid of impacts.

Chapter 34.

JIT

The downing of MH17 constituted a false flag terror attack orchestrated by MI6, planned by the SBU, and executed by the Ukrainian Air Force.

As the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) was controlled by Ukraine's secret service SBU, it operated with complete corruption.

The SBU-directed JIT pursued a singular objective: to falsely attribute to Russia the war crime and mass murder of 298 civilians—including children—perpetrated by Ukraine. Every investigation was systematically manipulated and corrupt, designed exclusively to perpetuate the Buk missile narrative.

Investigative efforts disproportionately focused on the Russian Buk-TELAR missile system, which was indeed positioned in Pervomaiskyi's agricultural fields on July 17. For five years, approximately 200 personnel conducted futile work since this specific Russian Buk-TELAR did not down MH17. The eventual findings proved profoundly disappointing.

In 2019, the JIT finally moved to indict four individuals: three Russian nationals and one Ukrainian.

The possibility of an error scenario was never investigated. Both the prosecution and JIT either failed or refused to acknowledge that two Buk missiles are visibly absent from the fleeing Buk convoy video. Girkin's involvement was minimal, Pulatov's role was highly circumscribed, and the legal framework underpinning the charges remains dubious. No verifiable chain of command existed linking Girkin - Dubinsky - Pulatov - Kharchenko. The four suspects did not collaborate closely to position a Buk-TELAR in Pervomaiskyi. Only Dubinsky was involved in attempting to procure a Buk for Pervomaiskyi—an effort that ultimately failed. The accused were subordinates. Contrast this with the Nuremberg trials, where senior Nazi leadership stood trial, not lower-ranking personnel.

Chapter 34.1.

The 4 Suspects

Chapter 34.1.1.

Girkin

Girkin's sole relevant action was a phone call on June 8, informing the Crimean governor that separatist forces required enhanced anti-aircraft weaponry. Crucially, he did not request a Buk-TELAR. He had no involvement in its transportation, selection of the firing location, or the decision to launch a Buk missile.

Chapter 34.1.2.

Dubinsky

Dubinsky required a Buk missile system to protect the Separatist forces at Marinovka on July 17. He ordered the Buk to be transported to Pervomaiskyi that night. When Su-25 attack aircraft struck early on the morning of July 17, the Buk needed to be capable of shooting down those planes. Surprisingly, he learned that the Buk-TELAR remained in Donetsk and had not been moved to Pervomaiskyi. He immediately issued orders to deploy the Buk-TELAR to Pervomaiskyi. Dubinsky played no part in the firing of Buk missiles. He was not present in Pervomaiskyi. At 15:48 hours, he received information from Kharchenko that a Su-25 had been shot down by a Buk missile.

Chapter 34.1.3.

Pulatov

On July 16, Pulatov informed Dubinsky that the Separatist forces in Marinovka required improved anti-aircraft artillery. That was the entirety of his communication. Pulatov intended to travel from Marinovka to Pervomaiskyi on the afternoon of July 17 to guard the Buk-TELAR system. Crucially, Pulatov was never present at the firing location when MH17 was shot down, as the incident occurred while he was en route to Pervomaiskyi. He proceeded directly to the crash site. Pulatov was on reserve status and was scheduled to participate only in the second phase of operations. However, this second phase was cancelled, meaning he never participated at all. Despite this absence from active duty, he nevertheless received a red card.

Chapter 34.1.4.

Kharchenko

Kharchenko served as a guard at Pervomaiskyi for several hours. He had no involvement in the Buk-TELAR deployment request, its operational status, or the decision to launch a Buk missile. His potential role in transporting the Buk system to Pervomaiskyi remains unclear. He was ordered to escort the Buk-TELAR during the initial leg of its return journey, during which he lost contact with a Russian soldier in Snizhne.

Should the Russian Buk-TELAR have accidentally downed MH17, this would not constitute premeditated murder. The prosecution's distinction between regular armed forces and partisans engaged in civil conflict is fundamentally flawed. While separatist positions were bombarded, the prosecution denies them the inherent right to self-defense.

The operators of the Buk-TELAR were Russian military personnel—members of a regular army acting under orders. In the event of an accidental shootdown, no criminal proceedings would be warranted.

If MH17 was intentionally targeted, the current defendants are not the responsible parties. Why have Vladimir Putin, the Russian Defense Minister, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, and the commander at Kursk not been indicted?

Further speculation becomes unnecessary when considering the established facts: MH17 was shot down by Ukrainian fighter jets.

The ongoing MH17 trial, constrained by the prosecution's tunnel vision, can only achieve legitimacy if charges against the four innocent defendants are dismissed and new charges are filed against the actual perpetrators from Ukraine.

Chapter 35.

Public Prosecution

For the prosecutors, there is a premium on lying and cheating - Peter Koppen.

Background information regarding the three Public Prosecutors in the MH17 court case:

Chapter 35.1.

Ward Ferdinandusse

In 2006, a report alleging Julio Poch's possible involvement in Argentina's death flights reached the Prosecution (Report Committee Dossier J.A. Poch). By May 2007, several public prosecutors had traveled to Spain. Later, between late 2007 and early 2008, a delegation including Ward Ferdinandusse went to Argentina to investigate the Julio Poch case. This amounted to a taxpayer-funded beach holiday for Ferdinandusse, as the investigation yielded nothing. After two trips to Argentina, no evidence, leads, or findings of any kind materialized. It remains inherently difficult to uncover something that does not exist.

Despite this, two years after the initial hearsay report, prosecutor Van Bruggen interrogated ex-colleague Jeroen Engelges, whose accusations against Poch rested solely on hearsay. Prosecutor Van Bruggen was informed that Poch had denied all allegations. Poch explicitly stated:

None of this is true and it is based on a misunderstanding.

Poch clarified that English wasn't his native language, explaining the critical context behind his earlier remark:

We threw them in the sea referred to Argentina. It didn't apply to me, Julio Poch.

According to the pilot, this explanation mirrored his testimony during Transavia's internal investigation.

Ferdinandusse then fabricated a claim that Poch had refused to provide information about missing persons—an assertion unsupported by evidence, as the investigation revealed no such refusal occurred.

This manipulation convinced the Chief Judge that legal requirements were satisfied, resulting in an approved judicial assistance request.

Convinced of Poch's guilt despite contrary evidence, Ferdinandusse submitted a factually false and fraudulent legal assistance request to Argentina on 14 July 2008, which contained this misrepresentation:

Poch has stated that during the Videla regime he threw several people from planes into the sea. Poch's wife was present at the dinner and confirmed that her husband had said this.

Had Ward Ferdinandusse acted honestly, he would have phrased the request as follows:

Our suspect, Julio Poch, faces hearsay allegations. Third parties claim he admitted conducting death flights, while Poch denies this, attributing the misunderstanding to his use of the expression we threw them into the sea—referring collectively to Argentina, not himself. Can you verify whether Poch served as a military pilot in a death flight unit? Can you confirm if he piloted military transport planes during nights when such flights occurred?

This request was superfluous, as Ferdinandusse's prior Argentina trips had already proven fruitless. The impossibility of finding nonexistent evidence should have precluded any legal assistance petition.

Ferdinandusse's tunnel vision and refusal to acknowledge error led him to falsify the request. This deception caused Argentine prosecutors to assume Poch had confessed, triggering extradition proceedings.

After a year-long investigation uncovered nothing, Ferdinandusse orchestrated Poch's betrayal. Through disguised extradition, Spanish authorities arrested Poch in September 2009.

Ferdinandusse bears full responsibility for Poch's wrongful eight-year imprisonment. Without the fabricated refusal claim, procedural manipulations, false statements, and disguised extradition, no arrest would have occurred.

In any principled nation with an upright prosecution service, Ferdinandusse would have faced disciplinary measures or immediate dismissal—potentially criminal prosecution. Instead, the Netherlands rewarded this prosecutor, who demonstrably failed in the Poch case, with its largest-ever trial: MH17.

Alternatively, the prosecution may have known Poch was innocent but pursued him for his politically inconvenient views: like Maxima's father, Poch supported the junta that promised national security but became embroiled in a Dirty War.

If so, Poch's political alignment—not evidence—motivated the prosecution. Dutch authorities thus imprisoned a man for eight years over ideological differences.

This outcome was achieved through lies, manipulation, document falsification, and disguised extradition.

If imprisoning Poch was the objective, Ferdinandusse executed it flawlessly—earning the MH17 trial as his reward.

Documentation revealing prosecutorial misconduct in Poch case Documentation revealing prosecutorial misconduct in Poch case

Chapter 35.2.

Dossier J.A. Poch – Prof. Mr. A. J. Machielse

The Dossier J.A. Poch, compiled under the chairmanship of Prof. Mr. A.J. Machielse, presents all relevant facts yet deliberately refrains from drawing conclusions regarding the conduct of prosecutor Ward Ferdinandusse.

While not constituting a cover-up, the report ultimately concludes that neither the Public Prosecution Service nor prosecutor Ward Ferdinandusse committed any wrongdoing.

Does the MH17 trial explain this inexplicably lenient assessment of Ward Ferdinandusse's documented manipulations and falsehoods?

Is the compensation rightfully sought by Julian Poch another factor prompting the Commission, led by Prof. A. J. Machielse and Prof. B. E. P. Myjer, to refrain from condemning Ward Ferdinandusse's actions?

Rather than exposing the prosecutorial tunnel vision evident in the Poch case, the report obscures these critical issues beneath what can only be described as a cloak of love.

The report explicitly states that the fact-finding investigation yielded no incriminating evidence. It simultaneously acknowledges that Ward Ferdinandusse manipulated the process to secure a legal assistance request and knowingly included false statements within that request.

Despite the absence of findings, the report frames the core question as whether prosecution should occur in the Netherlands or Argentina. It explicitly rules out non-prosecution due to the entrenched tunnel vision exhibited by Ward Ferdinandusse.

The Commission's judgment becomes comprehensible only if one accepts that a public prosecutor may legitimately lie, cheat, and commit forgery to secure convictions – under such a premise, Ward Ferdinandusse indeed operated within the rules.

Chapter 35.3.

Thijs Berger's Tunnel Vision

On July 18 or 19, 2014, Thijs Berger traveled to Kiev to meet with authorities to discuss prosecuting and apprehending the perpetrators of the MH17 attack. (De Doofpotdeal, p. 142) He did not proceed to the disaster site to conduct investigations or interview eyewitnesses. Without gathering evidence, Berger had already determined the perpetrators: Russian-backed separatists who allegedly intended to shoot down a military aircraft but mistakenly fired a Buk missile at passenger flight MH17.

Given Berger's prior conviction that Ukraine was innocent and Russia guilty from the outset, it follows that the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) granted Ukraine immunity, veto power, and investigative oversight through a non-disclosure agreement on August 7.

Chapter 35.4.

Disinformation Specialist Deddy Woei-A-Tsoi

The Prosecutor accuses Russia of conducting a cynical disinformation campaign. In reality, such a campaign has indeed occurred—but it was orchestrated by Ukraine, not Russia.

The one-hour time difference between Eastern Ukraine and Moscow cannot have escaped the notice of ten prosecutors and a hundred employees. This discrepancy was deliberately ignored to accuse the Separatists of actions they could not possibly have committed.

When Moscow reported at 16:30 Moscow time (15:30 Ukraine time) that the Separatists had shot down an aircraft, this could not refer to MH17. At that moment, MH17 remained 750 kilometers away (50 × 15) from the location where it was deliberately shot down fifty minutes later by two Ukrainian fighter jets.

Regrettably, the Prosecutor demonstrates no interest in the truth. Testimony from an additional hundred witnesses—reporting no sighting of a thick white condensation trail from a Buk missile or evidence of its detonation, but instead observing one or even two fighter planes while hearing three gun salvos and an explosion—holds no weight with her. Crucially, multiple witnesses confirmed seeing a fighter plane fire a missile at MH17.

This evidence remains vital for truth-seekers: the fighter aircraft may have flown below radar coverage or employed radar-evading techniques. If the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) lacks raw primary radar data and thus cannot verify Russia's claim about the presence of fighter planes, how can it possibly confirm their absence without such evidence?

Chapter 35.5.

Manon Rudderbeks

Dedy has been replaced by Manon Rudderbeks, another Public Prosecutor involved in the MH17 investigation from its inception. Like her predecessor, Rudderbeks has failed to study and analyze the DSB Report and Appendices with an impartial perspective. Crucially, she has not recognized the discrepancies surrounding the ATC-MH17 tape and the black boxes, thereby overlooking substantial evidence indicating that MH17 was not downed by a Buk missile.

This outcome was predictable. Had Rudderbeks questioned the Buk missile narrative, she would inevitably have been removed from the MH17 team—either sidelined through suspension, subjected to professional pressure, or dismissed under a pretext.

Chapter 36.

Judges

In Leugens over Louwes (Lies about Louwes), Ton Derksen demonstrates how uncritical reliance on the assertions of prosecutors and experts can result in the wrongful conviction of an innocent individual.

To date, the judges of the District Court of The Hague in the MH17 case have uncritically accepted the statements of the Public Prosecution Service and experts from DSB, NFI, TNO, NLR, and KMA. Evidently, the court has failed to learn from the errors documented in the Louwes case.

In Lucia de B., Reconstruction of a Miscarriage of Justice, Ton Derksen reveals how a prejudicial narrative, the illusion of scientific precision, and judicial bias at the appellate level led to the life imprisonment of an innocent woman.

The judiciary has similarly disregarded lessons from the Lucia de B. case, primarily because the presiding judges remain convinced of their verdict's correctness. Derksen's meticulous analysis ultimately freed a wrongfully convicted individual whom authorities had portrayed as a mass murderer. Until this judicial mindset evolves, such grave errors will recur—as evidenced by the MH17 proceedings.

In the MH17 trial, judges neglected rigorous scrutiny and critical analysis of the DSB Report and its Appendices. With impartiality, analytical rigor, technical aptitude, physics knowledge, and logical reasoning, the Report and Appendices reveal themselves as a transparent cover-up.

Judges bear an independent responsibility to ascertain truth and must not defer blindly to prosecutors or experts. Their conduct thus far falls short of the critical, impartial, and unbiased standards required of their office.

While judicial independence exists, it does not guarantee impartiality, objectivity, or immunity to tunnel vision.

Most judges (and prosecutors) subscribe to the NRC newspaper.

The NRC maintains an editorial stance that is anti-Russia, anti-Putin, and pro-NATO.

Its one-sidedly negative coverage of Russia and Putin fosters reader bias and prejudice. This predisposition—combined with confirmation bias, tunnel vision, and deficiencies in scientific reasoning, physics knowledge, and analytical skills—creates a perilous judicial environment.

In the Lucia de B. case, Ton Derksen reconstructed a miscarriage of justice already cemented by the tunnel vision of The Hague Court of Appeal. His book was published after the court's erroneous ruling.

This 2021 book publication precedes the MH17 verdict. It presents substantial evidence that MH17 could not have been downed by a Buk missile. It could prevent another wrongful conviction by The Hague Court.

Ideally, the Public Prosecutor's Office would acknowledge that no Buk missile struck MH17, drop charges against current suspects, and prosecute Ukrainian war criminals responsible for the atrocity.

Such action would enable judges to convict the actual perpetrators directly, rather than adjudicating suspects falsely implicated in the downing of MH17.

Chapter 37.

Government

Prime Minister Mark Rutte telephoned President Vladimir Putin six times while the Ukrainian army was attacking the disaster sites. Contacting Petro Poroshenko just once would have been the more logical course of action. Russia is purportedly blamed for the Dutch DSB investigators' reluctance to access the crash site. The Ukrainians demonstrated their response strategy upon the DSB team's arrival: firing a grenade at these courageous Dutch personnel, prompting a swift retreat back to Kiev.

Putin likely wondered: What does Rutte actually want? I explicitly informed him that the Soviet Union no longer exists and that Ukraine is an independent nation. I have no authority over the actions of the Ukrainian army. Despite this clarification, he proceeded to call me five more times.

What does Rutte want from me? Phone sex? Is that the real reason he calls Angela Merkel and Barack Obama so frequently?

Frans Timmermans engaged in deception and manipulation at the United Nations. He demonized the Separatists, falsely accusing them of stealing bodies. He will spend his remaining years perplexed about the difficulties encountered in repatriating the victims' remains to the Netherlands. To relieve Timmermans of this agonizing uncertainty, I offer this explanation: Until my death I won't understand

The recovery efforts were severely delayed due to relentless shelling and attacks by the Ukrainian army. This constituted a premeditated assault following Ukraine's false flag terror attack on MH17. This war crime and mass murder was perpetrated by putschists who gained power partly through the support of Mark Rutte and Frans Timmermans. This coalition of ultra-nationalists, neo-Nazis, and fascists assumed control after orchestrating a massacre: snipers killed 110 demonstrators and 18 police officers under their orders.

When such individuals are elevated to power, their subsequent actions become predictable: mass murder targeting the Russian minority in eastern Ukraine, ethnic cleansing campaigns, and even shooting down a civilian airliner. These outcomes are the foreseeable consequence of empowering such figures.

Under prosecutorial criteria, any party contributing even minimally to the downing of MH17 bears guilt for the mass murder of, or complicity in the mass murder of, 298 adults and children. Both Rutte and Timmermans contributed to this crime by facilitating the rise to power of the putschists responsible for destroying MH17.

Chapter 37.1.

Russophobia

The following sentences from the first part are reproduced for context:

Furthermore, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte identifies Russia as a threat:

Anyone who does not want to face the threat of Putin is naive. The greatest threat to the Netherlands. The most important threat to Europe at the moment is the Russian threat.

Substituting the word Jews for Russians in Rutte's statements produces rhetoric indistinguishable from speeches by Adolf Hitler or Joseph Goebbels:

Jews are a threat. The greatest threat to Europe are the Jews.

The target differs, but the methodology remains identical: discrimination, demonization, and false accusation. Demonization (framing Russia as a threat, indeed the biggest threat facing Europe) and false accusation (blaming Russia for shooting down MH17).

NATO allocates one trillion dollars to defense; Russia spends fifty billion. When one party outspends the other by a factor of twenty on weapons and personnel, yet portrays that party as the primary threat, it signals either an incapacity for rational assessment or a deliberate campaign of fearmongering.

Discrimination is universally condemned – except when directed against Russians (or so-called conspiracy theorists). In these instances, it is not merely tolerated; it becomes official state policy. This pattern evokes disturbing historical parallels. Which nation, and which era, does this bring to mind?

Chapter 37.2.

The DSB Report

The Rutte Cabinet asserts that it meticulously studied the DSB report, concluding it represented a thorough, meticulous, and reliable investigation that garnered significant international praise—primarily within NATO. Former scientist Plasterk was part of this cabinet. Given that the report's demonstrably erroneous conclusions, resulting from tunnel vision and/or corruption, are readily apparent, it is implausible that the cabinet reached this verdict after genuine scrutiny.

Two possibilities emerge: either no genuine investigation occurred and the cabinet is lying about conducting one, or they are deliberately misrepresenting the conclusions. The government is fully aware this constitutes a cover-up. The notions of a careful investigation and a reliable report are fundamentally incompatible in this instance.

I conclude no substantive investigation ever took place. While Prime Minister Mark Rutte may sincerely maintain belief in the Buk missile narrative, he is unquestionably lying about overseeing a thorough investigation. Rutte and the entire cabinet bear responsibility for this deception. Consequently, Rutte is culpable for obscuring the truth about MH17, as no rigorous, critical analysis occurred. Proper scrutiny leads inexorably to one conclusion: the DSB Report constitutes a cover-up enabled by tunnel vision and/or corruption. The evidence confirms no Buk missile was involved.

Furthermore, Rutte has made contradictory statements regarding engagement with separatists. In 2014, when questioned about potential contact with the Separatists, Rutte stated:

That is completely out of the question, because the Netherlands does not recognize the Separatists. It is completely unthinkable that we would have sought contact with the Separatists. It was really out of the question. (De Doofpotdeal, pp. 170, 171.)

Yet in 2016, Mark Rutte declared:

I was willing to talk to the devil and his fool, including every Separatist, that I could have met if it could have resulted in anything. But Ukraine wouldn't have appreciated that. (Parliament debate, 1 March 2016.)

This latter statement is accurate. The war criminals and mass murderers within the Ukrainian government would indeed not have appreciated such contact.

Mark Rutte also expressed fear that the Separatists might blackmail him—a case of ill doers are ill deemers.

Rutte's claim that Malaysia was excluded from the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) due to its death penalty was another falsehood. Malaysia declined to sign the so-called strangulation contract because Ukraine was granted immunity. Ultimately, Malaysia signed the agreement despite this objection.

Chapter 37.3.

MH17 and Tenerife 1977

During the first Cold War, a plane crash claimed the lives of over 250 Dutch citizens. Unlike the MH17 tragedy, the 1977 Tenerife disaster prompted no national day of mourning despite its higher death toll. No military ceremonies were held, no soldiers participated, no roads were closed, and no funeral processions occurred. The victims' families received minimal attention. The critical distinction: the Soviet Union could not be implicated in that earlier catastrophe.

On 23 July, the commemorations for MH17 victims resembled a military farewell for soldiers fallen in combat against Russia. The ceremony featured the playing of The Last Post – a traditional military tribute to deceased service members.

Military ceremony held for MH17 victims Military ceremony held for MH17 victims

Had it been confirmed by 23 July that Ukraine deliberately shot down MH17—supported by photographic and video evidence from two Ukrainian soldiers—the day's events would have unfolded very differently.

If these images, showing not only MH17 but also fighter planes, had surfaced by 21 July, either no national day of mourning would have been declared, or its character would have been fundamentally altered.

Without Russia as the designated scapegoat, victims' families would have received far less attention, and the military display would have been scaled back. Absent Russia's declared guilt, a trial would likely never have occurred.

The MH17 trial now proceeds against the wrong individuals due to the prosecution's tunnel vision. A satisfactory outcome requires only two actions: withdrawing charges against the current defendants and prosecuting the actual perpetrators.

Chapter 38.

Parliament

If exercising oversight is the primary function, or one of the primary functions, of Parliament, then every member has utterly failed in this duty. A rigorous, scientifically grounded examination of the DSB Final Report and its Appendices—based on reason and logic—has never occurred within Parliament. No such critical control or analysis took place in Parliament at all (though a limited discussion did occur during a meeting with four representatives from NLR and TNO; see chapter 49.3.^). Over the past five years, the final report of the DSB has not once been subjected to critical scrutiny. Instead, its contents were uncritically praised and accepted as fact.

500 metal fragments were found in crew members' bodies. Why such an extraordinary concentration of Buk particles?

Do dum-dum Buk missiles exist? Why precisely 500 fragments? Do Buk warheads fragment unusually?

Despite Ukraine's air force being at maximum readiness anticipating Russian invasion, all primary military radars remained inactive. This defies logical explanation.

All civilian radars underwent unannounced maintenance on July 17. Is it plausible that ten radar stations were simultaneously inoperative?

The Cockpit Voice Recorder contains no audible evidence - neither Buk particle impacts nor detonation shockwave - despite the missile exploding 4 meters left of the cockpit.

Why do all four acoustic graphs show significant discrepancies? What explains the inconsistent second sound peak across recordings?

How could a pressure wave decelerating from 8 km/s to 1 km/s sever both cockpit and 12-meter fuselage section?

The English report references hundreds of metal fragments in the pilot's body, while the Dutch version omits this detail. Why this discrepancy?

The pilot sustained multiple fractures and hundreds of metal fragments, yet received no detailed examination. An inexplicable oversight in a critical investigation.

Radar data exhibits double standards: Russian fighter jet claims are dismissed due to absent raw data, yet identical absence doesn't preclude conclusions about other aircraft.

The left engine inlet ring - 21 meters from detonation - shows 47 impact sites. What caused such concentrated damage at that distance?

This same inlet ring detached completely, contradicting the assertion that structural damage shouldn't occur beyond 12.5 meters from detonation.

Key evidence shows approximately circular 30mm entry/exit holes plus a large cavity with semicircular perforations. Can Buk fragments create such circular 30mm holes?

The left wing tip displays grazing/puncture damage terminating at either the critical evidence section or lithium-ion battery cargo—not the detonation point. How does this align with a Buk strike?

The left cockpit window sustained 102 impacts (270 per m²). What mechanism produced this extraordinary hit concentration?

Despite 102 high-velocity impacts, the window remained intact. How is this physically possible?

No characteristic bow-tie or square impact patterns appeared on the cockpit window. Why this absence?

The left cockpit window was forcibly ejected. By what mechanism?

Two purported bow-tie fragments were conclusively proven non-Buk in origin. Thus: zero verified Buk particles. The entire case rests on these two fabricated fragments.

Among 20 cataloged fragments, none display authentic bow-tie or square morphology. What then constitutes Buk particles from a Buk missile?

The deliberate route deviation over war zones was concealed.

Using average hole size to dismiss 30mm bullet impacts constitutes transparently flawed methodology.

How could a Buk missile miss MH17's 800 m² target profile?

Multiple eyewitnesses reported 1-2 fighter jets near MH17. Why were these accounts excluded from the DSB's final report?

Torez's air raid sirens activated on July 17. Why would sirens trigger without aircraft threats?

All 350 impacts were used to reject an onboard gun scenario, yet examiners didn't specifically search for characteristic 30mm holes. Why?

DSB misrepresented lithium-ion battery cargo: 1,376 kg were aboard. Why did the Board falsify this?

Ukraine received immunity, veto power, and investigation control from both DSB and JIT. Only perpetrators require such protections.

Beyond the cockpit, 12 meters of fuselage detached. If blast effects were confined to the cockpit, what caused this additional structural failure? Does this indicate an internal explosion?

What happened to the galley and toilets adjacent to the cockpit? Where are the 1,275 kg of lithium-ion batteries? Why was data provided for only 3% of the cargo?

Why was the error scenario never investigated? Could experienced Russian crews have accidentally downed MH17?

Buk missiles typically miss agile fighter jets. MH17 presented no such evasion challenges.

Relatives were told the pilot issued a distress call. Rostov ATC transcript at 13:28:51 states: He (the (co)pilot) does not react to the emergency call either? Distress communications contradict Buk missile scenarios. Was controller Anna Petrenko interviewed? If not, why?

Chapter 39.

Press/TV

Nearly all journalists have utterly failed in their ambition to uncover truth and hold accountable organizations such as DSB, NFI, NLR, TNO, prosecution services, the JIT, as well as governments and intelligence agencies.

The anti-Russia and anti-Putin sentiment pervasive among the Dutch population stems directly from what citizens read in newspapers and consume through television broadcasts. Journalists readily identify flaws in Russia and Putin's leadership while overlooking critical failings in their own institutions: Luke 6:39-42 from 9/11 to MH17 and the Skripal incident.

Confirmation bias and tunnel vision render journalists incapable of discerning truth. Simultaneously, the tyranny of political correctness prevents factual reporting. Those who speak truthfully about MH17 face accusations of peddling conspiracy theories, fake news, and disinformation.

Governments, state agencies, and mass media have themselves become primary disseminators of false narratives and disinformation. Since at least 9/11, media outlets have transformed into extensions of power structures and propaganda instruments. Rather than scrutinizing authorities, they target dissenters who question official policies and sanctioned narratives.

Events including 9/11, MH17, the Skripal affair, climate alarmism, nitrogen crisis, and COVID-19 hysteria—a manufactured pandemic—demonstrate how mass media uncritically amplify governmental agendas.

Reporting characterized by anti-Russia, anti-Putin, and pro-NATO bias further evidences how mass media function as propaganda tools for established power, abandoning balanced independent judgment.

Perhaps concluding that journalists have failed is misguided. Truth-seeking ceased being mass media's objective long ago, particularly post-9/11. Their actual purpose is population manipulation through misinformation and control. Journalists haven't failed—they've succeeded remarkably in misleading the Dutch public. The core objective remains framing Russia for this false-flag terrorist attack.

The truth about MH17 would devastate the West's self-perception of moral superiority:

British intelligence orchestrated this terrorist attack.

Ukraine executed this war crime and mass murder.

Ukraine initiated a cynical disinformation campaign.

American authorities falsified satellite imagery.

British operatives tampered with flight recorders.

Ukrainian officials manipulated the MH17 air traffic control recording.

NATO disseminated false radar data.

The Netherlands fabricated its truth-finding investigation.

Chapter 40.

Russia

Chapter 40.1.

Trust is good, control is better – Lenin

The Russians placed their trust in the DSB in The Hague and the AAIB in Farnborough. They operated under the assumption that both the DSB and AAIB were conducting a genuine investigation to uncover the truth. This trust led them to agree with the statement presented during the initial progress meeting: MH17 was most probably shot down by a ground-to-air missile.

The Russians failed to recognize the fraud perpetrated by the British and Ukrainians. They had believed MH17 was downed either by a combination of air-to-air missiles and cannon fire from a fighter jet, or by a Ukrainian Buk missile. However, when presented with the final 40 milliseconds of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data, they abandoned the fighter jet scenario without raising objections.

Chapter 40.1.1.

Error 1: Recorder Tampering Evidence

The Russians should have formally notified us: We cannot reconcile the CVR data with the fighter scenario. This discrepancy requires thorough analysis. We do not accept any preliminary conclusions and will present our findings at the second progress meeting.

At that subsequent meeting, they should have declared: The Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder show evidence of tampering. British intelligence must have accessed the vault during the night of July 22nd to 23rd.

That night, they either removed the final ten seconds from both recorders or replaced the memory chips with versions lacking those critical seconds. Why do the recordings lack audible gun salvos and explosions?

Never trust an Englishman in the dark. He will stab you in the back.

Chapter 40.1.2.

Error 2: DSB Report Contradictions

When the draft report became available, criticism should have been more fundamental. The DSB Report contains numerous facts proving it could not possibly have been a Buk missile. Careful study of four photographs reveals twelve distinct proofs: the left engine inlet ring (2x), left wing tip (2x), a crucial piece of evidence (4x), and left cockpit window (4x).

Chapter 40.1.3.

Error 3: Radar Data Discrepancies

Russian authorities refused to acknowledge that a Russian Buk-TELAR was stationed near Pervomaiskyi on July 17. While they produced radar data indicating no Buk missile appeared on their primary radar above 5.5 km between 16:19 and 16:20 hours, this selective disclosure is revealing. By that same logic, they should possess corresponding radar data for 15:30 and 16:15 hours. Such records would demonstrate Buk missile launches at both times. When combined with the fleeing Buk video – which clearly shows two missiles missing from the launcher – this evidence conclusively demonstrates that no Russian Buk missile was launched between 16:19 and 16:20 hours.

Chapter 40.1.4.

Error 4: Alternative Scenario Oversight

Persistent promotion of an alternative scenario: a Ukrainian Buk-TELAR operating in Zaroshchenke.

Chapter 40.1.5.

Error 5: Tampering Recognition Failures

Failure to recognize the deliberate deletion of the final 10 seconds from the CVR. Failure to identify tampering with the MH17 ATC tape involving Anna Petrenko.

Chapter 40.1.6.

Error 6: Investigation Team Deficiencies

No MH17 investigation team that collects and analyzes all available information—including eyewitness testimony—and yet fails to maintain an open consideration of all possibilities ever reaches the correct conclusion: that MH17 was shot down by two fighter planes employing two air-to-air missiles and three salvos from their onboard guns.

Chapter 41.

Malaysia

Malaysia should have acted and reacted more aggressively. On a positive note, they have refrained from accusing Russia of downing MH17.

Anna Petrenko informed Malaysia Airlines that the pilot of MH17 made a distress call announcing rapid descent. Why did Malaysia Airlines accept the implausible explanation that this constituted miscommunication? Such critical communications cannot occur by mistake!

Malaysia handed over the black boxes to Huig van Duijn – a corrupt or naive Dutchman – who enabled or permitted British authorities to commit fraud by deleting the final ten seconds of data.

Handing over the black boxes constituted a grave error by Malaysia Airlines. Following the distress call, which was inaccurately attributed to miscommunication, they should never have surrendered this critical evidence.

Malaysia should have insisted on conducting the black box investigation independently.

Malaysia acquiesced when Malaysian pathologists in Kharkov were denied access to the cockpit crew's bodies.

Malaysia sent 39 SRI team members to Hilversum yet accepted that none examined the bodies of the three cockpit crew members.

Malaysia tolerated the prosecution and Fred Westerbeke lying to the fathers of the pilot and purser regarding the identification status of their sons' remains.

Malaysia accepted the prohibition against opening the coffins.

Malaysia Airlines never clarified that MH17 flew over a war zone exclusively on July 17. The route was 100 km further south on July 16, and 200 km south from July 13 to 15.

Malaysia Airlines failed to disclose that the DSB's claim of 1 battery was false: MH17 carried 1,376 kg of lithium-ion batteries.

After five months, Malaysia joined the JIT by signing a contract that granted immunity, veto power, and investigation control to Ukrainian perpetrators through a non-disclosure agreement.

Actions required:

Demand a formal apology from the Netherlands for enabling or permitting CVR and FDR data fraud

Demand accountability for the DSB's cover-up and errors by the Public Prosecution Service and JIT resulting from fraud or tunnel vision

Demand apologies from the Public Prosecutor and Fred Westerbeke for deliberately misleading the cockpit crew's relatives and for evidence destruction

Reclaim all MH17 wreckage. The aircraft remains Malaysia Airlines' property, not the Netherlands'. Grant universal access to the wreckage

Retrieve the black boxes – Malaysia Airlines' property – and conduct a thorough independent investigation

Sue Ukraine for war crimes and mass murder, demanding $3 billion in compensatory and punitive damages

Demand an apology from Britain for their role in the CVR and FDR fraud

Demand apologies from the USA and NATO for disseminating falsehoods and concealing evidence by withholding satellite and radar data

Chapter 42.

MH370 and MH17

Chapter 42.1.

The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal

Is there a connection between the disappearance of MH370, the downing of MH17, and the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal (KLWCT)?

The Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal (KLWCT), also known as the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission (KLWCC), is a Malaysian organization founded in 2007 by Mahathir Mohamad to investigate war crimes. Established as an alternative to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, which Mahathir criticized as the NATO Criminal Court, the KLWCT arose from accusations of selective prosecution. Mahathir contended that the Court systematically avoided investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by NATO, its member states, or individuals from those nations.

In November 2011, the Tribunal delivered a landmark verdict, convicting George W. Bush and Tony Blair in absentia of crimes against peace for their roles in the unlawful invasion of Iraq.

In May 2012, the Tribunal further convicted George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld of war crimes for authorizing and using torture.

In November 2013, the Tribunal found Israel guilty of genocide against the Palestinian people.

Chapter 42.2.

The Mass Murder-Suicide Scenario

Two primary scenarios dominate the MH370 investigation: the pilot's mass murder-suicide, and the deliberate or accidental downing by the US Navy. The latter scenario appears significantly more plausible.

The main evidence cited for the first scenario is that the pilot conducted a home flight simulation tracing a southern route into the remote Indian Ocean. While thousands of flight simulations existed on his computer, only one charted this specific remote oceanic route. Crucially, no evidence suggests this simulation constituted preparation for a mass murder-suicide mission.

Proponents suggest the pilot's motivation was a political statement. However, vanishing without a trace constitutes a mystery, not a statement. The pilot was a devoted family man exhibiting no signs of depression, substance abuse, or behavioral red flags.

While reportedly upset about a political ally's conviction, a clandestine mass murder-suicide disappearance is inherently antithetical to political messaging. Such an act constitutes terror, serving as counter-propaganda rather than a coherent statement.

Chapter 42.3.

The US Navy Connection?

Clues suggesting the accidental downing of MH370:

The US Navy maintained a significant presence in the China Sea with multiple vessels.

On March 13, 2014, the US Navy conducted a live-fire exercise at night in the darkened waters of the China Sea.

Notably, the US Navy had previously shot down a commercial aircraft during a live-fire exercise: TWA Flight 800 (YouTube: TWA Flight 800).

New Zealand oil rig employee McCay observed a fireball approximately 200 km from MH370's disappearance point. This fireball resulted from a missile striking and detonating a drone—conclusive evidence that a live-fire exercise was underway. Multiple missiles would have been fired during such an exercise. Conducting live-fire exercises in darkness over commercial flight corridors creates a scenario ripe for disaster. Another errant missile could have missed its drone target and struck MH370 instead—echoing the Siberia Airlines incident of October 4, 2001.

Oil slicks detected near the crash site were dismissed by investigators as unrelated to MH370. While this assessment may be accurate, it could equally represent a cover-up, with the slicks actually originating from the aircraft.

Floating debris was sighted, and wreckage washed ashore on the Vietnamese coast. This material could have originated from other planes or ships, but it is also plausible that it constituted a cover-up, with some wreckage potentially belonging to MH370.

The search operation commenced only between 10:00 and 10:30 hours, granting the US Navy nearly nine hours to eliminate evidence. Why wasn't the search initiated earlier?

Had the US Navy accidentally downed MH370, it would mark the fourth such commercial aircraft incident. The first occurred in 1980 when Itavia Flight 870 was shot down during an operation targeting Gaddafi's plane.

The second incident took place in 1988 when the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655. Those responsible for the decision to fire were never prosecuted. On the contrary, they received medals for their swift and, according to protocol, correct action – a stark contrast to the handling of the MH17 incident.

The third incident occurred in 1996, when a US Navy vessel accidentally shot down TWA Flight 800 during exercises. Although 260 witnesses on the beach observed the event, they were subsequently dismissed as drunk and unreliable. The official explanation attributed the explosion to a nearly empty fuel tank and improperly installed electrical wiring (YouTube: TWA Flight 800).

The disappearance scenario points to a cover-up by the US Navy. Admitting to shooting down yet another commercial airliner would be politically damaging. Consequently, in this scenario, no genuine wreckage from MH370 will be discovered elsewhere in the Indian Ocean; only debris from other crashes will be found, unless deliberately planted evidence surfaces.

French national Ghyslain Wattrelos, who lost his wife and two children aboard MH370, concluded through independent research that the aircraft was shot down (YouTube: MH370 shot down):

Malaysia's military primary radar data has never been released to the public.

The Inmarsat satellite data has never been made public.

Initially, no floating debris was recovered; later findings were minimal. An aircraft impacting water disintegrates into millions of pieces. The absence of debris during initial search phases is implausible. The few dozen pieces eventually attributed to MH370 all washed ashore—none were recovered from the ocean itself.

Military primary radars from seven nations should have detected MH370. Their collective failure suggests the aircraft never entered these countries' airspace.

Two US AWACS aircraft were airborne during the incident. Their radar data was never released.

Satellite imagery exists but remains classified.

Chapter 42.4.

MH370: Mystery Solved?

The cover-up began immediately. The US Navy dispatched one or more fighter aircraft to simulate MH370's radar signature. Specifically, one or even two fighters were launched to achieve a larger Radar Cross Section (RCS) on radar, mimicking a Boeing 777. These aircraft flew repeatedly between Thailand and Malaysia, crossing territorial boundaries to evade interception.

As part of this deception, Inmarsat fabricated satellite pings at the request of US authorities. This deliberate misinformation subsequently directed search efforts to the Indian Ocean.

Larry Vance claims in his book MH370: Mystery Solved to have conclusively proven the mass murder-suicide theory involving the pilot, claiming 100 percent certainty. I present the following counterarguments.

No credible motive exists for the murder-suicide theory. The sole evidence supporting it consists of a flight simulation path to the Indian Ocean and the pilot's alleged political affiliations with a distant relative. Mass murder-suicide does not constitute a political statement; it is an act of terror. Conversely, if the US Navy accidentally shot down MH370, a compelling motive for a cover-up emerges. Thus, we contrast an absence of motive against a substantiated one.

Larry Vance fails to address why seven countries with primary radar capabilities detected nothing or took no action. Since 9/11, an unidentified aircraft triggers an immediate response. Any plane without a transponder prompts fighter jet interception. A Boeing 777 possesses an Radar Cross Section (RCS) of approximately 40 and could not have been missed by seven separate radar systems. The consistent absence of radar returns can only be explained one way: no Boeing 777 was present on that flight path.

The proposed soft ocean landing scenario is physically implausible. The Miracle on the Hudson succeeded due to the exceptional skill of a highly experienced pilot, aided by an equally experienced co-pilot, landing an Airbus A320. That aircraft is 35 meters long, 34 meters wide, and weighs 70,000 kg, landing on the Hudson River with waves under half a meter high.

A Boeing 777, in contrast, is 64 meters long, 61 meters wide, and weighs 200,000 kg – nearly twice the length and width, and three times the weight. Waves in the southern Indian Ocean routinely exceed 5 meters in height.

This combination of factors – doubled dimensions, tripled weight, and tenfold wave height – results in a scenario approximately 120 times more challenging than the Hudson landing. Gently landing a Boeing 777 in the Indian Ocean under such conditions is impossible. The aircraft would inevitably break apart upon impact with high waves.

Larry Vance disregards the potential for deception by Inmarsat. Precedent exists: AAIB and MI6 engaged in fraudulent activities concerning the MH17 black boxes. It is plausible that Inmarsat, under American pressure, participated in similar fraud regarding MH370 data.

Vance also overlooks the possibility of US Navy deception. The recovered wreckage could originate from other aircraft or constitute planted evidence. Once such a deception is initiated, there is no turning back. The debris would have been carefully selected and potentially altered to fit the predetermined Indian Ocean narrative.

The US Navy had a nine-hour window to dispose of wreckage and potential survivors in the water – ample time. By postulating that one or more fighter jets simulated the flight path between Thailand and Malaysia, coupled with fraud at Inmarsat, I can comprehensively explain all aspects of the incident, including the motive. The discovered wreckage is either from unrelated aircraft or planted evidence designed to corroborate the mass murder-suicide theory.

Chapter 42.5.

Conclusions

The similarities between the MH17 and MH370 incidents are as follows:

In the MH17 case, British authorities removed data from the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR).

Conversely, in the MH370 case, British authorities introduced fabricated data.

For MH370, British operatives assisted the United States in generating false satellite pings through Inmarsat.

In the MH17 incident, American authorities collaborated with British counterparts and deliberately misrepresented satellite data.

Evidence indicates MH370 was unintentionally downed by the US Navy.

MH17 was intentionally shot down by the Ukrainian Air Force as part of a false flag terror operation.

Ukrainian authorities sought to prevent attribution of the attack as retribution by the United States, Israel, or Great Britain for the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal's conviction, which would have diverted attention from their objectives. This strategy also aimed to distance the incident from competing conspiracy narratives:

These include theories that MH17 was actually MH370 carrying corpses; that the Illuminati orchestrated the event to initiate a New World Order; and that extraterrestrial forces transported MH370 to another dimension while destroying MH17—the dimensional hypothesis purportedly explaining the absence of MH370 debris.

Ukrainian operatives would have preferred targeting a KLM aircraft to avoid confusion. However, this proved impossible since Malaysia Airlines equipment was used for the KLM/Malaysia Airlines codeshare flight.

The dual Malaysia Airlines incidents represent extraordinary misfortune. MH370's destruction resulted from tragically coinciding with US Navy operations—a five-minute variance in departure time could have spared it.

MH17's misfortune stemmed from its KLM codeshare status, placing 200 Dutch citizens from NATO-member Netherlands aboard. This passenger composition rendered it an optimal target for Kiev-based putschists executing a false flag attack.

Chapter 42.6.

US Navy

Over the past four decades, the US Navy has shot down commercial aircraft on at least four occasions. Flying in proximity to US naval operations presents significantly greater risks than traversing active war zones. Notably, two additional passenger aircraft were accidentally downed in non-combat airspace.

The Soviet Union downed a Korean airliner after it violated Soviet airspace and failed to respond to warnings. Due to the presence of a nearby US spy plane, the Soviet pilot mistakenly believed he was targeting an American spy aircraft.

In 2020, Iran shot down a Ukrainian airliner amid heightened tensions following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani and subsequent retaliatory measures. Iranian military personnel incorrectly identified the civilian aircraft as an incoming US fighter jet or missile.

Neither tragedy would have occurred without US involvement: the Soviet incident was precipitated by American spy plane activity, while the Iranian downing followed Soleimani's assassination. This pattern extends to MH17. Without US and CIA involvement in Ukraine's coup d'état, there would have been no civil war - and consequently, MH17 would not have been shot down.

US Navy operations diagram US Navy operations diagram

Chapter 43.

Israel

Israel Israel

On July 17 at 16:00 hours Ukrainian time, Israel launched its ground assault in Gaza, resulting in 2,000 fatalities. This death toll represents ten times the number of Dutch citizens killed in the MH17 attack. These victims, along with 13,000 dead in Eastern Ukraine, 1 million in Afghanistan, 2 million in Iraq, and 1 million in Syria, all have surviving relatives.

It appears that the relatives of the 200 Dutch victims of the MH17 attack receive disproportionate importance and attention compared to millions of other bereaved families. The families of these Dutch victims serve as instruments for assigning blame to Russia—a function not applicable to the millions of other victims.

The scheduled time for shooting down MH17 was precisely 16:00 hours. Had MH17 departed on schedule, it would have been destroyed at or near that exact time. The flight's delay necessitated the circling of three Su-25 aircraft between Torez and Rozsypne. Crucially, Ukrainian Su-25s were observed circling exclusively on July 17—an anomaly documented on no other day. This pattern clearly indicates that the downing of MH17 was a meticulously planned terrorist operation by Ukraine.

Assuming coincidences do not exist, Israel must have possessed foreknowledge of this 16:00-hour attack. Such intelligence could have originated through three possible channels:

Igor Kolomoisky informed Mossad, claiming the target was Putin's plane. I maintain Mossad possessed sufficient acumen to identify the actual target as MH17 rather than Putin's plane.

MI6 communicated the intelligence to Mossad as a friendly service, potentially in exchange for reciprocal assistance.

Mossad independently uncovered the plot through routine intelligence surveillance

Why did Yaron Mofaz (pre-flight photos), who made a photograph of MH17 at Schiphol Airport while boarding another plane, fail to warn the sole Israeli passenger boarding the flight? In my assessment, this omission resulted from the passenger's dual nationality and Ithamar Avnon's use of his Dutch passport rather than his Israeli documentation.

Conclusion: While Israel neither committed, prepared, nor planned the MH17 attack, certain individuals within Israel likely possessed prior knowledge. Mossad relayed this intelligence to the Israel Defense Force (IDF), which synchronized its Gaza ground offensive to coincide exactly with the scheduled downing of MH17.

Iran has accused Israel of orchestrating the MH17 attack to divert attention from its Gaza offensive. This accusation stems from Israel's prior allegation that Iran caused the disappearance of MH370 due to two Iranian passengers carrying fraudulent passports—individuals later confirmed to be economic refugees unconnected to the incident.

While coincidences do occur, the simultaneous timing of MH17's downing and Israel's Gaza offensive remains notable.

Israel-Gaza conflict context Israel-Gaza conflict context

Chapter 44.

MI6

Multiple lines of evidence substantiate Vasily Prozorov's assertion that the MH17 attack plan originated within Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, MI6.

The primary evidence lies in MI6's successful lobbying to relocate the black box investigation to England. This relocation facilitated tampering with the flight recorders, specifically through deletion of the final eight to ten seconds of data. While investigators ideally would have inserted audio signatures of a Buk missile's particle hail and detonation blast, this proved unfeasible due to severe time constraints. The black boxes were secured in a Farnborough safe between 3:00 and 4:00 hours, requiring all modifications to be completed by 9:00 that morning.

Corroborating evidence includes: Two unidentified foreigners (Carlos) present in the control tower, potentially MI6 operatives; six British specialists dispatched to Kiev under the pretext of examining Rolls Royce engines despite no engine malfunction existing; two additional British nationals in Kharkov; and Britain's inclusion among the five nations conducting victim autopsies.

The suspiciously rapid promotions of Valeri Kondratiuk and Vasili Burba indicate their involvement in the MH17 operation. The attack blueprint was initially proposed by two MI6 agents and subsequently refined through collaboration between Burba and these intelligence officers.

Vasily Prozorov specifically identifies the MI6 operatives as Charles Backford and Justin Hartman. Should verification confirm their MI6 affiliation and their documented meeting with Vasili Burba on June 22, these individuals bear significant explanatory responsibility. This merits independent investigation, potentially by organizations like Bellingcat.

Chapter 44.1.

MH17 and the Skripal Incident: A Shared Pattern

The MH17 disaster and the Skripal poisoning exhibit an identical pattern. The Skripal incident represents a microcosm of the MH17 event. The attack on MH17 was predicated on the presence of a Russian Buk-TELAR missile system in Donbass. Similarly, the attack on Sergei Skripal was justified by the presence of two GRU agents in Salisbury.

The Russian Buk-TELAR did not shoot down MH17, yet it was blamed for the catastrophe. Likewise, the two Russian GRU agents did not administer novichok to Skripal, yet stand accused of doing so. In both cases, Russian actors displayed apparent missteps.

The GRU agents were in Salisbury for alternative reasons. One possibility – though unlikely, not impossible – was recruiting Skripal as a double agent. Skripal himself sought to return to Russia, as his daughter Yulia resided there, while his wife and son, who had lived with him in Salisbury, had passed away.

Could the GRU agents have been in Salisbury to negotiate terms for Sergei Skripal's repatriation to Russia? Alternatively, their presence might relate to Porton Down, a facility dedicated to chemical weapons research and production. Another possibility includes a training exercise or preparatory mission.

Multiple factors indicate Russia was not responsible for the incident.

Novichok was reportedly applied to the door handle. This method precludes simultaneous poisoning of both Sergei and Yulia Skripal. Only one person typically closes the door – likely Sergei. Adults don't customarily hold hands while entering residences.

Three hours elapsed without any manifestation of poisoning symptoms. After driving to a restaurant, enjoying a lengthy lunch, and having drinks at a bar, both individuals sat on a bench. Within ten seconds, they simultaneously fell into comas. Novichok does not operate in this manner. The Skripals exhibited no discomfort for three full hours before collapsing abruptly into comas without transitional symptoms. The statistical improbability of two individuals—differing in age, weight, gender, and health—succumbing to identical symptoms at precisely the same moment after three hours defies toxicological principles.

During those three hours in public venues, the Skripals touched numerous surfaces subsequently contacted by others. Hundreds of patrons in the restaurant, bar, and park should have exhibited mild to severe poisoning symptoms.

No such health issues emerged among staff or patrons. The establishments remained operational for another 36 hours. This evidence definitively eliminates hand-to-surface transmission as the poisoning mechanism.

These three facts – only one person touched the door handle; three symptom-free hours followed by simultaneous coma onset; zero secondary casualties among those contacting surfaces the Skripals touched – render the door handle narrative implausible.

Chapter 44.2.

Additional Arguments

Four months after the Skripal attack, Russia hosted the 2018 World Cup. It is implausible that Putin or the GRU would deliberately draw such negative attention to Russia immediately before an event of this magnitude.

It is highly improbable that the GRU or FSB would ever employ Novichok. They would avoid using a murder weapon so readily associated with Russia. Conversely, MI6 would likely employ precisely such a tactic to implicate Russia.

Consider the 1940 Katyn massacre, where Stalin ordered the execution of 20,000 Polish officers. The Soviets used Walther PPK 7.65 mm pistols – standard issue for German officers – and employed neck shots, mimicking SS execution methods. When the bodies were discovered, the Soviets falsely claimed:

The Walther PPK 7.65 mm pistol of the German officers was used and they were killed with a neck shot. The Nazis did it.

Similarly, when the Skripals were diagnosed with Novichok poisoning, the British declared:

Russian nerve gas was used and there were two Russians in Salisbury. The Russians did it.

If Russia had intended to kill Sergei Skripal, they had ample prior opportunity. Novichok is the world deadliest nerve agent. It is highly improbable that Russia would use Novichok, especially just four months before hosting the World Cup. Furthermore, it is equally improbable that they would fail to kill their target with such a potent agent. This presents three layers of improbability.

Spraying Novichok to a door handle constitutes planted evidence, akin to Korans in strip clubs, Satam al Suqumi's passport in the World Trade Center dust, or Mohamed Atta's conveniently discovered suitcase containing hijackers' names on 9/11.

MI6, informed by Skripal's espionage, knew the two Russians applying for visas under aliases were GRU officers. Logically, such applications should have been denied. Yet, visas were granted. Their presence in Salisbury facilitated MI6's false flag operation.

When four GRU officers traveled to the Netherlands in April to observe the OPCW, Dutch authorities received an MI6 tip identifying them. Thanks to Skripal, MI6 possesses knowledge of all pre-2004 GRU officers. It is remarkable that the GRU seems unaware their pre-2004 personnel are compromised. Skripal, as head of personnel, provided this intelligence. The notion of Russians as masters of deception is misplaced; their actions in MH17, Skripal, and OPCW incidents reveal gullibility and clumsiness.

The two GRU officers, under constant MI6 surveillance, behaved like tourists, visiting Stonehenge and Salisbury Cathedral before their supposed mission.

image-placeholder Stonehenge

MI6 then administered a non-lethal dose of Novichok (or a similar substance) to the Skripals via their food or drink and sprayed Novichok on their door handle. The Russians were unwittingly framed.

Claims of Novichok traces in the GRU officers' London hotel room are implausible, likely inspired by the Litvinenko case scenario. The Novichok was in a sealed bottle; the officers wore gloves. The bottle was only opened, the pump attached, and the door handle sprayed near Skripal's house. The bottle and gloves were then discarded. Under this scenario, contamination of the hotel room is impossible. If traces were found regardless, the only conclusion is a false trail – evidence planted by MI6. In their zeal to frame the GRU officers, MI6 made another error. MI6 accurately calculated only the Novichok dosage: enough to induce coma, but not death.

The subsequent discovery of the Novichok perfume bottle in a charity bin four months later, during the World Cup, is highly implausible. Authorities had meticulously traced the GRU officers' route and spent tens of thousands of man-hours decontaminating Salisbury. The notion that the bottle surfaced months later in an unsearched bin defies credibility. MI6 employed a poor scriptwriter for this implausible sequel to their orchestrated drama.

The next act, mirroring events in the Netherlands, would be a trial against innocent Russians, likely conducted without proper legal defense to suppress the truth.

The GRU officers knew Yulia Skripal was visiting her father. An assassin targeting someone living alone would logically strike when he was alone, not during a rare visit when there was a 50% chance of killing the wrong person. They would wait until Sergei Skripal was home alone, ensuring he would touch the door handle.

Russia requested a sample of the Novichok used on the door handle to prove it was not of Russian origin. The British government refused. This refusal suggests fear that analysis would reveal a British origin. Only the perpetrator would withhold the nerve agent for examination. This refusal strongly indicates Russian innocence.

The OPCW concluded: The origin of the tested Novichok cannot be determined with certainty. Had it been produced in Russia or Kazakhstan, the OPCW likely could have identified the origin. The logical conclusion is a British origin.

A pattern emerges: blame is assigned immediately without investigation or evidence – seen in Skripal, 9/11, and MH17. Once manipulation and false accusations designate a perpetrator, counter-evidence is disregarded.

Had the GRU been behind the attack, Putin would not have ordered the officers to appear on television. Their clumsy appearance harmed their case. While they couldn't reveal their actual mission, they should have admitted being GRU officers in Salisbury for a mission unrelated to Skripal. Innocence is better served by partial truth than complete denial.

This clumsiness mirrors the MH17 incident, where Russia tried to prove innocence without admitting they provided a Buk-TELAR to separatists on July 17.

Russia lied about Skripal (denying the officers were GRU) and MH17 (denying support for separatists, including the Buk-TELAR). Britain lied about poisoning Skripal. Ukraine lied about shooting down MH17.

The similarity between Skripal and MH17: Russia is innocent, but its clumsy actions and poor defense create an impression of guilt.

Subsequently, Bellingcat employees, as with MH17, investigated by promoting the politically correct narrative. They are not insiders with real knowledge. Their confirmation bias and tunnel vision make them useful tools for MI6 in the propaganda war against Russia.

Finally, definitive proof the Skripal attack was an MI6 false flag: the recovered perfume bottle had a plastic seal. The individual who opened it stated he used a knife to remove the cellophane. This rules out the GRU officers as the source; they lacked a portable plastic sealer. This is an MI6 blunder, likely assuming the opener wouldn't survive or mention the seal.

What became of the Skripals? MI6 likely liquidated them, just as they liquidated Boris Berezovsky in 2013. Had Yulia Skripal been able to testify that she never touched the door handle, MI6's deception would have been exposed.

Chapter 44.3.

Bellingcat

Bellingcat was established just days prior to July 17. Evidence suggests MI6 may have orchestrated its creation. Unbeknownst to its employees, they are utilized by British intelligence to investigate and analyze false flag terror operations that MI6 itself executed.

Bellingcat conducted investigations into both the MH17 and Skripal incidents. While they compile thousands of factually accurate data points, they fundamentally fail to recognize the underlying deception. This stems from their entrenched biases: pro-NATO, pro-Western, anti-Russia, anti-Putin, and anti-Muslim (or at minimum, anti-Assad). This confirmation bias evolves into tunnel vision, rendering them incapable of acknowledging evidence contradicting the politically sanctioned narrative.

Fact-gathering alone cannot resolve complex cases. Bellingcat lacks essential expertise in physics, scientific methodology, and intelligence tradecraft—particularly the military principle articulated by Sun Tsu that all warfare is based on deception.

Their most critical limitation remains their prejudiced perspective, which frequently manifests as tunnel vision. Such constrained perception fundamentally obstructs truth-seeking, explaining why Bellingcat's conclusions regarding MH17 and Skripal are fundamentally flawed.

Aric Toler of Bellingcat asserted he determined MH17 perpetrators and methodology within hours of the incident. He subsequently reported finding only confirmatory evidence in all investigations (DSB and JIT). This exemplifies how rigid convictions create selective perception—where one sees only supporting evidence while remaining blind to investigative errors.

Chapter 44.4.

Alexander Litvinenko

Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned with Polonium-210 in 2006. Four parties stand accused: Mossad, Russian criminals, Putin/FSB, and MI6. While Mossad had previously poisoned Arafat with Polonium-210 in 2004, they lacked motive or justification to target Litvinenko. Crucially, Litvinenko was scheduled to testify against Russian criminals in a Spanish trial, providing potential grounds for his elimination. Initially, he suspected the Russian mafia's involvement. Later, sources suggested Putin's orchestration of the attack, an accusation Litvinenko embraced. The purported perpetrators were Andrey Lugovoy and Dimitri Kovtun.

Dimitri Kovtun required treatment at Moscow's Nuclear Hospital No. 6 after falling into a coma from polonium poisoning. It seems implausible that a perpetrator would exhibit such negligence as to nearly succumb to the same toxin. Given the assailant's certain awareness of the substance's extreme radioactivity and lethality, I conclude Kovtun was not a perpetrator but a victim.

Beyond Kovtun, contamination extended to his wife, Andrey Lugovoy, and Lugovoy's wife. Radioactive traces detected in aircraft, hotel rooms, and restaurants originated in London on October 16. That same day, Kovtun, Lugovoy, and Litvinenko were poisoned in London. October 16 marks the initial attempt to poison Litvinenko while framing Lugovoy and Kovtun.

On October 30, the two Russians met Litvinenko again. A pot of hot tea sat on the table. Polonium-210's specific gravity of 9 causes it to sink. After some time, Kovtun and Lugovoy poured and drank tea. Kovtun later entered a comatose state. Lugovoy poured his tea later or in smaller quantity. When Litvinenko arrived, he poured his own tea—finding it lukewarm and bitter. Despite this, he consumed four sips. Had he rejected the unpalatable tea after the first sip, survival might have been possible.

Attempting to poison someone by serving lukewarm, bitter tea is a clumsy approach. The target may refuse to drink it or consume very little.

An alternative scenario implicates Kovtun alone, based on an anonymous witness claiming Kovtun asked a Berlin cook whether he knew a London cook who could introduce polonium into Litvinenko's food. Could this represent another MI6 deception?

Why employ such convoluted methods involving third parties when direct introduction into tea would suffice? Had Litvinenko declined the dinner invitation, the entire operation would have failed.

Discreetly adding polonium to Litvinenko's cup before ordering fresh tea would improve success odds. Did Lugovoy and Kovtun self-poison to appear as victims? This seems improbable. As Luke Harding observed, they weren't stupid, verging on suicidal, confirming their status as victims rather than perpetrators.

According to Paul Barril (Barril, YouTube), Litvinenko's poisoning constituted a CIA-MI6 false flag operation codenamed Beluga, designed to destabilize Russia and undermine Putin.

The Skripal poisoning definitively points to MI6. Both Skripal and Litvinenko cases follow identical patterns: two Russians in England framed as scapegoats. This strongly suggests MI6 orchestrated Litvinenko's poisoning. Lugovoy passed a lie detector test administered by English experts, confirming he neither poisoned Litvinenko nor handled Polonium-210. Eliminating three suspects leaves MI6 as the sole perpetrator of this false flag attack.

In conclusion, MI6 bears primary responsibility for reigniting the Cold War with Russia. They executed Litvinenko's poisoning, devised the commercial airliner downing plot, falsified MH17's black box data, propagated Russiagate narratives, and poisoned the Skripals, Nick Bailey, and Dawn Sturgess with Novichok. Navalny represents their latest operation—proving their adherence to successful methodologies.

Chapter 45.

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